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Abstract 
 
 
The military has been a symbol of nationhood and state control for the past two 
hundred years. As representatives of a society’s cultural values and political 
ambitions, the armed forces have traditionally been held within the confines of the 
modern state. Today, however, soldiers are expected to operate in the shadows of 
conflicts, drawing little attention to themselves and to their actions; they are 
physically and emotionally secluded from a civilian population whose governments, 
especially in the ‘West’, are proceeding to an unprecedented wave of demilitarisation 
and military budget cuts. Simultaneously, these same governments are increasingly 
opening their armies to foreign nationals and outsourcing military operations to 
private military and security companies. These experiments with the hybridisation of 
the armed forces have effectively changed the face of national security. 
This thesis explores the impact of hybridisation on the values, cohesion and 
effectiveness of the armed forces by comparing and contrasting the experiences of 
the French Foreign Legion, the private military companies in Angola, and the 
merging of private contractors and American troops in Iraq. Mercenaries have been 
used as a foreign policy tool to improve the strategic impact of national armies. As 
non-state actors, however, they are unaccountable to the hiring state and beyond the 
control of the military establishment. It is both timely and important to understand the 
experiences of soldiers and mercenaries fighting together in modern battlefields as 
this appears to be the trend for the future, and has a direct impact on civil-military 
relations, military effectiveness, and consequently on the overall security of the state. 
The study concludes that, although mercenaries and private security companies can 
contribute to the military effort and may be a useful foreign policy tool, the impact 
that these non-state actors have on the national army must be taken into 
consideration to avoid weakening the state’s armed forces. Furthermore, the 
differences between warriors of various nationalities and allegiances, and the 
difficulties in coordinating public-private partnerships in joint military operations 
undermine the legitimacy of the state – and by default its policies – by weakening the 
cohesiveness and morale of the national armed forces and by alienating the citizen 
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and the soldier. Results can be used to inform national governments and the armed 
forces in their inevitable process of hybridising their troops with foreigners and 
private contractors in the quest to answer the budgetary and moral concerns of their 
country.  
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PART I: Conceptual Framework 
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Introduction 
 
The military has been a symbol of nationhood and state control for the past two 
hundred years. As representatives of a society’s cultural values and political 
ambitions, the armed forces have traditionally been held within the confines of the 
modern state. The recent dissonance between societal expectations and foreign 
policy objectives, however, has led to experiments with the hybridisation of the 
armed forces which have changed the face of national security. Today, soldiers are 
expected to operate in the shadows of conflicts, drawing little attention to themselves 
and to their actions; they are physically and emotionally secluded from a civilian 
population whose governments, especially in the ‘West’, are processing to an 
unprecedented wave of demilitarisation and military budget cuts1. Simultaneously, 
these same governments are increasingly opening their armies to foreign nationals 
and outsourcing military operations to private military and security companies.  
This shift away from state-dominated defence policies is evident around the world: 
private contractors hired by the U.S. Department of Defence (among others) make 
up “the largest occupying force” in Iraq and in Afghanistan where, as of March 2009, 
“68,197 contractors compared to 52,300 uniformed military personnel” were 
supporting the U.S. military campaign2. In the past three decades, the governments 
of Papua New Guinea, Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone have all turned to foreign 
private military companies to train their armies and supplement their troops against 
rebel insurgencies. Furthermore, it is rumoured that in 2004 and again in 2011, 
former President Laurent Gbagbo called upon Liberian mercenaries to preserve his 
rule in Côte d’Ivoire3. Similarly, former Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was 
said to have recruited between 5,000 and 10,000 principally Touareg mercenaries 
from Mali, Niger, Chad and Algeria to quell local uprisings that challenged his right to 
                                            
1
Nick Witney, "How to Stop the Deminilitarisation of Europe," no. 40 (2011), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR40_DEMILITARISATION_BRIEF_AW.pdf.Nick Witney, "How to Stop the Demilitarisation of 
Europe,"4(2011), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR40_DEMILITARISATION_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 
2
Molly Dunigan, Victory for Hire : Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford Security Studies, 2011), loc279. 
3
Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, "Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the 
Ecowas Region,,"(2005).AFP, "120 Civils Tués Par Miliciens Et Mercenaires Pro-Gbagbo," La Libre Belgique 
2011. 
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rule4. Even China has begun to use private security companies “staffed with ‘retired’ 
members of China’s security forces”5 to provide security to its commercial operations 
in conflict zones, notably in the Sudan and other African countries6. This contravenes 
a two hundred year tradition of military nationalism and patriotism, during which the 
soldier has consolidated his identity and function as a symbol of security and a 
representative of the nation-state.  
Despite contemporary societal distaste for mercenaries7, mercenarism, defined here 
as the act of selling one’s military skills, is the world’s second oldest profession after 
prostitution8. Mercenaries were used in armies throughout history from the Greeks 
who were notorious as the best mercenaries of their epoch9 to the Italian Condottieri, 
the Swiss Pikemen, the German Landsknecht, the Gurkhas fighting in the British 
army and the famous French Foreign Legion. Regardless of claims that normative 
biases against mercenaries have restricted their use in recent military history10, 
practically speaking, these foreign combatants have never really disappeared from 
warfare and have fought side by side with state troops in battles worldwide, although 
not without facing certain obstacles.    
On the other hand, the corporate form of private military companies is a step away 
from the historical use of mercenaries. As contractors and soldiers share the 
battlefield against a common enemy, one actor remains accountable to the firm and 
the other to the state. This is clearly a new development in military history. Even 
though these mercenaries are most often former soldiers11, emotionally and 
physically conditioned by the state, as contractors, their work takes place in an 
                                            
4
 Many news reports corroborate this event, although credible sources argue that the mercenaries used by 
Gbagbo and Gaddafi had personal and tribal allegiances towards them. Therefore were returning to fight for the 
Presidents because of these personal and historical ties, and not solely for monetary gain. Jovo Martinovic, 
"Gaddafi's Fleeing Mercenaries Describe the Collapse of the Regime," Time World, 24/08/2011 2011. 
5
David Pilling, "The Trials of a Reluctant Superpower," Financial Times, 02/02/2012 2012. 
6
 Although there is little documentation on this matter, rumours of Chinese security personnel on mining and oil 
sites in Africa were confirmed repeatedly in interviews. 
7
 Machiavelli is possibly the best-known critic of mercenaries, accusing them of being “useless and dangerous”, 
“disunited, ambitious, insubordinate, treacherous, insolent among friends, cowardly before foes, and without fear 
of God or faith with man”  iccol   achiavelli and  . H. Thompson, The Prince, Unabridged. ed., Dover Thrift 
Editions (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), 31. 
8
Philippe Chapleau, Les Mercenaires; De L'antiquite a Nos Jours (Rennes, France: Editions OUEST-FRANCE, 
2006). 
9
 Alexander the Great made a point of killing every Greek mercenary whom he came across as he considered 
them to be the biggest threat to his military campaigns.  
10
Sarah V. Percy, Mercenaries : The History of a Norm in International Relations (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
11
 Ex-SAS, US SOF, SADF, former soldiers from the Israeli army and most recently from the ex-Yugoslavian 
army and the Colombian army- Chapleau, Les Mercenaires; De L'antiquite a Nos Jours. 
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entirely different setting. The institutions of private companies function very 
differently from the state’s national armed forces: military hierarchy, discipline, 
accountability and legal codes that are unique to national armies are not replicated in 
the private sector. This suggests that the warrior identity is no longer anchored to the 
realm of the state which traditionally provides the moral framework in which soldiers 
operate12. Values that are intrinsic to the warrior identity, such as patriotism and 
sacrifice cannot be expected from combatants who are risking their lives solely for 
monetary gain and are accountable to an abstract hierarchy of unaccountable 
shareholders. 
The immediate purpose of this thesis is to investigate the hybridisation of the armed 
forces and its impact on the values, cohesion and effectiveness of the armed forces. 
In order to do this, three models of hybridisation in modern armies are examined:    
1) the integration of foreigners into the French Foreign Legion; 2) the use of private 
military companies as support, training and combatant forces in Africa; and 3) the 
merging of private contractors and American troops in operations in Iraq. The study 
compares and contrasts the ways that mercenaries have been used to improve the 
strategic impact of national armies and highlights the differences between soldiers 
and non-state warriors as providers of security. It is both timely and important to 
understand the experiences of soldiers and mercenaries fighting together in modern 
battlefields as this appears to be the trend for the future and has a direct impact on 
civil-military relations, military effectiveness, and consequently on the overall security 
of the state. 
This study concludes that although mercenaries and private security companies can 
contribute to the military effort and may be a useful foreign policy tool, the impact 
that these non-state actors have on the national army must be taken into 
consideration to avoid weakening the state’s armed forces. Furthermore, the 
differences between warriors of various nationalities and allegiances, and the 
difficulties in coordinating public-private partnerships in joint military operations 
undermine the legitimacy of the state – and by default its policies – by weakening the 
cohesiveness and morale of the national armed forces and by alienating the citizen 
and the soldier.  
                                            
12
Christopher Coker, Ethics and War in the 21st Century, Lse International Studies (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
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A working definition of mercenaries 
 
The root of the word mercenary is mercis, which is Latin for merchandise. 
Mercenaries are identified as traders, men who sell their skills in exchange for 
financial or material gain. Today, the legal working definition of mercenaries is 
outlined in Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, also known as Protocol I:  
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar 
ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by 
a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a 
member of its armed forces. 
 
In summary, mercenaries are defined in terms of their (a, b) willingness to take part 
directly in the hostilities of an armed conflict, (c) motivation for private gain and 
material compensation, (d, e, f) and their foreignness to the territory, the national 
armed forces and any state participating in the conflict. Furthermore, point (c) 
emphasises that mercenaries must be offered compensation equal to or “in excess 
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed 
forces of that party”. This legal definition13, like any other, is of course a political 
compromise and is developed in relation to society’s contemporary preference for 
                                            
13
 Although there exist many other academic definitions for mercenaries Percy, Mercenaries : The History of a 
Norm in International Relations., P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors : The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 
Updated ed., Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).Deborah D. Avant, 
The Market for Force : The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). Only the legal definition is practically relevant to policy and law-making. 
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the citizen-soldiers and professional armies of nationals that have dominated the 
modern battlefield.  
Despite international efforts to regulate mercenaries and private combatants, no 
person has ever been successfully tried as a mercenary under international law, 
although several men have been fined or imprisoned for being mercenaries under 
national laws in South Africa and Zimbabwe – after having confessed to carrying out 
this profession, however, not upon trial and verdict. Doug Brooks, the president of 
the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA now ISOA) has criticised the 
U. . definition for being too broad: “if you look at the U. . definition of a mercenary, 
it’s a joke (...) and somebody said ‘if anyone’s ever convicted of being a mercenary 
under the U.N. law, they should be shot and their lawyer should be shot with them 
because they were incompetent’”14. The vacuum of legal and moral framework 
enables mercenaries to behave in any way they wish without risk of serious sanction.  
For policy and research-orientated purposes, academics have developed various 
definitions to characterise the typology of mercenaries as a separate category of 
combatant. Peter Singer distinguishes mercenaries by their foreignness to the 
conflict, their independence from the national force and the limitations of the 
contractual ties, their short-term economic motivations, the method of recruitment 
and organisation, and the nature of their services15. Janice Thomson, who published 
her doctoral thesis on the historical use of mercenaries by the state, defines 
mercenarism as “the practices of enlisting in and recruiting for a foreign army”16, and 
entirely leaves out the motive argument on the basis that “individual motives are 
impossible to determine”17. Sarah Percy, on the other hand, focuses exclusively on 
the financial motives of mercenaries and their lack of personal interest in the conflict: 
“mercenaries are morally problematic because they cannot provide a plausible 
justification for killing; they cannot point to a cause in the service of which they fight, 
aside from financial gain”18. The Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli corroborates 
this point by defining mercenaries by their lack of motivation in combat: “they have 
                                            
14
Nick Bicanic and Jason Bourque, "Shadow Company," (Purpose Films, 2006). 
15
Singer, Corporate Warriors : The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 43. 
16
Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns : State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early 
Modern Europe, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 27. 
17
Dunigan, Victory for Hire : Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness, 15. 
18
Percy, Mercenaries : The History of a Norm in International Relations, 54. 
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no tie or motive to keep them in the field beyond their paltry pay, in return for which it 
would be too much to expect them to give their lives”19. 
Despite the various definitions contradicting and completing one another, the only 
one that is realistically effective and that represents a political and therefore 
normative consensus is the legal definition as described in the Geneva Conventions. 
While Doug Brooks is correct in claiming that reuniting all the conditions of Article 47 
in order to identify a mercenary is a legal problem, this definition can nonetheless be 
useful for an academic purpose. There is no single category of mercenaries, nor is it 
necessary to create just one. Mercenaries can be any combination of clauses (a), 
(c), (d), (e), and (f)20: they can be foreigners or nationals; they can fight for a 
government, for a company, or for private individuals; they may be motivated by 
money, by the adventure, or by a feeling of solidarity to a cause. None of these 
attributes are necessarily inclusive or exclusive of the others. In fact, the most 
important definitive characteristic of a mercenary is that he fights in wars but he is 
not a soldier – that is, he is not an agent of the state. This is a crucial distinction as 
the international community has established a categorical and legal difference 
between mercenaries and soldiers in Protocol I of the Geneva Convention that 
criminalises mercenarism and refuses mercenaries the legal protections given to 
soldiers in warfare:  
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. 
 
This provision in the rules of law implies that men who are considered to be 
mercenaries are inferior to soldiers and should not be treated with equal 
consideration with regards to their rights. Although this is a legal condition, it reflects 
a normative prejudice that men who go to combat, allegedly for money, in a territory 
or for a cause that is not considered as their own, are to be considered illegal and 
amoral. This perception and the consequent treatment of mercenaries inform both 
their own behaviour and their interactions with the soldiers with whom they are 
engaging on the battlefield. 
Research methodology 
                                            
19
Machiavelli and Thompson, The Prince, 31. 
20
It is self evident that (b) – direct participation in hostilities – will be a necessary condition to qualify as a 
mercenary. 
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The objective of this study is to investigate the hybridisation of the armed forces and 
its impact on the values, cohesion and effectiveness of the armed forces with the 
view of strengthening the national security of hiring states. This thesis is broken 
down into three parts: the first lays out the conceptual framework on soldiers and 
mercenaries within a historical context; the second explores three empirical case-
studies of hybridisation; the third offers a synthesis of the findings and concluding 
thoughts.  
A comparative approach between case-studies is used as the principle analytical tool 
to study the effect of hybridisation on the armed forces. As “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context”21, the case-
study approach has the advantage of providing a “detailed examination of an aspect 
of a historical episode to develop or to test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events”22. The three countries analysed differ in geography, in 
regime-type and in military objectives, which, by comparing and contrasting their 
experiences with the hybridisation of the armed forces, can inform the debate by 
highlighting common difficulties and advantages that they each faced in their military 
experiments using deductive reasoning. These cases were chosen deliberately to 
show the experiences of using mercenaries in countries with different military 
traditions and political regimes. While each case is different, failed and successful 
strategies can be observed in all countries and, with hindsight, can inform the 
intellectual community on how to, or not to, integrate foreign and private soldiers into 
the armed forces. 
All examples used in this study share an experience of military hybridisation, either 
by merging state soldiers with foreign combatants or with private contractors. Data 
for these case-studies was collected from both primary and secondary sources: 
interviews were conducted in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town, in Erbil 
(Northern Iraq), in France, Belgium and in London. Documentaries and movies 
offered a visual experience to the research, whereas multiple think tank reports and 
                                            
21
Robert K Yin, "Case Study Research, Design and Methods," Sage Publications (2003a). 
22
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). 
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newspaper articles provided the perspective of the intellectual community and the 
experience of foreign correspondents on the ground. 
Interviews with mercenaries, security experts and military personnel, the use of 
archives and select biographies reflect the personal experiences of individuals with 
the hybridisation of military personnel and non-state actors. Sometimes stories 
contradicted one another and as far as possible the different versions have been 
integrated into this narrative to highlight the various interpretations of events. Access 
to political leaders was limited so therefore the case-studies and conceptual chapters 
also include extensive secondary sources who have interviewed many of the 
personalities who could not be reached for this study. The results of this investigation 
were tested orally against industry experts who appeared to confirm the validity of 
the concluding observations. 
 
Synopsis 
 
This thesis assesses the use of ‘mercenaries’ by states, and their integration into the 
national armed forces as part of a new hybridisation trend of contemporary armies. 
Chapter 1 explores the historical use and value of mercenaries in warfare prior to 
what  arshall Berman coins as ‘Classical  odernity’23. Mercenaries are shown to 
pre-date soldiers, and were used by warlords and sovereigns to pursue their 
territorial ambitions. The organisation of mercenaries into a military force was first 
put forth by the Swiss cantons which subsequently hired out these combatants to 
sovereigns across Europe. Private military entrepreneurship emerged during the 
Hundred Years War with the creation of companies of mercenaries. The White 
Company was most notable as the precursor of modern private military companies, 
contracting military, protection and intelligence services to the private citizens and 
sovereigns of Italy’s city-states. The fashion of using mercenaries, however, was 
challenged by the French Revolution in 1789 and the ensuing rise of nationalism that 
advocated in favour of citizen-soldiers as the more dependable, desirable and 
                                            
23
Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air : The Experience of Modernity (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1982), 16-17. 
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controllable combatant. Motivations, morals and military virtues are subsequently 
explored, and reveal that mercenaries are not solely motivated to go to war by the 
lure of profit, and they do not necessarily make worse combatants than soldiers. 
Nonetheless, their continued lack of accountability and restraint distinguishes them 
legally, morally, and psychologically from state-warriors.   
Chapter 2 focuses on the soldier, and presents his rise to prominence as the state’s 
chosen combatant. The advantages of a standing army of citizen-soldiers were 
already recognised by Aristotle and Machiavelli. They became the norm, however, in 
the nineteenth century, following France’s Revolutionary Wars and the military 
reforms of the Prussian army. The military institution came to represent the values, 
strength and aspirations of the state. Civic-militarism, duty and sacrifice were instilled 
in the population through massive propaganda campaigns and through education. 
Patriotism and nationalism were perceived as necessary attributes defining the moral 
and military value of the soldier who in turn received honour and recognition from his 
society. Obedience was insured through draconian training inspiring blind obedience, 
and a system of military courts that punished deviants and discouraged defiance. 
These measures guaranteed the accountability and performance of the soldier. The 
chapter emphasises the differences between mercenaries, who elect to join a conflict 
and remain outside of state structures, and soldiers, who are bound to and by the 
state. The attitudes, motivations and performance of these combatants on the 
battlefields are affected by their relationship to the conflict. While patriotism and civic 
duty may have motivated young men to join the armed forces, the gruesome realities 
of combat strip the soldiers of any idealistic sentiments, leaving them to fight ‘for one 
another’, pushed forward by an esprit de corps developed through training and 
experience. The chapter concludes with a glimpse of a changing security 
environment in which the identity of the citizen-soldier is shaken by the gradual loss 
of military values and civic duty in Western societies, creating a new opportunity for 
private combatants on the battlefield.  
Chapter 3 looks at the French Legionnaire as a quintessential example of the 
merging of military values and mercenary attributes.  It traces the military experiment 
of creating a regiment of foreigners from its difficult start as a funnel for immigrants 
and undesirables, to its successes and failures in the colonial and post-colonial 
military campaigns. Despite initial obstacles and national resentment, the Foreign 
11 
 
Legion progressively became the striking arm of the French colonial project, and the 
pride of the French army with its own international reputation. The chapter also 
explores the identity and motivations of the men who join as legionnaires and the 
training and disciplinary system of the Legion, with the aim of understanding the 
process by which these mercenaries were transformed into respectable and effective 
‘soldiers’. As a mercenary unit, the Legion suffers from above average desertion and 
suicide rates. Its members, all volunteers, have come from extreme backgrounds, 
ranging from criminals to intellectuals. Despite their differences, legionnaires exhibit 
unusual group cohesion and loyalty to the Foreign Legion which has played out on 
the battlefield to create a fierce and dependable force that carries out its orders, 
facilitating French foreign policy. The success of the Foreign Legion lies not only in 
its mythical reputation and stringent training and disciplinary program, but also in its 
integration into the French Armée de terre where it remains under direct French legal 
and political control, ensuring the accountability of the legionnaires.  
Africa has perhaps been the theatre with the most exposure to mercenaries.  
Chapter 4 outlines the continent’s experience with mercenaries and private military 
companies. It begins by analysing the impact of tribalism, colonialism and post-
colonialism on the identity of the armed forces and on their relations with the civilian 
government and the population. The security environment of post-colonial Africa, 
with its weak institutions and unreliable armies created a vicious circle of violence, 
fuelling conflict and hindering socio-economic and political development. 
Mercenaries have subsequently been hired by secessionist states, ousted leaders, 
and independent entrepreneurs to illegally challenge the legitimacy of the 
government. Private armies of mercenaries gave their employer a military advantage 
that went beyond their capabilities, and could potentially turn the tides of war, 
threaten the establishment or challenge the status quo. Consequently, African 
leaders have been particularly pro-active both in passing legislation condemning 
mercenaries, and in hiring these non-state actors when ‘necessary’ to the survival of 
their regime. The demand for private and foreign forces led to the creation of private 
military and security companies24. The use of these non-state combatants, however, 
was particularly contentious with the national armed forces, because of their 
foreignness, lack of accountability and interest in the state. By using Angola as a 
                                            
24
Avant, The Market for Force : The Consequences of Privatizing Security. 
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case-study, this chapter describes the particular attributes and traditions of the 
national armed forces in a weak and conflicted state and highlights the impact of 
hiring a private military company on the identity and military effectiveness of the 
national army. The successes and failures of this security model are explored in a 
wider context of military traditions and show that while privatisation might appear as 
a short-term solution to civil conflict, it is fraught with difficulties and can ultimately be 
damaging in the long-term to the identity, loyalty and hierarchical structure of the 
national armed forces. 
The emergence of private and foreign combatants as a key component of U.S. 
military strategy has created new opportunities in U.S. foreign policy, and 
exacerbated old tensions between non-state actors and the professional armed 
forces. Chapter 5 explores the rise of the private military sector within the context of 
privatisation and outsourcing that already characterised U.S. domestic policies. 
Using Iraq as a case-study for America’s experiments in military public-private 
partnerships, the chapter outlines the advantages and difficulties of hybridising the 
armed forces and focuses on civil-military relations, issues of command and control, 
overlapping identities and blurred hierarchies. The massive outsourcing of logistics, 
tech support, and even military tasks in the last decade has changed the face of 
security in Iraq, with contractors now outnumbering regular troops. Military 
operations are increasingly supported or even replaced by private military and 
security firms, leading to a difficult cohabitation between the two actors that can 
adversely affect the war effort. The lack of accountability remains an obstacle, 
however, impeding the integration of contractors as a regular feature of 
contemporary warfare. Contractors remain beyond the control of the state, and as 
such are viewed with justified suspicion by the population and military personnel, 
regardless of their perceived usefulness to the ambitions of the government. 
The objective of Chapter 6 is to evaluate the relationship between state control and 
the hybridisation of the armed forces through the evidence brought up in the three 
case-studies of the French Foreign Legion, African mercenaries, and PMCs in Iraq. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the changing role of the state and its 
reliance upon armed combatants to establish legitimacy and hold on to power. It 
analyses the use and manipulation of norms by the state, and shows how these 
norms can be adapted to suit the purposes of the ruler, particularly regarding the 
13 
 
waging of wars. As the state’s need for combatants exceeds its domestic supply and 
capabilities, it has turned to foreigners, mercenaries and corporations to meet its 
demand, and has easily justified this shift to its citizens. By outsourcing its military 
needs to non-state actors, however, the state has reached a new zenith of power, 
where it can shift moral and legal responsibility away from itself and evade the 
system of democratic control that the national army claims to safeguard. Taking into 
account the lack of accountability that characterises non-state actors, the chapter 
concludes that mercenaries who are hired by a state uphold the power and centrality 
of said state, despite accusations to the contrary. On the other hand, they also 
threaten established norms of democratic accountability by giving the state the ability 
to act beyond the will of the people, and undermine the morale and ultimately the 
strength and performance of the national armed forces. 
The final chapter revisits the empirical evidence within the context of the conceptual 
framework and brings together the general lessons that can potentially inform 
politicians and military decision makers.  
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1. Mercenaries  
 
The mercenary’s role in war is fraught with controversy, illegitimacy and 
condemnation. Yet mercenaries have been hired time and again to carry out a 
military objective for their respective employers. Not unlike the soldier, the 
mercenary is a romantic, lone figure who has caught the imagination of the world 
and inspired countless tales of prowess and intrepidity. The mercenary is the 
ultimate adventurer, rootless and independent, whose ability and willingness to kill 
for others comes at price. But he is a horribly mutated type of combatant; his 
isolation, fearlessness, apparent lack of morals and constant presence in the wars of 
the world have made him into a misunderstood, magnetic figure that is both the 
embodiment and antithesis of humanity. Mercenaries are not soldiers, and this 
distinction is probably the root of the difficulties that define the relationship between 
these two combatants on the battlefield.  
This chapter aims to present a comprehensive picture of the function of mercenaries 
in warfare. It briefly covers historic case studies where mercenaries have played a 
decisive role in the projection of their employer’s domestic and foreign policies: from 
the development of Greek mercenaries into the most notorious force of their era to 
the mercenary revolt that led to the fall of the city-state of Carthage, the use of Swiss 
Pikemen in the armies of Medieval Europe, and the success of the White Company 
in Italy. The narrative then turns to the rise of nationalism in the eighteenth century 
and its impact on military and political consciousness which changed the ways that 
mercenaries have been perceived and employed. Modern objections to mercenaries 
and mercenarism are subsequently explored and critically evaluated against a 
thorough psychological profiling of these non-state combatants. This chapter 
therefore provides a historical and political snapshot of mercenaries and serves as a 
reference for analysing their similarities and differences with the more conventional 
soldiers. 
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The historical value of mercenaries 
 
Despite the normative assumption that mercenaries are intrinsically corrupt and 
should have no role in war, these rogue combatants actually pre-date soldiers in 
their historic place on the battlefield, hence their reputation as the second oldest 
professionals in the world1. Historian Anthony Mockler makes the case that 
mercenaries only became disreputable with the “growth of the nation-state in 
Europe” and “the introduction of universal conscription”2. Historian Azar Gat refers to 
this paradox as the “non-state armed bands in a state environment”3, where 
mercenaries challenged the ambitions and goals of the new political system.  
Even so, until the nineteenth century, European states mainly conducted their 
foreign policies through non-state subsidiaries: mercenaries, mercantile companies, 
and privateers4. No history of warfare would be complete without an expansive 
description of the role played by mercenaries. Indeed, hiring mercenaries was the 
norm, and not the exception, as powerful states preferred to outsource their security 
requirements to foreigners rather than send their active citizens to war.  Most 
sovereigns required their citizens to participate economically in the development of 
the state and contribute to the tax base. They were also averse to arming their 
subjects in case these chose to revolt against the powers that be. Consequently, the 
peasantry were burdened with labour-intensive work, merchants maintained a 
healthy repugnance for war, and although the elite classes abided by a certain 
noblesse oblige, they were averse to expose their sons to real danger. Sovereigns 
therefore turned to mercenaries as a practical solution to enforce their rule through 
the use of organised armies and to project their power by means of violence. Even 
where rulers maintained a force of citizen-soldiers, these were often too small to both 
secure the state and travel abroad to invade and control new territories. Ambitious 
leaders subsequently began to recruit men from neighbouring states to complete 
their armies.  
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Early mercenaries were rarely organised. They entered into the employ of another 
state as individuals, and were subsequently grouped with other individual 
mercenaries to form a battalion. Entire armies functioned on this model. Mercenaries 
sometimes had a contract, but were generally considered free men and could break 
the contract at any time. They had to supply their weapons and armour themselves 
and were often responsible for their own subsistence, which further pushed them 
towards pillage, theft, desertion and rebellion. 
 
Ancient mercenaries 
 
The oldest known case of foreign military assistance can be dated 3,000 years ago 
to Ancient Egypt. The Egyptian population was employed in agriculture and building 
monuments for the glory of their rulers, and hence was neither trained nor available 
to fight wars. The Egyptian Empire had to resort to recruiting warriors from the 
regions bordering its territory to fight its wars. Therefore to expand their empire, the 
Pharaohs Sesostris III (1842-1191BC) and Ramses II (1279-1213BC) hired Nubians, 
Palestinian and Syrian mercenaries. Greek and Asian mercenaries served in 
Psammetique I’s army and expelled the Ethiopians and Assyrians from Egypt. In the 
subsequent empires, Egypt incorporated foreign soldiers from its conquered lands 
into the army: the Pharaoh Apries is believed to have hired an army of 30,000 
mercenaries, largely made up of Greeks who were the most sought after warriors in 
Asia Minor. Indeed, traces of Greek hoplites dating from the sixth century BC can be 
found on the Colosses of Abou Simbel, a testimony to the large presence of 
foreigners in the Egyptian armies5. 
The notoriety of the Greek mercenaries is engraved in the famous Expedition of the 
Ten Thousand. In 401BC, the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger enrolled more than 
13,000 Greek mercenaries to fight against Artaxerxes, the King of Persia. The 
mercenaries were hired to travel from Sardinia to Babylon merely to fulfil the 
personal ambitions of the prince who was eventually killed in Counaxa6. Under the 
                                            
5
Chapleau, Les Mercenaires; De L'antiquite a Nos Jours, 9. 
6
 This decisive battle took place in the territory of Iraq.
17 
 
leadership of Xenophon, and against all odds, the mercenaries retreated back to 
Greek territory, pillaging the countryside on the way. Xenophon recorded the events 
in his book Anabasis, which inspired Alexander the Great in his expedition into 
Persia. The  acedonian King “strongly reinforced (his army) with mercenary 
contingents recruited from the surplus of soldiers left unemployed by the Greek 
wars”7 and marched over 44,000 mercenaries into Asia Minor in 334BC. He also was 
infamous for massacring any Greek mercenary he found fighting for the ‘barbarians’ 
on the other side: “Alexander may have exterminated between 15,000 and 18,000 
Greeks after the battle (of Granicus) was won. (...) Alexander would have to kill like 
no other Westerner before him to achieve his political ends, and he would be forced 
to eliminate thousands of Greeks, who for either greed or principle were willing to 
fight him in service of the Persian king”8. Through their campaigns and military 
successes, Greek mercenaries acquired a reputation that transcends history: “the 
murderous Hellenic-inspired armies – the Ten Thousand, the Macedonians under 
Alexander the Great, and the mercenaries of Pyrrhus – possessed of superior 
technology and shock tactics, would run wild from Southern Italy to the Indus River”9 
and determine the fate of battles for centuries.  
 
Carthage and the mercenary wars 
 
On the other hand, the case-study and eventual defeat of Carthage by the Romans 
in the third century BC offers the first signs of what would become a tradition of civic-
militarism – “the notion that those who vote must also fight to protect the 
commonwealth, which in the exchange had granted them rights”10 – and early signs 
of a declining reliance on mercenaries. Carthage was a rich city-state based on the 
coast of what is now known as Tunisia. It was also the most important rival to the 
expansionist ambitions of the Roman Republic, and the two powers confronted each 
other in three successive wars that became known as the Punic Wars. At the time, 
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the Roman Legion was a standing army made up of Roman citizens, whereas the 
Carthaginian city-state was a heterogeneous amalgamation of nationalities11, and 
the army was complemented by at least 40,000 mercenaries12. The rivalry between 
the two powers reflects the political choices and military effectiveness of hiring 
mercenaries (on the Carthaginian side) versus enlisting citizen-soldiers (on the 
Roman side). 
The First Punic War lasted 20 years, from 264 to 241 BC, at the end of which Rome, 
with her citizen army, was victorious and imposed heavy reparations on Carthage 
who was unable to pay her mercenaries returning from battle. Predictably, the 
mercenaries assembled together and seized Tunis, demanding payment for their 
services and refusing to negotiate with the Carthaginian representatives. The 
mercenaries were further supported by the Libyans, led by leader Matho, who were 
also rebelling against the oppressive rule of Carthage. Although the revolt was 
eventually crushed by the Carthaginian General Hamilcar Barca13, distracted by her 
internal problems, Carthage was unable to prevent Roman expansionism and thus 
lost her territories of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica – which enabled the finalisation of 
Roman monopoly in the Mediterranean (her Mare Nostrum). The mercenary wars 
had important ramifications for the balance of power in the region. Carthage’s 
eventual defeat in the Punic Wars, according to Machiavelli, is largely to blame on 
the mercenary revolt, which took up resources and weakened the state and its 
military branch: “Carthaginians at the close of their first war with Rome were well-
nigh ruined by their hired troops, although these were commanded by Carthaginian 
citizens”14. 
Historian Victor Davis Hanson stresses this point by stating that the civic-militarism 
of Rome facilitated a continuity of military campaigns and victories that goes beyond 
its army’s defeat at the Battle of Cannae in 216BC. Indeed, the lesson for Hanson is 
that “students of war must never be content to learn how men fight a battle, but must 
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always ask why soldiers fight as they do, and what ultimately the battle is for”15; by 
hiring mercenaries, Carthage might have increased her military power temporarily, 
but at huge risk and high cost as these mercenaries were unreliable and ended up 
rebelling against the hiring state, causing more problems. Rome on the other hand 
was able to recover from her losses through a campaign of mass mobilisation of 
citizens: “every able-bodied man in the city was to be drafted into the home militia”16. 
The mobilisation of Roman citizens and the Republican tradition of citizen-warriors 
eventually led to Carthage’s defeat in 146BC, and Roman rule over the civilised 
world for a further 500 years. Ultimately, the end of the Roman Empire is attributed 
to the loss of its tradition of civic-militarism and its growing military dependence on 
barbarian troops which made up the bulk of Roman forces by 476AD, date that 
historians mark as the end of Antiquity17. The fall of the Roman Empire provoked a 
return to mercenary armies in Western Europe, but not without leaving a legacy of a 
warrior identity and a tradition of civic-militarism that would re-emerge in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century.  
 
The Swiss Pikemen 
 
The wars of the Middle Ages are characterised by the overlapping identities and 
allegiances that marked the Feudal system and left little distinction between a paid 
soldier and a mercenary. The concept of foreignness only began to emerge at the 
end of the thirteenth century in “independent and increasingly centrally administered 
states where distinctions between local, ‘national’, ‘own’ troops and ‘foreign’ troops 
became gradually apparent”18.  The Swiss cantons were exactly that.  
In the fourteenth century, Switzerland was a loose confederacy of poor cantons. Its 
inhabitants were accustomed to a harsh climate and difficult terrain that offered few 
natural resources and even less economic opportunities for their sons19. Young men 
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unable to find a trade were oriented towards the military arts; this only contributed to 
exacerbating the tensions between the cantons which were constantly at war with 
one another. United in a common goal to eject the Austrians from their country, 
however the cantons crushed the mighty Habsburg armies20 at the famous battles of 
Morgarten (1315), Sempach (1386) and Näfels (1388). These military victories 
against the vastly superior Austro-Hungarian army earned the Swiss Pikemen, so 
called because they carried pikes, a reputation as the most fearless soldiers in 
Europe21. 
Thereafter, Swiss mercenaries became a pillar of European wars, present in every 
battlefield and fighting on all sides. The humiliation of the Habsburgs rejoiced her 
enemies and created a demand for Swiss soldiers to serve in the armies of 
European kings: in 1480, the Cent Suisses were commissioned by the French King 
Louis XI to serve as his personal guard in the Louvre Palace. By 1567, the cantons 
guaranteed a permanent Swiss Guard Regiment to the French sovereigns and King 
Francis the First hired a further 120,000 Swiss mercenaries to supplement his 
military campaigns. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the model of 
the Cent Suisses was reproduced in most of Europe’s royal families, from the 
Kingdom of Sardinia to the Dutch Republic. The Swiss Guard that today still protects 
the Pope in Rome has been continuously employed through a pact with the cantons 
that dates back to 1471. Thus, between the fourteenth and the eighteenth century, 
an estimated one million Swiss mercenaries served abroad, particularly in France 
and in Italy, where the Vatican’s Swiss Guard remains the last vestige of the Swiss 
Foreign Service22.  
Their ferocity and courage even earned them the praise of Machiavelli, who 
commended their sense of freedom and equality and viewed the Swiss militia system 
as a model for others23. With a high demand for Swiss mercenaries, a new market 
was opened to the cantons who began hiring out their excess men in exchange for a 
tidy profit: “the soldiers were paid four florins a day, but only for so long as their 
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service lasted, whereas the contracts between prince and canton were normally for a 
minimum period of at least one campaigning season”24. This enabled the canton of 
Valais, for example, to finance its expenditures without raising any taxes on its 
citizens25. Modern Switzerland can credit its system of organised mercenaries for 
propelling the country out of poverty and into the military history annals of Europe. 
Although mercenaries were sent out to fight for other countries, they remained under 
Swiss jurisdiction. As early as 1394, all cantons agreed to the Swiss military code in 
which they were given the duty to supervise the “strict military training of its men”26, 
thus starting a long tradition of military service. The men who went to fight for foreign 
lords had to make an official military oath to the Confederation, and they represented 
their country for the entire duration of the campaign. The Swiss mercenaries largely 
acquired a reputation as loyal and reliable. They often fought to the death: in 
particular, in 1527, the entire Swiss Guard in the Vatican was killed defending Pope 
Clement VII as Spanish mercenaries sacked Rome27. In its most famous episode in 
history, six hundred out of nine hundred Swiss Guards defending the King at the 
Tuileries Palace on August 10th 1792 were massacred by the Parisian crowd.  
Although Swiss mercenaries were naturally motivated to ‘enlist’ by the lack of 
economic options in their rural cantons, they also famously nurtured a love for 
combat and warfighting28. Indeed, the Swiss were constantly at war, if not with 
foreign powers, then among the cantons themselves29. David Courtwright argues 
that “whenever young, single men congregated for long period under other than 
stringent discipline, violence ensued”30. A surplus of armed and unemployed men 
has always been considered a threat to the security of the state. As a result, 
communities repeatedly ‘encouraged’ their excess population to migrate to new 
opportunities so as to control the level of indiscipline and potential for violence inside 
their territory. This model was evident in the case of Xenophon’s ten thousand 
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mercenaries who, upon their return from fighting Cyrus’ wars, found a cold reception 
as the Greek cities were reluctant to accept these soldiers of (mis)fortune and 
integrate them back into society. To be rid of the presence of these offensive men, 
the various Greek cities sent them to fight with the Spartan troops against the 
Satraps. This strategy was emulated after the Hundred Years War by the French 
who sent the roving bands of mercenaries across the border to fight in Spain. In a 
further bid to bring an end to the lawlessness, Charles VII of France attempted in 
1445 to integrate the mercenaries into the Royal Army31. Finally, Switzerland 
perfected the administration of its excess young men and even managed to turn a 
profit from their military potential. The successful business of mercenarism 
developed by the cantons was soon imitated by other countries. Emperor Maximilien 
became the biggest competitor to the Swiss enterprise by hiring out his Landsknecht 
whose heirs, the Dragons, were later contracted out to Great Britain to fight in the 
American Revolution. Eventually, mercenaries came together in their own 
companies to provide military services to foreign princes.  
 
The case of the White Company 
 
The successful business model of hiring out mercenaries that the Swiss cantons 
developed was first reproduced in a privatised form by Roger de Flor, who created 
the Great Company in 1302. The first company’s “organisation and modus operandi 
provided a useful model”32 for what eventually became the White Company, the 
precursor to modern private military companies.  
The commercialisation of warfare in the fourteenth century was the result of the 
military organisational shortfalls of the feudal system, financial opportunities 
(especially in the Italian city-states), a vast supply of available soldiers, and a 
growing demand for non-state combatants. In particular, Italy offered “a vast 
marketplace where men in search of adventure and reward could strike profitable 
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bargains with an employer”33. The Italian city-states preferred to hire foreign 
combatants to defend their territory and further their political interests because “the 
fractious nature of political and social life caused local officials to think carefully 
before hiring their own for military service. A successful native captain might seek 
political gain at home; an unsuccessful captain might provoke scandal and internal 
quarrels between his supporters and opponents”34. Mercenaries therefore were 
considered to be more loyal than citizen-soldiers. William Caferro explains that hiring 
foreigners was a safe bet because, in theory, they had no interests in the politics of 
the city and could be easily fired. Hiring private companies instead of bands of 
individual mercenaries provided the contracting state with a professional service led 
by a reputable captain who could organise a military campaign and satisfy the 
security needs of the state in a structured framework, thus offering a certain amount 
of accountability and control. It also enabled the state leaders to dictate policy 
without fear of military retribution or need for public support. This particular 
environment fermented the corporate structure of mercenaries, which was to mature 
and evolve along the centuries adapting to the changes in the international system 
and the demands of war. 
The White Company is the best documented example of early private military 
companies. Led by the famous Englishman John Hawkwood, the company emerged 
from the vestiges of the Great Company that crossed into Italy in 1361 during a lull in 
the Hundred Years War. The foreign mercenary bands amalgamated into companies 
that “were corporate in structure. The captain stood at the head of his brigades in a 
manner similar to the way a modern CEO stands at the head of his firm”35. They 
referred to themselves as ‘societies’, employed accountants, treasurers, secretaries, 
constables and lawyers36, and were under the jurisdiction of their captain. When 
under contract, they also had to respect the conditions and the laws of the 
contracting party: “the Condotte provided that the leaders of the companies are 
responsible for the crimes committed by the soldiers in camp, while the Commune 
shall judge those committed in the city or to the damage of the republic”37.  
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In his first campaign with Pisa in 1363, Hawkwood had 3,500 horsemen and 2,000 
infantry under his command. The companies signed contracts with various actors, 
mostly states which hired them to defend their territory and to attack their enemies, 
but private citizens also used the companies as escorts through the insecure routes 
of Northern Italy38. At a time when mercenaries were perceived with suspicion and 
accused of pillage and intimidation, Hawkwood gained a reputation as an honest 
entrepreneur, characterised by his “steadfastness in performing his obligations to his 
employers”39. This view is supported by Machiavelli in The Prince, although the 
Florentine chancellor insisted that Hawkwood’s faith was never tested as he 
generally failed in his military campaigns. Hawkwood was considered as “a loyal 
soldier during the periods in which he was directly employed by a state, pope, or 
prince”40. The captain’s reputation determined the success of his company. 
Hawkwood was a popular captain, having been elected to the position by his 
colleagues and inspiring the loyalty of his troops: Hawkwood never suffered a mutiny 
at a time when indiscipline was a problem41. Likewise, Italian city-states competed 
for the services of the White Company, although this may also be motivated by their 
desire not to be the victims of a contract between the company and an enemy state, 
and to remain outside of the path of pillage, plunder and bribery that all companies, 
including the White Company, resorted to when not restrained by contractual 
conditions.  
 
When the White Company was contracted by the city-state of Pisa in 1363, Florence 
and Pisa had already been antagonists for several hundred years due to Florence’s 
ambitions to gain access to the sea through Pisa’s port. Pisa in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth century was a rich city with successful commercial enterprises that 
enabled it to make up for its military weaknesses by securing a private army. The 
White Company served Pisa and, despite losing a few battles (including one against 
Florence in 1364), was arguably a stabilising influence in the foreign policies of the 
city-state: exempted from military service, the inhabitants of Pisa could direct their 
time and resources towards developing the economic and political infrastructures of 
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the city. Their defences were ensured by the White Company, which deterred other 
cities from attacking and encouraged some city-states, particularly Florence and 
Milan, to make alliances with Pisa.  
 
The White Company not only provided relative peace and encouraged prosperity in 
Pisa, it also enabled its employers to act out a foreign policy independently of foreign 
interference42. During his unusually long career, Hawkwood and his White Company 
signed contracts with Pisa, then with Pisa’s enemy Florence where he commanded 
the city’s army and “acted as a kind of policeman for the Florentines”43 during the last 
fourteen years of his life, with the Milanese Duke Bernabo Visconti – whose daughter 
he eventually married, and with the Pope, among others. The services of the 
company, once hired by a state, could be sub-contracted by the state to its allies in 
times of peace. Hawkwood also developed a network of spies throughout Italy which, 
along with his personal knowledge of the terrain and politics, enabled him to gain an 
advantage over competing companies and sell his information services to foreign 
and local dignitaries. The White Company was different from previous manifestations 
of mercenaries: it was a very modern conception that set a precedent by its 
corporate nature at a time when the European continent was witnessing the first 
seeds of capitalism.  
 
As these case-studies have shown, mercenaries were a normal and recurrent figure 
in the military landscape of Europe. Until the White Company, mercenary companies 
were a pre-commercial and loose organisation. Hawkwood’s enterprise was a 
commercial outfit that represented the changing trends in European society. This 
began to change, however, with the rise of nationalism and national consciousness 
that spread across the continent, inspired by the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic Campaigns. 
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The French Revolution and the rise of nationalism 
 
Mercenaries were a fixture of sovereign power in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and nowhere more so than in France. Mercenaries offered a practical 
solution to the limitations of feudalism which required men to remain under arms for 
only forty days. As kings turned to foreigners to arm their military campaigns, the 
armies of Europe became increasingly heterogeneous and developed a permanent 
presence in the country that employed them. When Charles VII of France 
established the fifteen companies of a standing army, two of them were made up 
exclusively of Scots. By 1789, the French army also included eleven Swiss 
regiments. These personal guards came to represent the foundations, ambitions and 
subsequently the tyranny of military absolutism.  
The unsavoury image of mercenaries, however, deepened with the mounting calls 
for political reform in France as King Louis XVI increasingly levied taxes to cover the 
cost of his ruinous military campaigns against the British: “the successful war of 
independence waged by the United States may have assuaged somewhat the 
humiliations France had suffered from England in India, Canada and the Caribbean; 
however the war had cost over one billion livres, more than twice the usual annual 
revenue of the state”44. In 1789, foreigners made up about a quarter of the French 
army and “twelve of ninety-one non-Swiss regiments in the French line infantry were 
also foreign regiments”45. It is no wonder that the French military defeats and the 
financial burden of war were blamed on the mercenary troops in French employ. 
Furthermore, when the Revolution broke out in  ay 1789, “the foreign regiments 
proved most loyal to royal authority, which hardly increased their popularity with 
reformers”46. Among its first decrees, the new Constituent Assembly called for the 
expulsion of foreigners from the French army, which was finally achieved in July 
1791. Ironically this transformation only occurred when German soldiers in the 
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Nassau Regiment, after constant harassment from the French citizens, tore off their 
insignia and declared that they were French47. The remaining Swiss units were 
largely massacred in 1792 and the survivors were subsequently disbanded.  
The French Revolution encouraged the creation of a national army by pitting the 
citizens, with their grievances, against the sovereign and his army of foreigners. The 
consequences of this ad-hoc national force, however, were unexpected. 
Conscription was first introduced in 1790 with the aim of creating a homogenous 
army “based on the cheap supply of patriotic manpower, clearly superior to their 
more expensive predecessors in which loyalty to the organisation was low”48. This 
citizen army “expressed national purpose and fought for national goals, which made 
them, potentially at least, at once more forceful and more flexible (...). Nor were they 
as likely to threaten the integrity of the state”49. In reality, however, the overhaul of 
the armed forces was fraught with problems, political intrigues and mixed loyalties. 
Without its officer corps, which had largely resigned or been killed during the Terror, 
the army lacked discipline, training and strategy. By August 1792, after a 
disappointing performance against the Austrian cavalry and the capitulations of 
Longwy and Verdun, the government appealed to the Swiss to return, enlisting 
“between three and four thousand well-disciplined Swiss troops released from 
service in French units barely a month earlier”50.  
A second unexpected consequence of the French Revolution was its ideological 
appeal to soldiers and civilians across Europe who flocked into the country to 
embrace liberty, equality and fraternity. The propaganda machine worked too well, 
as France promised asylum to all victims of political repression, making it the ‘terre 
promise’ for refugees, criminals, and idealists. In August and September 1792, a 
légion franche étrangère and a légion germanique were created to integrate the 
excess Dutch, Belgians, Prussians and Austrian deserters into the French army.  
The First Republic thus began its days with a strong ideological appeal, but an 
inefficient citizen army without proper experienced leadership, and an overload of 
foreign soldiers creating havoc inside the country. The solution to both these 
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problems was to make an about-turn in policy and re-establish foreign regiments- or 
mercenarism into the French armed forces. Napoléon Bonaparte maintained this 
tradition in his military campaigns across Europe, requiring the troops of conquered 
nations to serve in his army. Thus by the time Napoleon attacked Russia in 1812, 
“between a third and a half”51 of his army was made up of former soldiers from 
Poland, Italy, Greece, Holland and Spain. These foreign regiments, however, were 
still considered as inferior to French troops, as they were often “assigned secondary, 
often coastal defence, roles or garrison duties (...) for most of their existence”52. This 
precaution was justified by the high desertion rates, particularly in the Saxon, 
Bavarian and German units. By 1813, “many of the foreign units were dissolved (...) 
leaving only Swiss, Poles, and three régiments étrangers”53.  
Military historian Douglas Porch argues that the rise in nationalist sentiment that 
resulted from the Revolution actually gave a second wind, albeit arguably short-lived, 
to mercenarism. The ideological appeal and promises of freedom in France made 
the country into the homeland for mercenaries and “virtually guaranteed that 
generations of Europe’s politically repressed would make for Paris”54. 
 
The normative case against mercenaries 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of their extensive role in the history of war, mercenaries 
have always maintained a bad image. They pillaged and plundered France during 
the Hundred Year War, wreaked havoc in the Italian city-states between the 
fourteenth and sixteenth century and “ravaged Germany in the Thirty Year’s War”55. 
Their reputation as “faithless, dangerous and expensive”56 is well-earned. 
Nonetheless, mercenaries were useful and often more reliable combatants than 
citizens throughout most of history. They remained a legitimate feature of wars until 
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states began to pass laws in the nineteenth century prohibiting their use and 
recruitment on national territory. This distaste for mercenaries, however, easily 
predates  iccol   achiavelli’s famous warning to Prince Lorenzo against the evils of 
mercenaries whom he qualified as “useless and dangerous (...), disunited, ambitious, 
without discipline, disloyal, overbearing among friends, cowardly among enemies; 
there is no fear of God, no loyalty to men”57.  In Barbarous Philosophers, Christopher 
Coker interprets  achiavelli’s disgust for mercenaries as recognition that these 
combatants no longer have a role to play in modern warfare. With the advent of new 
technology and the rise of civic-militarism, war experienced a transformation in the 
way that it was perceived and experienced and “in this paradigm shift,  achiavelli 
believed there could be no place for mercenaries”58.   
The general disapproval of mercenarism displays a normative judgement that is 
today institutionalised in international law.  orms are generally defined as “‘collective 
expectations for the proper behaviour of actors within a given identity”59. They reveal 
the shared values of a society and are constantly shifting to adapt to the cultural and 
technological changes that characterise modernity60. Customary international law 
reflects the principle that laws are to be derived from the common behaviours of 
international actors. The laws of war, indeed, were a matter of customary law until 
they were codified first in the Hague Convention then in the Geneva Convention. 
Hence it is only since the end of the nineteenth century that the general norm against 
mercenaries has made them into illegal combatants61. Wars are normative and 
constantly changing, adapting to new methods, strategies, political systems and 
cultures, and actors among others. Consequently, norms regarding combatants have 
also fluctuated. This is true of the norms concerning the use of non-state actors, or 
mercenaries, in war. 
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Money, morals and military virtue 
 
Mercenaries are perceived as immoral because they fight for money, have no 
attachment to the conflict and are answerable to no one. This critical assessment of 
mercenaries is both a result of the terrible reputation that they have justly earned 
through their own behaviour in the past and a comparison to the ideal combatant that 
societies have strived to create through military institutionalisation.  
 achiavelli envisaged an “Aristotelian figure of the armed and independent citizen 
willing to fight for his liberties”62 as the model combatant and the only one capable of 
successfully waging war in conjunction with the norms of modern society. Because 
of their lethal potential and their necessity to the security of the state, warriors need 
to embrace restraint and civic virtue. This is the antithesis of mercenaries who are 
creatures of appetite in the Platonic sense63, unable to control their murderous 
impulses and waging war for the sake of war itself – and for money.  The 
uncontrollable and indiscriminate violence that has been associated with 
mercenaries since the Middle Ages only serves to confirm this accusation. 
Mercenaries are outside of the instrumental rationality of the state; they are therefore 
not controlled by the state and cannot be considered as part of the Trinity that 
characterise Plato’s definition of the state. 
Mercenaries today are considered morally wrong because they do not have any 
attachment to the cause for which they fight, but are nonetheless ‘whoring’ 
themselves by going to war ‘just for money’. This goes against the norms of 
contemporary society: ‘good’ combatants should have an intrinsic interest in the 
outcome of the conflict. This intrinsic interest is anchored in nationalist sentiment, 
and therefore to a sense of belonging to a community for whose survival the 
combatant is ready to die. It guarantees loyalty and reliability. Anna Leander refers to 
the “intrinsically immoral nature of contractors”64, which is derived from the idea “that 
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to fight for money, without sharing the goals of the hiring group, is problematic”65. 
 ercenaries “are morally undesirable because they do not fight for an appropriate 
cause”66. Unlike citizen-soldiers, “it is their appetites, not reason of state, that propel 
them into war”67.  
Furthermore, through their cowardice and lack of loyalty, mercenaries are an insult to 
military virtues: “mercenaries are not considered to be good soldiers; they were 
businessmen only interested in profit; they did not take risks because they wanted to 
survive to old age to enjoy wealth, rather than die when still young on a battlefield for 
civic glory”68. Contemporary society requires that their combatants follow an 
institutionalised set of rules that codifies their behaviour, rendering them into ‘just 
warriors’, reliable in war and loyal to the civilian community. Even Frederick the 
Great of Prussia, who made use of their services, criticised mercenaries for having 
“neither courage, nor loyalty, nor group spirit, nor spirit of sacrifice, nor self-
reliance”69. Equally, King Gustavus Adolphus “took good care to keep them away 
from his native Sweden” as they were both a danger to and a corruptive influence on 
society70. Evidently, mercenaries do not fulfil this ideal. 
 
Killing and control 
 
The moral argument is extended to the idea of jus ad bellum “which define who can 
kill in warfare and separate out justifiable killing from unjustified murder”71 and the jus 
post bellum which refers to the accountability of warring parties after a conflict72. 
 odern states define themselves in terms of holding a “monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory”73. By this norm – which is embedded in 
international law – only the state has the authority to sanction and delegate an act of 
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violence within specified boundaries74. It must therefore have the ability to control its 
combatants and hold them accountable for their behaviour during and after the war. 
This is not the case for mercenaries, however, as they are generally non-nationals 
operating outside of the territory of the state that hires them; they are beyond the 
reach of legal jurisdiction: “the international community’s fear of mercenaries lies in 
that they are wholly independent from any constraints built into the nation-state 
system”75. This problem is correlated to the foreignness of mercenaries and further 
justifies the norm against mercenarism. 
Because mercenaries have no institutional, legal or national ties to a conflict, they 
may also leave at any moment, making them not only unreliable but also 
uncontrollable. Unlike soldiers, mercenaries are outside of any juridical system of 
punishment, other than those that they set up themselves. In an unusual but extreme 
example, Colonel Mike Hoare, the commander of 5 Commando in Congo in 1964, 
ordered that one of his mercenaries have his big toe shot off as punishment for 
having raped and killed a young girl76. Cesare Borgia, himself a condottiero and a 
duke, dealt with the mercenary problem in Sinigaglia (Italy) by inviting his three 
captains into his castle and subsequently having them strangled. Usually, though, 
mercenaries have been unaccountable for their actions, and this is still the case 
today77. Despite proscriptive norms against mercenaries, neither governments nor 
the international community has been able or willing to control or sanction the 
behaviour of these non-state combatants.  
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Mercenary incentives 
 
The normative case against mercenaries is very much entrenched in the accusation 
that these combatants have no justifiable cause for going to war78. It also assumes 
that a financial motivation is not acceptable grounds either for killing or for taking 
such great risks with their own lives. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions reflects 
this convention in Article 47: it defines a mercenary by his motivation “to take part in 
the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain”79. The importance of the 
financial incentive is evident in the emphasis made on the difference in pay that 
characterises the earnings of a mercenary compared to that of a soldier: a 
mercenary “is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party”. 
 
This focus on motivation, however, is the greatest legal weakness of the Geneva 
Conventions. Motivation is a state of mind, and while circumstances and bank 
statements can show proof that financial transactions were an incentive for 
participating in combat, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate that a combatant had 
no other personal, religious or political motivations80. This is evidenced in the 1972 
Diplock Report commissioned in the United Kingdom to address the problem of 
terrorism in  orthern Island, which concludes that any “definition relying on positive 
proof of motivation would ‘either be unworkable or so haphazard in its application as 
between comparable individuals as to be unacceptable’”81. 
 
Furthermore, the Diplock Report also argues that the motivations of non-state 
fighters range from “sheer desire for private gain accompanied by indifference to the 
cause which that force is supporting, to a conscientious conviction that the merits of 
the cause are so great as to justify sacrificing his own life”82. Although mercenaries 
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generally are incentivised by the short-term prospects of earning a good salary, they 
are also motivated to join this trade by societal and economic circumstances, political 
conviction, or simply a passion for ‘soldiering by other means’. This does not exclude 
them from being defined as mercenaries, in the sense that they are participating in a 
conflict in which society has decided that they have no intrinsic or moral interest, and 
are being remunerated for their efforts. 
 
Profit and the economic realities of demilitarisation  
 
The profit motive is often not sufficient to explain the career choice and huge risks 
that the mercenaries chose to take. The promise of riches can be exaggerated and is 
too frequently never fulfilled. Cognisant of this,  achiavelli explained that the “paltry 
pay” of mercenaries was not even enough motivation for them to risk their lives, 
making them cowardly and useless as combatants83.  espite  achiavelli’s 
accusation that mercenaries lack the courage to take risks and gamble their lives for 
the sake of money, the actual mortality rates for this profession suggest the opposite: 
in the Congo of the 1960s, the mortality rate for mercenaries went as high as “one 
out of four men in actual combat from death, wounds and disease”84 according to 
Mike Hoare. In Iraq and Afghanistan, more than 1,500 contractors have been killed, 
with a further 13,000 wounded since 200385. Mercenaries, however, do not appear to 
associate their profession with the level of risks that they are taking:  “that they might 
be killed in action was something that never entered their heads”86.  
Early in the war in Afghanistan, contractors were lured to the country by salaries as 
high as $1,000 per day and are still able to earn $240,000 a year working in Iraq87. 
Self-confessed mercenary Simon Mann makes a distinction between his motivation 
and those of the men fighting with him in Angola on behalf of Executive Outcomes 
and the oil companies88: “these men were not doing this for their country. They were 
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not doing this as Tony and I were – in order to defend their property and livelihood. 
They were being wounded, being killed in Willy’s case – purely for money”89. At the 
same time, in his book Congo Warrior,  ike Hoare described mercenaries’ tendency 
to spend most of their pay while in the field, which suggests that making money and 
living a comfortable lifestyle were certainly not among their chief points of motivation: 
“what good is money to you in this god-forsaken part of the world anyway? (...) 
Tomorrow you may be killed in battle, with your horrible, hard-earned bucks still in 
your grubby little pockets. Lot of good it will do you then!”90.  
To add insult to injury, mercenaries have often been victims of employers defaulting 
on contracts – occurrences which led French journalist Philippe Chapleau to refer to 
these men as “soldats d’infortune”, or ‘unlucky/unfortunate soldiers’91. Indeed, to 
avoid paying these unconventional and potentially dangerous combatants, the 
princes and lords of feudal Italy repeatedly resorted to assassinating the leaders of 
the Condottieri. Thus such personalities as Carmagnola, Albert Sterz, Fra Moriale 
and Paolo Orsini saw their military career cut short by the very people who had hired 
them92. Defaults on payments are still a significant risk in this sector. Tim Spicer, the 
CEO of the private military company Sandline, sued the government of Papua New 
Guinea for the 18 million dollars which the country owed him according to their 
signed contract. Despite early termination of the contract, Spicer won his case in 
1999 and was awarded the full sum he had been promised93. Neal Ellis, a helicopter 
gunship pilot in Sierra Leone and one of the most famous mercenaries according to 
South African journalist Al Venter, claimed to be fighting because “flying over the 
jungle was better than working for a living”94. Venter explained that “this South 
African mercenary loved the job. He must have, because he certainly wasn’t getting 
paid when I was there (...). By that time he and his crew were owed about a million 
dollars”95. 
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The economic realities of demilitarisation, which left thousands of men without a job, 
have also been a launching ground for soldiers to become mercenaries. Rather than 
being motivated by profit, these men are just trying to survive and make a living as 
they are left unemployed in the wake of large conflicts. The supply of mercenaries, 
therefore, rises at the end of wars in what Chapleau calls a ‘wave phenomenon’: 
“after the wave of Vietnam, the English emerged on the market following the 
Falklands War; after the Gulf War, the offer was a bit more diversified: still the 
English, Americans, the French whose numbers went up after their intervention in 
Ex-Yugoslavia. More recently, many former soldiers from the Eastern bloc have 
flooded the market”96. In particular, the end of the Cold War saw substantial military 
cuts and more than one million demobilised soldiers from the United States and 
Russia97. Some of these men developed skills in training for war that are not easily 
transferable in civilian society, and as a result, they remained unemployable after 
their military mandate expired. A South African Recces captain quoted by Chapleau 
asks quite justifiably “what else can you do, when you only know how to make 
war?”98. The demilitarisation of society, a result of changing political trends, has left 
many soldiers disappointed, disillusioned and questioning the integrity of their home 
state. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Barlow, for example, explains that when the new South African 
government dismantled the infamous 32-Battalian, “these men, both black and white, 
who had readily sacrificed their lives for South Africa, were finally betrayed in 1993 
by the country they had so willingly served and died for. We were deeply ashamed of 
this”99. Soldiers were left with a feeling of resentment and despair, “among the 
thousands of men who had to leave military life and attempt to reintegrate a pacific 
existence, many were disappointed. The disintegration of military societies was too 
violent; accompanying measures [were] generally insignificant”100. This feeling of 
betrayal served to alienate a large proportion of the armed forces, many of whom 
turned to mercenarism as a way to continue exercising their profession, albeit no 
longer for their country.  
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Ideology 
 
Although mercenaries are defined by a lack of political interest in the conflict in which 
they are participating, despite general assumptions to the contrary, freelance 
combatants often have had or have developed ideological ties to the countries in 
which they are operating. Many white mercenaries fighting in Africa from the 1960s 
to the 1980s cited the communist threat as “one of their principal justifications for 
fighting the liberation movements which were provided with military aid, training and 
finances by both the Soviet Union and China”101. Eeben Barlow, for example, 
stresses that his company’s operations in Africa were motivated by his desire to help 
“African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats 
from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. I believe that only Africans (Black 
and White) can truly solve Africa’s problems”102.  
As a South African, Lieutenant-Colonel Barlow maintained strong ideological and 
political beliefs regarding the state of security on the continent, and had a vested 
interest, not just a financial motivation, to participate in the military processes of 
‘peace-building’, particularly in Angola. In a comparable tone, Simon Mann 
expresses his sense of responsibility towards the repressed citizens of Equatorial 
Guinea as well as a desire for adventure and excitement: “I want to make the money. 
I want to make a difference, make some lives better. I feel challenged to takes on 
such a tough job. I want the danger and the hardship. I love the craic103”104. 
Ideological attachment to a cause can develop with exposure, regardless of the 
circumstances that led the men to combat. The mercenaries fighting in Sierra Leone 
against the rebels became significantly attached to the difference that they could 
make by protecting the citizens from the brutality of the RUF105. Journalist Al Venter 
insists that mercenaries have played an important role defending citizens and 
governments in countries that have fallen into war and chaos. These non-state 
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combatants are “fighting other people’s wars” and are stepping into the political 
vacuum that a non-interfering West has left post-Cold War106. 
 
A quest for adventure: the existential dimension 
 
The risks that mercenaries take are not justified by the sole purpose of economic 
gain. Machiavelli is right when he argues that men will not put their lives on the line 
just for the sake of money. Plenty of men have joined the profession of mercenarism 
not only in pursuit of adventure but also in search for a sense of meaning which can 
arguably be reached through the hardships of war. Combat becomes “a supreme 
test of character in which those who come through achieve a lasting sense of self-
knowledge of a kind usually not available in civilian life”107. The empowerment of 
one’s actions, the ability to exceed his capabilities, to transcend his own fears and 
contribute to a larger purpose within a group has motivated many a man (and 
woman) to pick up arms.  
War has a deeply existential dimension that often redefines a combatant’s sense of 
self-worth108. This transformative experience makes the combatant authentic in the 
sense that he is only himself, his life is only worth living, when he is in battle. It is at 
this time that the individual is fulfilled in the adrenaline of the action and the ensuing 
recognition that he craves from others on the assumption that the sacrifice of his life 
is worth something to somebody.  en who derive this satisfaction from war “end up 
in armies and many more move on again to become mercenaries because regular 
army life in peacetime is too routine and boring”109. 
Mercenaries who have been drawn to Africa since the 1960s with the promise of 
adventure have lauded this new avenue for professional combatants: “the mercenary 
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unit of soldiers in these days is unique, so you could say it is the opportunity to 
practice our skills which attracts us rather than the way of life. (...) The ambitions of a 
soldier can be consummated only by action”110. The fact that so many mercenaries 
are indeed former members of their nation’s armed forces with combat experience 
also shows, at least to a certain extent, the attachment that these men have to the 
life of soldiering. On the other hand, some men are just attracted by a license to kill, 
as well as by the state of chaos that inevitably results from conflict and leads to 
opportunities for crime. In the Rhodesian war, a number of mercenaries were 
allegedly “paid by the kill” and “a few were there just for the love of killing”111.  
In their forays into the world of private contractors, journalists Robert Young Pelton 
and Steve Fainaru found that, although these men were motivated by patriotism and 
money, they also shared an intrinsic interest, not to say love, for this pseudo-military 
lifestyle. A Marine Forward Recon working for DynCorp and interviewed by Pelton 
revealed that “he saw working the Karzai detail as a way to make money, continue 
his interest in the military, and be part of a unique moment in history”112. Some 
contractors “develop an addiction to the lifestyle and a dark craving for being ‘in the 
game’”113. Fainaru encountered these characters in Iraq, as he was imbedded with 
the cost-cutting, corrupt114 private security company Crescent Security Group: former 
Marine John  unns explained his choice of career by his “need (for) something to 
show my system to remind myself I’m alive”115. Another young contractor, Jon Coté, 
who was later kidnapped and assassinated in Iraq, stated that his job with Crescent 
was “by far the coolest thing I have every experienced in my life”116. Fainaru 
concluded that Iraq and the private security industry ensnared men with its promise 
for “the camaraderie and the addictive thrill- Iraq as a reality, not as an 
abstraction”117. Each contractor also had their personal psychological motivations 
and perversions that led them away from the safety of their homes and into a war 
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zone: “you were part of it, and it was part of history, and so you were part of history 
too, even if you were dead. But it went much deeper, and it was mostly personal”118. 
 
Conclusion: Are mercenaries warriors? 
 
Mercenaries can exhibit the same military virtues as soldiers according to Deane-
Peter Baker. He argues in his book Just Warriors, Inc that “there are no intrinsic 
flaws which apply generally to the character of private warriors such that they are 
unable to display courage, exhibit comradeship and a sense of discipline, or lack an 
appropriate sense of honour”119. Aristotle offers a different valuation of courage, 
claiming that men who are brave and virtuous are happier than others but have more 
to lose by dying: “for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly 
losing the greatest goods, and this is painful. But he is nonetheless brave, and 
perhaps all the more so, because he chooses noble deeds of war at that cost”120. 
The best soldier, therefore, “may be not men of this sort but those who are less 
brave but have no other good; for these are ready to face danger, and they sell their 
life for trifling gains”121. According to Aristotle, the type of courage exhibited by a 
soldier and a mercenary differs in its ultimate purpose. 
The transcendental experience of war is not equivalent for mercenaries as it is for 
soldiers. Both combatants can derive a sense of self-worth and existential 
satisfaction from their role in combat. Only soldiers, however, are considered as 
worthy of honour and recognition. Whereas society values the sacrifice of soldiers, it 
vilifies the mercenary. This is significant, because it is the recognition of the 
combatant’s sacrifice that gives value to the life and death of the warrior. The 
importance of recognition cannot be undervalued in the experience of the combatant. 
Coker describes the warrior as an instrument of the state, who derives his purpose 
from his desire for glory, vainglory, amour propre and recognition122: “man is the only 
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animal who needs to place value on things – himself in the first instance but also on 
people and actions around him, such as the unit, or regiment, or ‘band of 
brothers’”123. Therefore, Shannon French explains, “warriors are not mere tools (...). 
For those who send them off to war must make an effort to ensure that the warriors 
themselves fully understand the purpose of, and need for, their sacrifice. Those 
heading into harm’s way must be given sincere assurances that their lives will not be 
squandered”124.  ercenarism does not cater to the ‘warrior experience’ of 
combatants who derive their sense of self-worth from the recognition of their 
societies. This is unavoidable, since mercenaries isolate themselves from their own 
homes by agreeing to fight for the cause of another country. In the process of 
executing their contractual arrangement, they lose their sense of belonging and 
forfeit their right to recognition.  
One of the main differences between soldiers and mercenaries lies in the value that 
society puts on the exercise of restraint. Soldiers operate within a legal framework 
and are furthermore indoctrinated in a warrior code that defines how they should 
fight, who they should kill, when, and how. The why is mandated by society. French 
suggests that the warrior code is set up “to protect the warrior himself from 
psychological damage” in the face of the murderous task that he/she is set in the 
process of defending his/her country125. The warrior code also serves to create ties 
between the men and women who share these principles and increases their 
effectiveness in combat by setting common standards of behaviour which reinforces 
their mutual trust and cohesiveness.  
The principle of restraint is the guiding factor behind the laws of war and the Geneva 
Convention. Restraint is necessary to ensure that prisoners of war will be treated 
humanely and not murdered. It protects the civilians from arbitrary retribution. In 
contemporary strategies of counterinsurgency, restraint is a central element of the 
hearts and minds campaign. It also marks the distinction between murder and lawful 
killing and only state-sanctioned killing is deemed honourable. The importance of 
restraint as a warrior virtue is most vivid in French’s survey of military personnel, who 
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value “a Hector who wins” over the legendary Achilles in Homer’s epic poem126. 
Although Achilles is required to go to war to defend King  enelaus’ honour, he has 
no real interest in the battle and “does not really care about the Greek cause or the 
condition of the Greek troops”127. His behaviour in combat shows no restraint or 
respect for his enemy. He has no warrior code but instead “sets his own standards of 
conduct and relies exclusively on his own internal judgements of when he is 
deserving of honour and when he should feel shame”128. The opinion of his peers is 
meaningless to him and his final desecration of Hector’s body shows an utter lack of 
restraint. This is contrasted to Hector whose “humanity and nobility of character”129 
are admired by contemporaries. The Trojan prince derives his sense of self-worth 
from his position as the defender of his city: “he cannot now, in the midst of such a 
dreadful conflict, allow himself to be anything other than Troy’s bravest defender 
without losing his self-respect and all sense of identity, meaning, and purpose in his 
life”130. Although both warriors are celebrated in history for their military prowess, 
they represent opposite values in their experience of war. After Hector’s death, 
Achilles is left as “a warrior with no cause he truly embraces, far from his own 
country, with no beloved comrades left to fight for or revenge”131. The only thing that 
separated him from being a mercenary is that, despite his lack of restrain, Achilles’ 
actions were entirely sanctioned by his kinsmen. 
Today, soldiers are expected to exercise restraint. Killing must still be state-
sanctioned, but the behaviour of combatants on the field is strictly codified by the 
Geneva Convention. Achilles’ behaviour would be punishable within the context of 
the army in which he belonged, whereas mercenaries lie beyond the realm of 
accountability.  espite any ‘warrior’ or moral code that they may exercise, regardless 
of their actual motivations or behaviour, mercenaries are not considered to be 
warriors. They are legally unaccountable and uncontrollable to a society that values 
sacrifice, restraint and control above all warrior virtues. In the eyes of the 
international community, mercenaries are illegal combatants, undeserving of 
recognition, unrestrained by laws, and unattached to any legitimate cause. 
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2. Soldiers 
 
Soldiers are agents of the state: recruited, paid, trained, punished and 
sometimes killed by their employer. Their citizenship makes them liable for 
military service, responsible for the defence of the nation and accountable to the 
state. Unlike mercenaries, armies of soldiers represent the state’s preference for 
total control over its military agents: armies are the “operational tools of rulers 
interested in creating stable social relationships based on a monopoly of 
violence”1. The soldier’s enforced subservience in war, ruthless military training 
and national indoctrination within the context of the army inevitably leads to a 
different state of mind than that of the mercenary. Consequently, mercenaries 
and soldiers view war and duty through opposite lenses, experiencing the same 
horror of combat but with very different responsibilities framing their actions and 
relationships.  
This chapter presents the soldier’s rise to prominence as the chosen combatant 
of the state. It describes, and dispels, the specific conditions under which soldiers 
are expected to develop a sense of patriotism and duty for which they are ready 
to die – a motivation which mercenaries allegedly lack. As an agent of the state, 
the soldier loses the right to autonomy, which is arguably at the origin of his 
resentment and distrust of mercenaries: legally and psychologically free to leave 
when the situation becomes too dangerous, mercenaries make unreliable allies 
and are thus a direct threat to the lives of the soldiers next to whom they are 
meant to be fighting in select conflicts. 
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Definition of soldier 
 
The first attempt to regularise armies came in 1445 when King Charles VII of 
France created the Compagnies d’Ordonnance that hired mercenaries on a 
permanent basis to defend his kingdom2. This offered the realm an 
unprecedented capable and reliable force, led by senior officers appointed by the 
crown and loyal to the monarchy. These companies were dependent on the king 
for their supplies and salaries. The first men to receive these regular salaries 
were called soldats. The word soldier comes from the Italian word for money, 
itself derived from the latin gold coin called solidus, and means literally, one who 
receives the solidi – the money or salary. Indeed, John Keegan and Richard 
Holmes, pillars of academic research on the armed forces, define soldiers as 
“warriors who fight for pay”3.  
A soldier today is defined as a combatant who is an official member of a 
permanent army sanctioned by and under the jurisdiction of the nation-state. 
There are several types of soldiers: contractual volunteers who have chosen to 
enrol in the armed forces for a limited amount of time; career soldiers, generally 
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs); conscripted soldiers, who are 
expected to perform a civic duty towards their state; and mobilised soldiers, who 
are called upon in times of crises to defend the country. The common 
denominator between the different types of soldiers is their dependence, 
subservience and accountability to the state during the entire duration of their 
contractual agreement.  
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The birth of the citizen army 
 
Citizen-armies can be organised into three main categories: Aristotle and Plato 
conceived of the first citizen-soldiers in the context of Ancient Greece, with the 
polis as the main political actor.  achiavelli’s concept of a citizen-army in the 
city-state of Florence took on a different form in a diversified geopolitical 
environment which was described above in the case-study of the White 
Company. Finally, the eighteenth century idea of the citizen-soldier emerged 
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s model of the social contract in which all citizens 
entered a covenant with the state in which they agreed to participate in the 
common defence of their society in exchange for the protection they enjoyed. 
These categories of citizen-armies reflect the changing norms of ‘civil society’ as 
defined by Adam Ferguson: in the first, armies fought princely wars, in the 
second, armies fought for profit, and in the third, they fought for the virtue of the 
state4. 
The concept of the citizen-soldier was first articulated by Aristotle in the 
Nicomachean Ethics in which he explains that virtue and citizenship are the key 
attributes of the polis. In exchange for the privileges of being a citizen in a city or 
state, men were expected to contribute to the protection of their society by taking 
up arms whenever necessary, and without expecting financial compensation. On 
the other hand, sailors, known as nautus ochulos, were pooled from the poorest 
citizens of Athens and therefore were paid for their work. Plato dismissed these 
men because he considered them demeaning to the integrity of the state. 
Civic duty in the Middle Ages was extended to the feudal system whereby serfs 
owed their rulers 40 days of military service per year. Large armies of citizens, 
however, only became the norm in the nineteenth century. Prior to this, rulers 
mostly fought their wars through non-state subsidiaries that were hired for the 
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duration of the conflict and subsequently released from their duties5. Rulers were 
reluctant to arm their citizens for security reasons6, and the general population 
was “eager to let any available foreigners assist them in any necessary bleeding 
and dying for la Patrie”7.  
Early attempts by Niccolò Machiavelli to field an army of citizen-soldier –  which 
he considered more efficient and trustworthy – in the city of Florence failed as the 
Florentine militia was defeated by the Spanish regulars in 1512, leading to the 
dissolution of the city-state and  achiavelli’s prompt dismissal and imprisonment. 
Instead, mercenaries continued to be the norm up until the French Revolution 
and the Revolutionary Wars: the Thirty Year War that brought about the Treaty of 
Westphalia – and sowed the first grains of sovereignty – was largely fought by 
mercenaries who were led by captains with personal allegiances to the state. 
France was dependent on foreigners for most of her wars: “from the Scots who 
rode with Joan of Arc to the Foreign Legion and Dien Bien Phu, the foreign 
soldier, idealistic volunteer or hard-case mercenary, is an integral part of the 
French military tradition”8. Britain has equally used foreign and proxy troops in 
her colonial projects up to and including the American War of Independence and 
during the Crimean War9. It was only after the French Revolution that ideals such 
as patriotism and civic duty spread across Europe and eventually led to the 
adoption of conscription and the creation of citizen-armies. 
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Citizens, enlightenment and the Revolutionary Wars  
 
The ideas that emerged from the French Revolution changed the military fabric in 
Europe for the next two hundred years. The Enlightenment that preceded the 
Revolution proved to be a cultural phenomenon. Concepts such as the social 
contract and citizen rights were particularly appealing in France where the 
monarchy and nobility abused their power of taxation, enforcing excess duress 
on a population already suffering from the 1787 financial crisis and several years 
of bad harvest. Information and propaganda were communicated through 
pamphlets and publications that were increasingly accessible thanks to the 
availability of new technology: “well before 1789, the language of ‘citizen’, 
‘nation’, ‘social contract’ and ‘general will’ was articulated across French society, 
clashing with an older discourse of ‘orders’, ‘estates’, and ‘corporations’”10.    
The spontaneous uprisings that spread across the country leading up to the 
assault of the Bastille prison reflected a population’s exasperation with an 
antiquated socio-political system that was unable or unwilling to adapt to the 
requirements of a new era. When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, the 
French army was largely made up of foreigners and noblemen whose duty it was 
to protect the royal family and execute the King’s decree upon his people11. 
Understandably, the population’s hatred for the monarch turned against his 
military representatives: the nobility and the foreigners charged with his 
protection. The Swiss regiment’s loyalty to King Louis XVI and their subsequent 
massacre at the Palais des Tuileries in August 1792 led to the dissolution of all 
foreign regiments from the French army, and the call for a system of conscription 
that was realised in 1793. Known as the levée en masse, the first draft initially 
ordered 300,000 men into the armed forces, followed by the general mobilisation 
of all young men, an event unheard of in military history.  
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The chaos of the revolution, purging of officers and disbanding of all foreign 
troops had created a military vacuum by 1792. Furthermore, the citizen’s uprising 
against the monarchy insulted the neighbouring royal families who subsequently 
issued the Declaration of Pillnitz, a statement of support for the French monarch 
that threatened retaliation if anything were to happen to him. This, however, only 
served to further inflame the citizens of France who declared war on Austria and 
on Prussia in the spring of 179212. Inspired by ideological discourse and 
nationalistic sentiment, Frenchmen flocked to the army, overwhelming the 
smaller Prussians, Austrian and the Dutch armies with their numbers13. Between 
1789 and the Peace Treaty of Amiens in 1802, the French Republic with its army 
of conscripts had defeated all its enemies and conquered neighbouring territories 
that had eluded the ambitions of the Valois and Bourbon monarchs. 
Clausewitz attributed French successes in the Revolutionary Wars to the 
enthusiasm of its citizen-army. Porch and Tim Blanning14, however, argue that 
the failures of an undisciplined and paranoid army led to France’s early defeats in 
the Revolutionary Wars: in April 1792, the French army “broke and ran at the first 
sign of enemy cavalry”15 and lost Longwy and Verdun to an allied army of 
Prussians, Austrians and Hessians. The disconcerting rate of desertions by 
French citizen-soldiers forced the Republican government to re-enlist Swiss 
troops and integrate other voluntary foreigners into their ranks. It was only after 
the reorganisation of the French army and the re-integration of foreign 
mercenaries that the tides of war began to change and France started collecting 
victories on the battlefield: a young  apoleon, “made extensive use of foreign 
and allied troops, organizing Italian and Polish auxiliaries during his Italian 
campaign of 1796-1797, and Copt and Greek legions during his invasion of 
Egypt”16. 
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 apoleon’s  rande  rmée and military reform 
 
Contrary to popular belief,  apoleon’s Grande Armée was not made up of 
revolutionary citizens imbued with enthusiasm and nationalism. Despite the levée 
en masse, by 1810, “80 per cent of the annual quota failed to report to 
conscription”17. Instead, Napoleon relied heavily on foreigners who were forcibly 
incorporated into the French Army: the number of foreign troops in the Grande 
Armée increased substantially as  apoleon’s conquests brought more and more 
of Europe under his control and as allied and vassal states were prevailed upon 
to contribute men to the French army18. By the time Napoleon marched into 
Russia in 1812, between a third and a half of his army of 600,000 men were 
Austrian, Prussian, German, Saxon, Bavarian, Swiss, Polish, or Italian19. 
 apoleon’s charismatic and intelligent leadership set the scene for the armies of 
the next century20. Although most of his soldiers were poorly trained and 
equipped, Napoleon nurtured the formation of the educated military elite through 
the establishment of two officers’ schools: Saint-Cyr in 1802 and the Ecole 
Polytechnique, which formed officers and promoted scientific research with the 
motto “ils s’instruisent pour vaincre” (they learn to win). Few officers from Saint-
Cyr, however, actually fought in the Napoleonic Wars as these ended in 1815. In 
fact, most of  apoleon’s generals were veterans of the Ancient Regime. 
Napoleon also developed a meritocratic system by which commissions were 
earned, and not bought, thus placing competent officers at the head of the army.  
Most significant for Tim Blanning, however, is the Emperor’s ability to mobilise 
such a huge body of men on the battlefield. Before the Napoleonic Wars, most 
armies were of moderate size, with few exceeding 200,000 soldiers. Even the 
Prussian army in which Clausewitz fought never exceeded 320,000 men at arms 
in the eighteenth century. By contrast, the Grande Armée amassed up to 3 
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million Frenchmen out of a population of 28 million. This was enabled partly by a 
mandatory military service for all males between the ages of 20 and 25. Blanning 
successfully dispels the belief that the French Army was victorious because of its 
energy and enthusiasm, and instead demonstrates that “whenever the allies 
were able to assemble even roughly the same number of troops as the French, 
they won”21. This shows that the French Army was not necessarily better than 
any other European army, but instead was able to dominate its opponents on the 
battlefield simply by overwhelming them with numbers that were reached by 
conscripting all available man power from France and its conquered territories.  
 apoleon’s strategy of total war further contributed to the war effort as “until total 
victory was achieved, every man, woman, child, animal and inanimate object was 
conscripted for the war effort”22. Total war marked a dramatic change from the 
wars of the Ancien Régime which, although “an indescribable bloody horror”, was 
kept on a leash and fought by noblemen who preferred to withdraw their best 
troops than sacrifice them to the enemy23.  avid Bell argues that  apoleon’s 
armies were able to beat the Prussians because the French fought with total 
abandon: “the absolute destruction of the enemy became a moral imperative”24 
whereas the demographically inferior Prussian officers were still using the old, 
cautious rules of war.  
 
The changing military landscape of Europe 
 
The military successes of  apoleon’s army changed the military landscape of 
Europe for two reasons: first,  apoleon’s conquests in Spain, Italy and Prussia 
forged a national identity within these territories that previously had never needed 
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to exist. The population of the conquered territory had a common enemy in the 
occupying French army. They were also united for the first time under one ruler. 
Inspired by the philosophy of the French Revolution, combined with the 
unwelcome experience of French occupation, the Italian city-states began a 
movement of insurrection against Napoleon, and later against the Austrian and 
Habsburg empires. Indirectly, the French conquest of Italy arguably contributed to 
its unification fifty years later. A similar case can be made for German unification. 
The occupation of the Rhineland and the enforced frenchification of Germany 
contributed to the rise of nationalist sentiments that emerged from the 
populations’ efforts to defend their traditions and values25.  
Second, the overwhelming numbers of the French Army and its use of total war 
set a new standard for European armies that wished to compete on equal footing 
with the French: “the French had introduced universal military service in 1793 via 
the levée en masse, inaugurating the era of mass continental land armies. The 
other European powers had to follow suit or risk their armies being vastly 
outnumbered”26. Governments could no longer afford to field armies of 
mercenaries, and were forced to look to their own citizens for cheap military 
labour:  “once the citizen army was adopted by one state, the logic of path 
dependency took hold”27. 
Having been defeated and occupied by the French, Prussia took the lead in 
military reforms, founding new officer training schools, opening up the officer 
corps to all classes of population, tying promotion to a system of examinations, 
and setting up a system of recruitment called the ‘Krümper system’ which would 
eventually turn into universal conscription28. The Prussians, however, did not 
have a common spirit of patriotism after the Napoleonic Wars, and neither did the 
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French or British associate nationalism with a sense of military duty: “when 
Prussia adopted a citizen army, her leaders were taking an extraordinary leap of 
faith. They had to hope that a standing army would create nationalism in a 
people notably lacking in it, and that nationalism would lead to better and more 
unified soldiers”29. The Prussian middle class, however, were not allowed not join 
the army because most of them were traders, and therefore not considered to be 
good fighters. 
The introduction of conscription, therefore, created a new relationship between 
the state and its citizens. Rousseau’s concept of a social contract was developed 
and exploited by governments to instil a sentiment of duty and patriotism into 
their military institutions: “now that the government was responsible to the 
people, the soldier was their servant – no longer an enemy but an ally”30 . 
George Washington expressed this relationship in terms of individual and 
communal responsibility on the part of the citizens towards the security of the 
state: “it must be laid down as a primary position and the basis of our 
(democratic) system, that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free 
Government owes not only a proportion of his property, but even his personal 
service to the defence of it”31. Percy argues that the ideals of the French 
Revolution and the enlightenment, along with the military successes of citizen 
armies, led to a new norm in European societies: “soldiering was only 
respectable when it was done voluntarily by citizens from love of their country, 
under which circumstances it became morally admirable”32.  
By 1871, the militarily superior and reformed Prussian army had crushed the 
Austrian, Danish and French armies in the span of just 7 years. The French, 
having practiced a form of modified conscription since the fall of Napoleon were 
shocked and humiliated by this defeat. Their reaction was a massive military 
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expansion in the following years. The armies that met one another on the 
battlefields of the First World War were unprecedented in their size and make-up: 
“any continental power which wished to escape annihilation as swift and 
overwhelming as that which overtook the Second Empire had to imitate the 
German pattern and create a Nation in Arms – a nation whose entire man-power 
was not only trained as soldiers, but could be mobilized, armed and concentrated 
on the frontiers within a few days”33. Between 1914 and 1918, 60 million soldiers 
were mobilised across Europe, with governments appealing to patriotism and 
nationalist sentiment, and using conscription to forcibly recruit the numbers that 
were needed to face the enemy. The French Revolution and the subsequent 
wars between increasingly large European armies changed the military 
landscape of the continent. The systematic creation of citizen armies reflected an 
instrumental belief in the importance of loyalty and motivation to defend the 
nation: “the armed forces became an institution for solidifying the attachment to 
the nation and the state, for promoting social mobility, for education and thus 
played a central part of the shaping of the modern state, not only militarily but 
also socially and politically”34.  
 
The soldier and the state  
 
The rise of massive citizen-armies in the nineteenth century placed a new burden 
on the state. To mobilise its citizens for war and turn them into reliable soldiers, 
the state needed to develop and instrumentalise three sentiments: nationalism, 
patriotism, and a sense of duty. This was achieved militarily through the 
introduction of universal conscription, which reduced the social barriers and 
ensured that the masses were represented throughout the military ranks. 
Conscripts were generally expected to be literate and were educated in the 
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glorious history of their nation as part of their military training. The state also 
began to invest heavily in the construction of new schools whose curricula were 
undeniably patriotic. Historian Eugen Weber explains that new educational 
policies made schools the primary “vehicle for instilling patriotism”35 and 
contributed significantly to the development of a homogenous nation-state36. In 
All Quiet on the Western Front, protagonist Paul Bäumer and his schoolmates 
enlist in the armed forces after being urged to do so by their school teacher37. 
The state also encouraged a wave of propaganda that was “disseminated in the 
army camps in the forms of pamphlets and journals”38; they staged public 
displays of punishment for acts of cowardice, and ceremonies rewarding acts of 
heroism. In France, festivals celebrating the ideals of the revolution “brought 
together soldiers and civilians”39 whereas patriotic songs were commissioned 
and taught in the schools. The entire country was mobilised in a cultural 
campaign to instil pride and patriotism among the citizens and ensure its 
emotional commitment to the security of the state.  
  
Civic-militarism, duty and sacrifice 
 
William Doyle explains that inherent in the ideals of the post-Revolutionary state 
is the notion of civic-militarism. This concept was developed by the Ancient 
Greeks for whom all free citizens of the state were expected to “fight to protect 
the commonwealth which in the exchange had granted them rights”40. Civic-
militarism is articulated in the philosophy of the social contract which views the 
relationship between the citizens and the state in terms of dues and duties (des 
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droits et des devoirs). In the Declaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, 
the right to electoral and judicial participation is expressed in Article VI: La Loi est 
l’expression de la volont  g n rale.  ous les Citoyens ont droit de concourir 
personnellement, ou par leurs Représentants, à sa formation (the law is the 
expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to compete either 
personally or through their representatives). This right, however, is conditional on 
the security of the polity, which requires the general participation and contribution 
of each individual: Article XII: La garantie des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen 
nécessite une force publique (the guarantee of the rights of man and the citizen 
requires a public force). Article XIII therefore articulates the duty of military 
participation that is expected from each and every citizen: Pour l’entretien de la 
force publique, et pour les d penses d’administration, une contribution commune 
est indispensable. Elle doit être également répartie entre tous les citoyens, en 
raison de leurs faculties (for the maintenance of a public force and for all the 
administrative expenses, a common contribution is indispensable. This burden 
must be shared equally by all citizens according to their abilities). This military 
duty, therefore, “is instrumental: it is in the service of others”41, but it is also 
inescapable as it is tied from birth to the individual’s right to exist, live and work 
inside the confines of the state. 
Soldiers, therefore, are citizens who are actively fulfilling their duty towards the 
state. They are required to commit a portion of their time and potentially sacrifice 
their lives to protect the existence of their fellow citizens. It is this sacrifice that 
also explains the state’s choice of citizen-soldiers over mercenaries. The Greek 
philosopher Aristotle compared citizen-soldiers to mercenaries whose training 
and experience, he admitted, make them “most capable in attack and in defence, 
since they can use their arms”42.  Whereas mercenaries can be brave in battle, 
however, their bravery is not one which holds them to their post when faced with 
certain death: they “turn cowards when the danger puts too great a strain on 
them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment; for they are the first to fly, 
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while citizen-forces die at their posts”43, as evidenced by the Spartan citizen-
soldiers who stood their ground to the death in the famous Battle of Thermopylae 
in 480BC. Aristotle explained that only citizen-soldiers have sufficient interest in 
the outcome of the battle to face the enemy with the necessary courage to stand 
their ground: “the courage of the citizen-soldier is most like true courage”44 
because the individual is motivated by a sense of duty which drives him to avoid 
disgrace, pursue honour and sacrifice himself for his country. This notion is 
supported by Coker who states that each soldier has a personal responsibility for 
and intrinsic interest in the outcome of the battle which makes him a more 
dependable combatant45. Furthermore, most soldiers in conscript armies were 
originally peasants and farmers, and “farmers don’t yield ground”46 – an attitude 
that the wandering mercenaries evidently do not share.  
Plato expands on the importance of duty in The Republic, where he defines the 
characteristics of soldiers, whom he calls Auxiliaries: “nothing can be more 
important than the work of a soldier should be well done”47 and the existence of 
these Auxiliaries therefore is instrumental in providing the security of the state. 
The soldier must be engaged to carry out his duty to the polity to the extent of 
sacrificing his own life. To Plato, Auxiliaries must be professionals whose bodies 
and soul are educated in the art of war and in the values of the city which they 
promise to protect. They are characterised by their ‘spirit’ which stimulates their 
emotions and drives their actions to defend the parent-state to which they must 
undoubtedly belong: “this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly 
educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become 
hard and brutal”48.  
Citizen-armies re-emerged in the nineteenth century along with a new moral 
norm among states by which citizen-soldiers were perceived as the 
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onlyappropriate combatants to represent their state on the battlefield: “if citizens 
were willing to die for their state, it suggested that the state was a powerful and 
glorious entity that took care of its people, who returned the favour”49. Patriotism 
and nationalism came to define the moral value of the state, and was expressed 
through the sacrifice of its citizens. Soldiers, therefore, became the preferred 
combatant because they fight for the right reasons50. Having entered a covenant 
with the state by choice or by default of being a citizen of the state, they “serve a 
larger human purpose; (the soldier) puts himself at the disposal of his city, to 
enhance its power or secure its ends”51.  
 
Obedience and punishment 
 
 espite the state’s expectation that its soldiers are willing participants in the 
military project of the nation, it has nonetheless developed a system to guarantee 
the patriotic sacrifice of its servants. This is done through three measures: 1) 
draconian training with the objective of instilling blind obedience; 2) societal 
norms that glorify this obedience and vilify dishonour; and 3) military and civilian 
courts to punish deviants and discourage defiance. This infrastructure is 
necessary to ensure a soldier’s performance on the battlefield and to avoid an 
abuse of military power that may threaten the civilian government: Plato warned 
of the dangers of the soldiers, who like Achilles, fall victim to the temptations of 
their spirit, and argued that only the state structure keeps these combatants 
under control. This is why Plato stressed the characteristics and training that are 
essential to the warrior class: “it is precisely because he has it in his power to 
pressure his fellow citizens that he needs to exercise remarkable self-restraint”52. 
Plato explained that soldiers are not to have “any property of his own beyond 
what is absolutely necessary (...). Their provisions should be only such as are 
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required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they 
should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the 
expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like 
soldiers in a camp”53. Plato argued that by isolating the soldiers and removing 
any temptation of physical belongings and comfort, the Auxiliaries would devote 
their entire existence to protecting the polity to which they belong, and would not 
be tormented by their own ‘appetites’ which might lead them to irrational and 
violent behaviour. 
Armies consequently have distinguished themselves from civilian institutions by 
their cohesive and hierarchical structure. Samuel Finer describes the army’s 
main characteristics as having “a centralised command, hierarchy, discipline, 
intercommunications, esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation and self-
sufficiency”54. As their principal objective is to “fight and win wars”55, or to act as a 
“protection device against external enemies”56, the army differs in both function 
and purpose from civilian society. Soldiers end up thinking in terms of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ where civilians and their institutions are perceived as inferior to the strictly 
disciplined life of the military. 
The entire training mechanism of the soldier is therefore manufactured to forge 
him into a combatant and prepare him to follow the orders of his superiors. 
According to Clausewitz, “the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothes, armed 
and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marking is 
simply t at  e s ould fig t at t e rig t place and t e rig t time”57. Basic training 
begins with “the socialisation and indoctrination of the recruit” by breaking down 
a man’s civic identity and rebuilding a soldier in the image of the army58. This 
psychological transformation is accomplished through a purposeful segregation 
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of society in terms of ‘military’ and ‘civilians’. Soldiers are distinguished by a 
common uniform and have the right to bear arms. They are kept apart from 
civilians with military barracks isolating the armed forces from the general 
population. Recruits are indoctrinated with the virtues of the military system with 
an emphasis on the unique qualities that only the armed forces embody. This 
includes their access to and monopoly over the use of arms, their organisational 
superiority, and their important symbolic status within the state59. Humiliation and 
brutality are also used “to break down an individual’s self-esteem, lower their 
resistance to the values and attitudes that the military wants them to adopt, and 
reinforce the omnipotent nature of military discipline”60. 
Furthermore, the absolute regulation of the recruit’s life inside the army base 
restricts his freedom and increases his dependence on the military institution. 
The recruit is told when to eat, sleep and fight. Personal initiative is discouraged 
and instead he is taught to act only upon hearing his superior’s orders. A soldier’s 
identity is stripped away and replaced with a rank and a function. Eventually, the 
recruit is broken down by the harsh physical training: sleep deprivation, long 
marches, repetition of drills, shooting and manoeuvres gradually condition the 
troops to obey without reflection to the verbal commands of their officers. Studies 
have shown that a rigorous training increases the soldier’s commitment to the 
group which in turn improves his ability as a combatant61. Rather than inspire 
mutiny, French legionnaire Captain Morin de la Haye explains that the hard 
training and education of the soldier produce surprising results: “one would say 
that the constant exercise of the will of the leader works on them like a hypnotic 
suggestion. One sees in the eyes of the soldiers that they are attentive to orders, 
proud to manoeuvre well, and conscious of their worth. (The instructors) carry it 
out with zeal, even fanaticism, in the expectation of campaigning with the men 
that they prepared for this end”62.  
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The military’s strict hierarchical structure also encourages a culture of obedience. 
Soldiers are organised by rank in an order of increasing authority and 
responsibility. Refusal to accept orders is called insubordination and is 
punishable within the military legal system. In the United State for example, 
Articles 90 to 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice make it a crime to 
disobey the orders of a superior commissioned or non-commissioned officer. The 
exercise of hierarchy in the army is enabled by a legal body that is specifically 
created for the armed forces. By joining the military, the recruit forfeits his civilian 
rights: unlike other citizens, soldiers are governed by a specific body of laws that 
restricts their personal freedoms and rights; “les militaires jouissent de tous les 
droits et libertés reconnus aux citoyens. Toutefois, l'exercice de certains d'entre 
eux est soit interdit, soit restreint dans les conditions fix es par la pr sente loi”63 
(all soldiers enjoy the same right and liberties given to citizens. At the same time, 
the exercise of some of these are either forbidden or restrained within the 
conditions described in the present law). These laws also cover the political life of 
the soldier who is forbidden from being politically active, syndicalise or go on 
strike in certain countries64. Furthermore, while serving his country, the soldier is 
required to wear the uniform, live where he is told, and may only leave the 
military base with the explicit permission of his superior. In France, the Code de 
la Défense describes the legal requirements of the soldier, which range from the 
expectation of a spirit of sacrifice to the details regarding his availability, loyalty, 
neutrality and discipline. Its equivalent in the United States is the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice which regulates the disciplinary measures that can be taken 
against a member of the Uniformed Services. 
Military bodies, therefore, are empowered by the civilian government with the 
right to punish any member of the armed forces according to the country’s code 
of military justice. Offenders may undergo a military trial – as in the case of the 
United States court-martial system, and can be incarcerated in a special military 
prison or detention centre. Should a soldier fail to obey military orders, he is 
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liable for punishments ranging from monetary fines, floggings or imprisonments 
to torture and death depending on the crime and the military culture. In the 
Roman army for example, treason was punished by placing the perpetrator in a 
bag of snakes and throwing him into a river or lake65. Decimation, or the removal 
(by stoning or clubbing) of one in ten soldiers, was also used to punish cowardice 
and mutiny. This was particularly effective, because soldiers organised in these 
units of 120 men were likely to at least know each other by name and would 
therefore be personally affected by the execution of their comrades66. Execution 
by firing squad can still be expected in many contemporary armies dealing with 
cases of high treason or spying. The entire military infrastructure is built around a 
system of strict juridical control, engrained with the values of the nation, and 
judged upon the normative preferences of the society. 
 
Honour and recognition 
 
Soldiers have neither the right nor the ability to refuse to partake in warfare: “the 
disciplinary apparatus of the military removes a soldier’s ability to refuse a 
mission”67. Soldiers are not expected to support the war – they are required to 
follow their orders as dictated by the contract between them and their state. In 
return for their sacrifice and to remain motivated in their mission, soldiers need to 
be recognised and appreciated by the society that they are serving. French 
explores the psychological need for soldiers to have the “profundity of their 
sacrifice” acknowledged68. She explains that soldiers “are not mere tools; they 
are complex, sentient being with fears, loves, hopes, dreams, talents and 
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ambitions”69. If they are regarded as “mere means to an end”, they risk losing 
faith in the society they are protecting and their performance on the battlefield will 
be adversely affected70. This is particularly important because the soldier may 
face death at any moment, and he is therefore continuously reassessing the 
value of his life and potential sacrifice: it is the confidence of his own worth, 
anchored in the eyes of his community, which “gives life itself its value”71.    
Recognition therefore is crucial to the confidence and motivation of the soldiers: 
“they are public servants and derive much of their self-esteem from the extent to 
which they are esteemed by others, even civilians”72. The judgement of society 
determines the soldier’s sense of worth by giving value to his sacrifice and to the 
risks that he is taking. Honour and glory are important to the soldier as it is the 
hope of being welcomed home after the war that enables him to fight as his 
country requires: “it is important for them to conduct themselves in such a way 
that they will be honoured and esteemed by their communities, not reviled and 
rejected by them”73. The soldier’s craving for honour and glory has been 
manipulated by governments and military institutions and is used to drive these 
combatants to risk their lives on the battlefields. The celebration of soldiers and 
public rewards for acts of heroism and sacrifice provide a psychological impetus 
to the men marching to war. Conversely, governments have also encouraged a 
culture of shaming ‘cowardice’ in citizens who fail to fulfil their civic duty, 
especially during a time of war. This was demonstrated in the UK during World 
War One with the ‘white feather’ campaign which publicly branded any man who 
was not wearing a uniform
74
. 
Furthermore, killing is often antithetical to the instincts of the soldier who 
embodies “the values of the society in which they were raised and which they are 
prepared to die to protect”75. Ironically, clinical psychiatrist Jonathan Shay 
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explains that “the painful paradox is that fighting for one’s country can render one 
unfit to be its citizen”76. Society’s mandate to go to war therefore legitimises the 
murderous actions of the soldier and puts a moral stamp on killing. Coker argues 
that “to be legitimate, killing has to be programmed, disciplined and directed and 
it must above all conform to the social construction of an enemy. For it is society 
which determines when a soldier kills, whom he kills, and even how he kills”77. 
The approval of civil society therefore absolves the soldier of his actions. Finally, 
the military hierarchy eliminates any notion of moral responsibility, enabling the 
soldier to fulfil this bloody mission. The support of his family, community and 
state is therefore necessary because they are the source of a soldier’s moral 
salvation. 
Soldiers not only crave society’s recognition to fulfil their psychological and 
existential need:  their physical survival also depends on the approval of their 
fellow combatants. Indeed, “the only thing that they fear is being shamed in front 
of their peers”78. This is confirmed repeatedly by soldiers who explain that “an 
apprehension nagged at each of us that he might appear to be ‘yellow’ if he were 
afraid”79. Soldiers undergo extensive social conditioning that is “designed to keep 
soldiers at the front, not least of which is the belief that flight from danger will 
result in their comrades considering them a coward”80. Any display of weakness 
or cowardice on the battlefield can endanger the entire group. Soldiers therefore 
share mutual responsibility and derive their only guarantee of security and 
potential survival by trusting that their fellow soldiers will equally act with courage 
and sacrifice while carrying out their own orders
81: “any man in combat who lacks 
comrades who will die for him, or for whom he is willing to die, is not a man at all. 
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He is truly damned”82 explains William Manchester in his war memoirs. Coker 
explains this dynamic between soldiers who “put their lives on the line for each 
other (...). (They) have to trust each other to stand in line, rather than cut and run, 
to fight side by side and overcome personal fears, to go the extra distance. A 
soldier is expected to fight on even when all is lost rather than dishonour himself 
in front of his comrades”83. This esprit de corps is realised through the rigorous 
training prior to battle, and to the constant presence of death during a war – the 
experience of which inculcates soldiers with “an ingrained sense of personal 
responsibility not to ‘let the unit down”84.  
 
Breaking the myth of combat: why soldiers fight 
 
In approximately 12BC, the Roman poet Horace wrote a poem in his Odes 
exhorting the young male citizens of Rome to join the military and fight for their 
country: 
Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori:          Ho  s eet and fitting it is to die for one’s country 
mors et fugacem persequitur virum             Yet death chases after the soldier who runs,   
nec parcit inbellis iuventae                           and it  on’t spare t e co ardly back   
poplitibus timidove tergo                              or the limbs, of peace-loving young men 
Horace’s poem illustrates his society’s celebration of patriotism and the 
vilification of cowardice. Ironically, Horace himself allegedly threw down his 
shield in panic and fled the battlefield at the Battle of Philippi in a bid to save 
himself from certain death85. This is perfectly in line with Thomas Hobbes’ 
explanation, however, that “men pursue their own self-preservation, which is why 
he agreed that a soldier might run away from battle provided he did so not out of 
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treachery but fear”86.  onetheless, Horace’s verse “dulce et decorum est pro 
patria mori” has been used repeatedly in government propaganda to glorify war 
and incite young men to enlist. Horace’s actual behaviour on the battlefield, 
however, is rather representative of the stark realities on the ground. Wilfred 
Owen, a British soldier fighting in the trenches of World War One and who 
experienced the extreme horrors of that war, denounced the call for patriotism as 
“The old Lie” in a poem he names Dulce et decorum est.  
Society expects its men (and sometimes, but rarely, its women) to go to war in its 
defence. A good citizen must have a sense of civic obligation or risk being 
stigmatised as “corrupt and vicious”87. Propaganda, nationalistic sentiment, and 
cultural mobilisation have contributed to a glorification of war among young men. 
Wilfred Owen berates society for telling this lie to its “children ardent for some 
desperate glory”88. The realities of war, which he and his contemporaries have 
described so vividly in poetry, literature and photography, are so horrific that it 
should in theory inspire soldiers to flee and not to fight.   
The mobilisation of men and the courage of citizen-soldiers in the battlefields of 
Europe have been largely attributed to the patriotic zeal and moral superiority of 
the combatant. Soldiers are considered to “have a personal stake in the 
matter”89, which makes them loyal and effective warriors, ready to die for the 
cause. Experiences of soldiers on the ground, however, contradict societal 
expectations that its warriors are fighting out of patriotic fervour and suggest 
instead that it is the military infrastructure, with its draconian training, stringent 
laws and unbreakable esprit de corps that inspire the soldiers to fight on.  
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Lacklustre patriotism 
 
Patriotism and civic duty are good for civilians supporting the war effort from their 
homes. They are also useful for inciting young men to join the army. In the 
battlefield on the other hand, patriotism is a remote sentiment “rejected as fit only 
for civilians”90. In his study on The American Soldier, Samuel Stouffer found that 
patriotism and nationalism were not major factors of motivation for soldiers 
fighting in World War Two91. In another survey led by M. Brewster Smith, the 
social psychologist concluded that less than 2% of all American soldiers were 
fighting for patriotic reasons after they had landed in Europe during the war92. 
The experience of war, with the constant presence of danger and potential death, 
forces the soldier to realign his values. Whereas he may enlist out of patriotic 
zeal, “there is no patriotism on the line. A boy up there 60 days in the line is in 
danger ever minute. He ain’t fighting for patriotism”93. Brigadier Julian Thompson 
explains that fighting for an idea such as patriotism “is a very fragile foundation 
on which to base morale, because in the stress of battle it evaporates. Whereas, 
if you’re fighting for yourself, your comrades, for each other, that sustains you in 
the moments when you think you might be losing”94.  
On the other hand, Leonard Wong argues that American soldiers fighting in Iraq 
have been motivated at least by cause if not by patriotism: “once the war 
outcomes become apparent, the motivation shifts to more ideological themes (...) 
Despite the results of previous studies and the subsequent conventional wisdom 
that American soldiers are not motivated by ideological sentiments, many 
soldiers in this study reported being motivated by notions of freedom, liberation, 
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and democracy”95. Similarly, James McPherson explained that in the American 
Civil War, Confederate soldiers fought “for liberty and independence from what 
they regarded as tyrannical”96.  
Regardless of Wong’s and  cPherson’s allegations, soldiers on the battlefield do 
not fight “for home, for the flag, for all the crap the politicians feed the public”97. 
The soldiers are not the public; they are the protagonists making the sacrifice 
that the public asks them to make. But the cost of war, particularly when the 
frontline is far from home, is born by the soldiers who fear mutilation, death, 
capture and torture. And yet these men keep fighting, not out of patriotism, not 
just because they have to, but because their lives and the lives of the men next 
to them depend on it.   
 
Esprit de Corps 
 
The Air Force Officer’s Guide states that “it is not primarily a cause which makes 
men loyal to each other, but the loyalty of men to each other which makes a 
cause”98. Small group loyalty or cohesion is purposefully developed in the armed 
forces because it is widely recognised that solidarity and group identity is the 
primary motivation for soldiers during combat99: “by living together, sharing 
discomfort and danger and becoming utterly dependent on each other for 
survival, a unique bond of comradeship develops among these small bodies of 
men”100. Armies, therefore, have repeatedly been organised into small 
administrative units from the Roman Army’s conturbernia, to Genghis Khan’s ten 
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man arbans and Frederick the Great’s seven man Kameradschaft101. Regiments 
are encouraged to develop a ‘corporate identity’ emphasising its uniqueness and 
lauding the previous heroic deeds of its adherents102.  
The physical presence of comrades from the same background appears to be an 
important factor in keeping a soldier fighting and motivated on the battlefield. 
Australian  ajor  arren  oore explains that “when a soldier is beginning to 
succumb to such fears, often the realisation that others around him are still 
fighting provides enough motivation to fight on”103. Therefore, Wong concludes 
from his study on American soldiers that “cohesion, or the emotional bonds 
between soldiers, appeared to be the primary factor in combat motivation”104. 
This is confirmed by French who argues that the “sheer force of shared 
experience binds warriors together in the crucible of combat”105.   
Another important factor in this esprit de corps is its existential dimension that 
empowers the soldier. The nihilism of war can strip the combatant of his 
existential meaning, especially if he perceives that he is treated as a “mere 
means to an end”106. Group mentality gives a soldier purpose. Soldiers must be 
made to “feel that although their individual contribution to the group may be 
small, it is still a critical part of unit success and therefore important”107. 
Furthermore, “a man’s sense of his own worth is determined by the judgement 
passed on him by others”108. Therefore the group’s recognition of a soldier’s 
instrumental purpose as an element of the unit is a self-affirming experience that 
validates the individual’s presence on the battlefield. Coker describes the 
instrumental value of the soldier who, by risking his life “may be brave but he 
must recognise also that he is more useful alive than dead. It is more useful for 
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everyone if he is still alive to continue the fight. To lose one’s life usefully is 
indeed to instrumentalise it”109. 
Through constant exposure to one another and to high levels of risk, the soldier’s 
immediate group becomes his family, sometimes even closer than his own core 
family. William Manchester, recalling his wartime experiences in the Pacific, 
explained that “those men on the line were my family, my home. They were 
closer to me than I can say, closer than any friends had been or ever would 
be”110. The sacrifices and heroic deeds that soldiers perform in the battlefield are 
emotional and deeply personal acts of love directed towards a person who has 
come to mean more to the soldier than life itself: “devotion, simple and selfless, 
the sentiment of belonging to each other was the one decent thing we found in a 
conflict otherwise notable for its monstrosities”111. The certainty of this devotion 
within the unit is what gives hope and existential meaning to the soldier on the 
battlefield: “that was part of what made it possible to do the job. You might be 
wounded, cut off from your comrades, surrounded by the enemy, but someone 
would be coming to get you”112.  
This esprit de corps is a critical factor in combat performance. Group identity 
creates bonds of loyalty that guarantee as far as possible the continued presence 
of a soldier on the battlefield. The emotional support that soldiers receive from 
one another inspires an important amount of motivation, especially when the 
patriotic fervour and ideological aspirations have been blasted away by the harsh 
realities of combat. It is also an important factor in protecting combatants from 
psychological breakdowns by providing the structural and relational support that 
every individual needs, especially in times of hardship. 
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Fighting to go home 
 
Charles Moskos argues that the emotional bonds tying soldiers to one-another 
on the battlefield originates from a sentiment of self-preservation in a situation of 
heightened danger rather than from an altruistic concern for their comrades113. 
Wong further explains that “once soldiers are convinced that their own personal 
safety will be assured by others, they feel empowered to do their job without 
worry”114. Soldiers in the battlefield have no choice but to ‘bite the bullet’ as the 
military and civilian infrastructure hold the threat of certain death if a soldier 
deserts his position. 
In his research on combat motivation, Stouffer found that Iraqi war veterans 
claimed their motivation on the battlefield was stimulated by coercion, not out of 
solidarity or patriotic sentiment: “their behavior was driven by fear of retribution 
and punishment by Baath Party or Fedayeen Saddam if they were found 
avoiding combat. Iraqi soldiers related stories of being jailed or beaten by Baath 
Party representatives if they were suspected of leaving their units. Several 
showed scars from previous desertion attempts”115. Wong explains that this fear 
overrode camaraderie as the primary source of motivation because of poor 
training and low levels of group cohesion116. His argument is substantiated by the 
threat that all soldiers face if they desert or surrender against the expressed 
wishes of their commander. Article 85 of the Punitive Articles of the Uniform 
Code of  ilitary Justice states that “(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or 
attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by 
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion 
or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than 
death, as a court-martial may direct”.  
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Threat of retribution and punishment, therefore, does not generally appear to be 
a significant motivation in keeping soldiers in the field. Officers have repeatedly 
used the threat of death on the spot to keep their troops from fleeing in panic 
during battles. A soldier therefore can chose between taking his chances on the 
battlefield, or assured death if he is caught deserting. Nonetheless, the high 
desertion rates on all sides during World War Two suggest that this threat was 
not sufficient to keep men fighting if they chose not to: in the United States, 
21,000 soldiers were convicted and sentenced for desertion117; Nazi Germany 
executed 15,000 men during the war118, but Joseph Stalin had 158,000 soldiers 
shot for deserting the Soviet war effort119.  
Whether soldiers fight out of a sentiment of self-preservation or out of solidarity, 
the outcome remains the same: only by surviving the battlefield will a soldier be 
able to go home. Their survival, whether physical, psychological, or moral, 
depends ultimately on the ties between the men fighting together on the 
battlefield. These emotional and practical bonds create a sense of loyalty 
between soldiers that keep them fighting on the battlefield even when all hope is 
gone. Esprit de corps or group cohesion is therefore a strategic objective that 
improves military performance and combat reliability. 
 
Conclusion: The soldier’s disenchantment 
 
Until the end of the Cold War, security threats against the nation-state bore an 
existential dimension: wars were ‘total’, requiring absolute sacrifice from each 
and every citizen. Failure on the battlefield was perceived to have apocalyptic 
consequences: the experiences of entire populations at the hands of the 
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Napoleonic, Nazi, Japanese or Soviet armies brought up the cost of occupation 
and defeat. Citizens were consequently empowered with a common and mutual 
responsibility for the security of their state and the safeguard of their traditions. 
Governments exploited this opportunity by creating mass-conscripted armies, 
which fulfilled the dual purpose of bringing the population under the state’s 
control, and improving the security of the nation by affordably mobilising all 
necessary resources and manpower. 
The security environment changed in later decades of the twentieth century, 
however. In the first place, the fall of the USSR in 1989 reduced the existential 
threat of a nuclear attack: “though the nuclear threat has not vanished, it has 
receded greatly as a possible instrument of war between major states”120. The 
threat of invasion has also been reduced significantly, with a greater institutional 
respect for territorial sovereignty which is safeguarded by supranational 
organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations. Security 
threats have shifted away from an existential and national dimension and now 
encompass more value-minded missions such as peace and humanitarian 
operations. Furthermore, there has been a decline in inter-state wars with a 
corresponding rise in civil wars and state collapse. The military purpose of armies 
has shifted from “war fighting or war deterrence to military deployments for peace 
and humanitarian purposes”121. In this security context, the existential rationale 
for maintaining huge armies of citizen-soldiers has disappeared. 
 ot only has the rationale for huge armies disappeared, “the non-existential 
nature of most contemporary security problems decreases citizens’ willingness to 
accept large military budgets and to contribute personally to national defence”122. 
The armed forces have also lost their ‘glamorous’ image. Even in the United 
States, which appears to many as the most militaristic and patriotic nation today, 
“there is a finite number of competent people willing to choose a career that 
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requires wearing a uniform, performing often dull work, such as guard duty, with 
alertness, and being ready at any moment to risk one’s life for others”123. In The 
Warrior Ethos, Coker explains that society no longer celebrates war and its 
warriors: it “can no longer interpret sacrifice, except as a waste of life”124. Parents 
are reluctant to allow their children to go to war – let alone encourage them to do 
so; and society carries on ‘as usual’ while battles wage in faraway frontiers. For 
the soldier, whose sanity and performance depend on an expectation of 
recognition, this utter lack of support and gratitude is a killing strike.  
Faced with the non-existential security environment of the twenty-first century, 
Western countries have abandoned the draft in favour for smaller and more 
professional armies: The United States abolished the draft in 1975, whereas 
France suspended conscription in 2001 and Germany in 2011. Only six Western 
countries still operate a system of military service. On the other hand, their most 
likely military and economic competitors have maintained conscription as a 
national policy: Egypt, Brazil, China, Algeria, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Israel and 
North Korea continue to enlist their young men (and women) into the armed 
forces. In the West, as wars have lost their existential and patriotic glory, armies 
are rapidly feeling the pinch of a shortage of manpower125.   
The civic-militarism that enabled the massive armies of the twentieth century is 
presently undermined by the murderous legacies of French, German and 
Japanese nationalism and ethnic militarism in the Balkans (among others). Civic 
duty is also eroded by the effects of globalisation: improvements in 
communications and transportation technology along with the high rate of 
mobility and migration have facilitated a system of overlapping identities and 
loyalties that are no longer centered on the nation-state126. Furthermore, 
supranational and regional organisations have weakened and diminished the 
influence of the central state. These events have significantly affected the social 
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contract, replacing social and military responsibility with absolute and 
unconditional rights ranging from healthcare to security. The apathetic attitude of 
citizens towards their nation is evident not only in their refusal to attend to their 
military duties, but also in the diminishing rate of voter turnout: only 10 countries 
today enforce compulsory voting. In other countries, voter turnout is as low as 
39.79% in the 2007 Swiss Parliamentary election and 57.47% in the 2008 U.S. 
Presidential elections. In France, the United Kingdom and Germany, less than 
75% of the population bother to vote in general elections127. 
Max Weber argued that industrialisation and the rationalisation of modern life led 
to a “disenchantment of life” which he defined in terms of the erosion of sublime 
values from public life128. The citizen-soldier has every reason to be 
disenchanted with war. There is no longer any patriotic fervour to encourage 
citizens to enlist. Military budgets are increasingly being cut, forcing armies to 
take shortcuts and leaving soldiers under-equipped in the heat of battle129. The 
soldier’s sacrifice is unwarranted, undeserved and unrecognised. There is no 
existential threat or existential purpose to justify the soldier’s presence on the 
battlefield. Soldiers have lost track of the mysticism of war. Unlike mercenaries 
who generally fight for money or for the love of war, there is very little incentive 
for soldiers to keep fighting. On the other hand, there is a crucial distinction 
between these two combatants. No matter how disillusioned they may feel, only 
the soldier can be counted on to fight to the very end: the punitive juridical 
system of the military and the esprit the corps deliberately engineered between 
the soldiers make these men brave beyond reason- a quality that can in no 
means be expected from mercenaries. 
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3. Integration: The French Foreign Legion 
 
The legionnaire is the mercenary-soldier par excellence. A modern-day Achilles, 
who fights to the death for a cause that is not his own, while operating under a 
strict military code and entirely answerable to the French state. Born out of the 
ideological flames of the French Revolution and thrust into the era of the citizen-
soldier, the French Foreign Legion has survived and thrived against all odds. 
Indeed, the Legion is unique in its heterogeneity and in its success at overcoming 
institutional and societal norms against mercenaries and foreigners. Of its 7,650 
legionnaires, 75% are foreigners representing 140 nationalities1 integrated into 
l’ rm e de  erre of which it makes up 5% of the manpower. The Kepis Blancs 
are recognisable worldwide and “form an important part of France’s military self-
image”2. Furthermore, today’s legionnaires embody and inspire the modern-day 
warrior in a world that appears increasingly disenchanted with war.    
 
This chapter traces the history of the French Foreign Legion and explores the 
identity and motivations of the men who join as legionnaires. The study aims to 
inform the discourse on the hybridisation of the armed forces by highlighting the 
ways in which France has, in this case, managed to overcome societal norms 
and military expectations regarding nationality and patriotism. Through a 
stringent use of disciplinary methods, an ideology focused on solidarity and duty, 
and the forging of a new identity anchored in its own traditions and history, the 
Foreign Legion has managed to build a regiment whose performance on the 
battlefields have inspired the respect and admiration of their peers. 
Consequently, the French Foreign Legion has become ‘le plus beau corps de 
France’, successfully integrating foreigners and French citizens into an army 
whose national pride has been a benchmark for citizen-armies since the 
nineteenth century. Lessons from this case-study can be brought forward to 
                                            
1
Jean-Dominique Merchet, "La Légion Étrangère S'accroche À Ses Effectifs," Libération, November 6th 
2008.
2
Porch, The French Foreign Legion : A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force, xxiii.
77 
 
address some of the problems facing modern armies that seek to merge 
nationals and foreigners or soldiers and private contractors in their military 
expeditions. 
    
A military experiment 
  
In 1830, France was a haven for political refugees and unsuccessful 
revolutionaries. The ideals of the French Revolution attracted political activists 
from Russia, Spain, Italy, Poland and Belgium who found asylum in the country 
of freedom and equality. A second Revolution in July 1830 saw the Bourbon 
monarchy overthrown and a “unilateral renunciation by France of the extradition 
treaties with other European governments signed in the shadow of the 
reactionary Congress of Vienna of 1815”3. Foreign immigrants flocked into the 
country for political or economic reasons, and, finding themselves unemployed, 
“became vagabonds, delinquents or even contributed to the considerable political 
turmoil of the period”4.  
Threatened by the presence of these turbulent personalities on French territory, 
the newly crowned King Louis-Philippe sought to control these foreigners by 
integrating them into the armed forces. Unfortunately for the King, a fervent anti-
mercenary norm had developed out of the two revolutions: Article 13 of the 1830 
Charter stated that “aucune troupe étrangère ne pourra être admise au service 
de l'État qu'en vertu d'une loi”5 (no foreign troop will be admitted into the service 
of the State unless exempted by decree). This stipulation was intended as a 
safeguard against the King’s inclination to protect himself from the French people 
by using foreign troops, generally the Swiss Guard. It was by royal decree 
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therefore that the Foreign Legion was established on March 9th 1831 with the 
recommendation that they should only serve outside of France.  
 espite the Legion’s claim that the 1831 ordinance follows France’s long tradition 
of using foreign troops, the circumstances surrounding the birth of the Foreign 
Legion indicate otherwise: France’s experience with foreign troops had made 
these combatants terribly unfashionable. In 1832, a new recruitment bill, the Loi 
Soult, declared that “ ul ne sera admis à servir dans les troupes française, s’il 
n’est Français”6 (no one shall be admitted into the French troops if he is not 
French), emphasising the general distrust vis-à-vis arming foreigners. French 
War  inister  ar chal  icolas Soult wrote in 1834 that “as the Foreign Legion 
was formed with the only purpose of creating an outlet and giving a destination to 
foreigners who flood France and who cause trouble (...) the government has no 
desire to look for recruits for this Legion. This corps is simply an asylum for 
misfortune”7. Donald Porch describes the birth of the Legion as “the illegitimate 
child of the July Revolution, an embarrassment, as once acknowledged and 
shunned, whose meagre patrimony was to be the right to die for France in the 
wastes of her empire. Its very name suggested all that was unfamiliar, unknown 
and distrusted, the very antithesis of the citizen, the compatriot, the 
comprehensible”8.  
 
Early days 
 
With such an inglorious beginning, the Legion’s early years were inevitably 
fraught with difficulties. The men who made up the legion were a heterogeneous 
group. Captain  orin de la Haye describes the legionnaire as “a déclassé, an 
adventurer, someone made bitter by life, a bandit. In the Legion we get 
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everything. In the companies which have a strength of three to four hundred 
men, one finds a mixture of ex-officers, ruined gentry, anarchists and freed 
convicts”9.The Legion was “a mongrel unit recruited among the scrapings of 
humanity, perhaps even among the criminal classes”10.  
Finding competent officers to train and lead the legionnaires was a task in itself. 
French officers were reluctant to take command positions in the Legion and 
nomination to such an assignment was considered as punishment: “today as 
officers are sent into the Foreign Legion as a punishment, they serve reluctantly, 
are humiliated to be there and look for any way to return to France. Several have 
very bad records and those good officers are upset to have comrades of this 
ilk”11. The first commander of the Legion, Swiss Baron Christopher Antoine 
Jacques Stoffel, himself criticised for lacking command experience, complained 
in June 1831 that the Legion had only 8 competent officers out of 2612. Non-
Commissioned Officers also frequently lacked training, confidence and authority, 
undermining the organisation of the Legion and encouraging a tendency towards 
insubordination and indiscipline. 
French commanders initially dismissed the Legion as a combat unit and assigned 
the battalions to “the least desirable, most disease-ridden posts (giving them) 
useless or often futile tasks to perform”13. Legionnaires were given manual labour 
and left to their road-building duties. The legionnaires were generally ignored by 
the French army who regularly forgot to send reinforcements, pay, and even 
food. Between 1831 and 1835, the Legion lost about a quarter of its numbers to 
disease. In its early days in Algeria, the legionnaires spent more of their time “in 
the hospital or building roads than in combat”14.  
The Legion’s perceived expendability was most evident in the Spanish campaign. 
In 1833, Spain was torn apart in a civil war between the three-year-old Queen 
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Isabella and her reactionary uncle, the Infante Carlos, who refused to recognise 
a female sovereign. Isabella’s reign was supported by the Quadruple Alliance 
made up of the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal. As the Carlists 
grew stronger, the Regent  aria Christina appealed in her daughter’s name for 
military support. France’s difficult experiences in Spain during the  apoleonic 
Wars had left the government hesitant with regards to committing itself to another 
unpopular campaign in the perilous Iberian Peninsula. Therefore on June 28th 
1835, King Louis-Philippe compromised by ceding the French Foreign Legion to 
Madrid. In this manner, France provided diplomatic support to Isabella short of 
sending French troops. Furthermore, by leasing the Legion to the Spanish 
authorities, the French government declined any responsibility towards their 
troops: “the Legion offered tangible evidence of French interest; with no strings 
attached (...) It was a gift, a disposable item, and so appealing to the politicians 
and diplomats precisely because it was expendable”15.  
The leasing of the Foreign Legion was badly received by the soldiers who argued 
that “they came to serve France and not other countries”16. The Legion was not 
so much ‘loaned’ as auxiliaries, which had been the practice in armies throughout 
history, but given over entirely to the Spanish. It was even temporarily renamed 
“the Spanish Legion”. The French government argued that, as mercenaries, it 
should not matter to the legionnaires who they were fighting for or where their 
salary came from – although Spain was expected to pay the soldiers, something 
which they often forgot to do17. The Legion was effectively treated as a force for 
hire, owned by France and given to Spain with diplomatic relations serving as the 
monnaie d’ c ange. In contrast, the United Kingdom sent to Spain a force of 
4,000 to 10,000 volunteers from the British Army line regiments between 1835 
and 1837. The British troops were known as the Auxiliary Legion, and as 
volunteers, released Britain from any moral or material commitments while 
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demonstrating her diplomatic support to Isabella’s cause18. Both the British 
Auxiliary Legion and the French (now Spanish) Legion suffered heavy losses in 
the Carlist wars. By 1837, only 1,500 British soldiers remained in Spain, with 
some 2,500 casualties – a quarter of the force. For the French legionnaires, the 
war was much worst: out of 5,000 legionnaires dispatched to Spain, only 159 
returned to France in 183919. The Foreign Legion had effectively been sacrificed 
– politically and militarily – to Spain. 
  
Earning its laurels 
 
When the French authorities abandoned the Foreign Legion to the savagery of 
the Spanish war, the military experiment of a regiment of foreigners appeared to 
come to its (un)natural end. The colonisation of Algeria in 1830, however, along 
with the continued flow of immigrants into France, offered a new wind to the 
Foreign Legion. On December 16th 1835, King Louis-Philippe created the 
nouvelle Légion with the purpose of supporting France’s colonial project.  
By 1840, the Legion had enough recruits to form two regiments. The Algerian 
campaign was harsh, requiring exceptional stamina from the legionnaires. The 
dynamism of the postings in Algeria transformed the Legion from an army of 
labourers to an army of combatants. The “ambulatory life in the open air” and the 
opportunity for military engagements restored the morale of the troops and 
contributed to their improved performance, born out of discipline and hardship20. 
A handful of exceptional leaders, most notably the governor-general of Algiers, 
Thomas ‘le père’ Bugeaud, managed to develop a system of command and 
control that sowed the seeds of a regimental spirit.  
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Algeria eventually became the Legion’s base and is engraved in the history and 
identity of the army. The legionnaires built their military headquarters themselves 
in Sidi-bel-Abbès, a town that would be the home of the Legion until 1962. The 
“glorious” reputation of the legionnaires was forged in the French colony, with 
major battles including Constantine (1837), Djidjelli (1839), Millianah (1840), 
Zaatcha (1849) and Ischeriden (1857)21. The successes of the Legion in Algeria 
led to its status as a colonial army, with exceptional endurance and mobility.  
The Legion was more than just a colonial army however. It was called to fight 
besides regular French forces in the Crimean War from 1854 to 1856. The 
Crimean campaign was particularly important for the Legion, because it gave it a 
“double vocation; that of fighting in France’s European wars as well as in her 
colonial wars”22. In this way, the Legion became a vital component of France’s 
system of defence. The 1859 Italian campaign confirmed France’s acceptance of 
the Foreign Legion as a fighting force: in the battle of  agenta, “2e étranger was 
in the thick of the fight, and by all accounts acquitted itself with great courage”23. 
The Legion subsequently accumulated battle honours in the 1850s, reaching new 
heights in the colonial wars of the 1880s as the French government tripled the 
Legion’s recruitment numbers and transformed the force into the striking arm of 
the colonial army. 
 
The colonial project 
 
In 1883, the Foreign Legion landed in Tonkin to support the French invasion of 
Indochina. The Legion was part of the attack column that captured the cities of 
Son Tay and Tuyên Quang and was also an integral component of France’s 
victory in the Sino-French War. By March 1885, the French had secured large 
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parts of the country: “with hardly more than a relative handful of troops, they had 
driven the Chinese off the Mandarin Road and broken the siege of Tuyen Quang, 
thereby achieving their immediate strategic objectives”24. Indochina was to 
become a ‘second fatherland’ for the legionnaires: in Tonkin, there were 
opportunities for action. By contrast, Algeria had been pacified and there were 
few excuses for military engagements. Furthermore, pension pays were doubled 
in Indochina where legionnaires qualified for ‘colonial pay’, a privilege denied in 
Algeria as it was considered to be part of metropolitan France. Indochina was 
perceived as an exciting posting, with guaranteed battles, an abundance of 
women, and servants to take care of menial tasks.  
The French colonial project continued and saw the Foreign Legion sent out to 
conquer parts of Africa, namely Dahomey (1892), Western Sudan (1892), 
 adagascar (1895) and  orocco (1900). The Legion’s ability to adapt to any 
terrain was proven in its battles from the jungles of Indochina to the deserts of 
Morocco and Algeria. The Foreign Legion became the outil de base for France’s 
colonial ambitions, even more so when, following the Franco-Prussian War, 
French public opinion turned against imperial expansion: colonialism became 
perceived as a waste of French lives and a distraction from the German threat. 
France compensated by using native troops in her colonial expeditions, but the 
commanders “continued to request the participation of the Legion because, when 
properly selected and led, they made excellent soldiers”25. Furthermore, the 
French did not trust their native troops and preferred to deal with white soldiers. 
The legionnaires were therefore employed “to solidify discipline within these 
expeditions as well as fight the enemy”26.  
The Foreign Legion was to be the beacon of French colonialism until the process 
of decolonisation in Indochina and Algeria from the 1940s to the 1950s squeezed 
the Legion out of its military bases. The Legion’s last years in Indochina were 
characterised by a steady deterioration of the French imperial troops, a shortage 
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of manpower, incompetent leadership and gross mistakes, which eventually 
culminated in the army’s final defeat at  ien Bien Phu in  ay 1954. The 
difficulties on the ground were exacerbated by the “indifference, even outright 
hostility of France to the war, a hostility that translated into poor armaments and 
even sabotaged equipment”27. The long war of attrition in Indochina cost the 
Legion 11,000 casualties, which corresponded to about one third of its manpower 
in the country28. Nonetheless, Dien Bien Phu is celebrated by the Legion as a 
paragon of courage and sacrifice and a display of heroic resistance.  
The Legion’s return to Algeria was a sombre event. Humiliated, defeated and 
abandoned, the legionnaires began to lose morale. This was exacerbated by the 
French policy of deducting the food allowance of former prisoners of war from 
their back pay on the assumption that the legionnaires “had been fed by the Viet 
Minh during captivity and therefore were not entitled to it”29. The legionnaires 
were increasingly isolated from their political base, particularly as France set 
Tunisia and Morocco on the path to independence, paving the way for Algeria, a 
move that the Legion refused to accept.  
 
The loss of Algeria and t e Legion’s rebellion 
 
The outbreak of the Algerian War in November 1954 caught the French 
government by surprise. Adjudant-Chef Janos Kemencei expressed his anger 
that the equipment provided by the authorities in 1955 to fight against the 
National Liberation Front  (FLN) was utterly unsuited for military operations and 
appeared to be leftovers from World War One: “I no longer had any faith. My 
professionalism remained intact. But I no longer wanted to fight for causes lost in 
advance, like here in Algeria (...). To support an intemperate climate without 
appropriate material, support the constant absence of hygiene, swallow on 
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operations execrable flood, all of this had literally disgusted me with the army”30. 
The French army, including parts of the Legion, ran counter-insurgency 
operations in Algeria, characterised by a brutal war of attrition with escalating 
levels of violence, particularly between the Legion’s paras and the local FLN 
terrorists. The unrestrained use of torture, however, led to public condemnation 
in France, especially among the literary community. 
The Legion was particularly provoked when, despite false promises to safeguard 
Algeria from independence, President Charles de Gaulle reached out to the FLN. 
Despite declarations of support for an Algérie française, in 1960, de Gaulle 
yielded to the demands of the United Nations and began secret peace talks 
setting out the conditions for Algerian independence. This was exacerbated by 
the Legion’s recent memories of defeat and abandonment in Indochina. The loss 
of Algeria, although controversial in France, was unacceptable to the Legion 
whose ville sainte was still Sidi-bel-Abbès, which the Legion had built itself: “as it 
increasingly appeared that Algeria would be cut free from France, unit loyalty and 
solidarity became an important factor in determining attitudes, foremost among 
them the feeling that without Algeria there could be no Legion”31. Morale was 
severely undermined as the legionnaires feared for their future. The legionnaires 
of the 1er REP were particularly sensitive to the loss of Algeria. They had been 
almost constantly in battle since 1940 and had suffered from huge losses in 
Indochina, which they attributed to the betrayal of the French government. The 
regiment’s headquarters in Z ralda also placed them at the political heart of 
Algeria. 
On April 22nd 1961, the 1er REP under the leadership of General Maurice Challe 
seized control of Algiers in an attempted putsch against President de Gaulle. The 
French President responded by calling a state of emergency and arresting select 
officers. The coup, it appeared, was not supported by the general population, and 
led to a mobilisation of the unions, conscript soldiers and intellectuals. The coup 
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also divided the Legion with Lieutenant Colonel Brothier declaring that “the 
putsch is a French affair; it is unthinkable that foreigners should become mixed 
up with it”32. His statement was to save the Legion from being abolished 
completely. 1er REP Legionnaire Simon  urray observed that “the army is 
completely divided and we appear to be very much a minority... I wonder what 
will happen if this putsch does not succeed and what our own position will be”33. 
On April 26th, the 1er REP “awoke to find themselves surrounded by heavily 
armed police and army units, with helicopters buzzing overhead”34. General 
Challe was arrested and the 1er REP was dissolved on April 30th upon the orders 
of Defence Minister Pierre Messmer. The legionnaires tore down the barracks 
that “they had built themselves from scratch, brick by brick, in the tradition of the 
Legion”35 and left their base in Z ralda singing Edith Piaf’s song “Je ne regrette 
rien”.   
Even though the failed coup was engineered by French officers, the Legion was 
made the scapegoat of the whole affair. The formal independence of Algeria on 
July 3rd 1962 forced the Legion out of the base that had been their home for 120 
years and left the French army without a role in Africa. Simon Murray described 
the problem for the Legion: “suddenly there is no purpose, there is no direction. 
Bewilderment is quickly superseded by boredom, which is itself overtaken by a 
rapid decline in morale. Discontent follows and the system begins to rot”36. The 
Legion’s numbers was cut from 40,000 soldiers to 8,000. Headquarters were 
moved to Aubagne in the South of France and the Legion began their search for 
a new meaning and role in a post-colonial world. 
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The transformation of the Legion 
 
On December 10th 1962, the fate of the Legion was suddenly decided. After 
rumours of disbandment and months of building roads, the French Inspector-
General of the Legion, General Jacques Lefort announced to the 2e REP that 
they were to be transformed into a rapid reaction force. The geopolitical situation 
had changed with the end of the colonial era, and “France’s requirement for 
troops now that they (had) lost Indochina and North Africa (was) to be 
considerably less”37. In order to survive, the Legion had to clean up its image and 
diversify its skills. Hence the regiments were required to “set about training up 
specialised sections in underwater combat, demolition, guerrilla warfare, night 
fighting, special armaments”38. Simon Murray enthusiastically described the 
training program ahead: “we will be trained to operate tanks and armoured 
vehicles, we will be taught to ski and mountaineer, we will become familiar with 
submarines, we will be sent on survival courses and we will become highly 
skilled and dextrous with multipurpose capability. This is all terrific stuff. (...). 
We’re back in business. Somebody thinks we can do more than just build bloody 
roads all day”39.  
In 1969, the Legion received its first post-colonial posting in Chad when the 
French government sent them to support President Tombalbaye’s regime against 
a rebel insurgency. This was followed in 1976 by a second mission in Djibouti 
where the 2e REP was sent to release a bus-load of children that Somali 
terrorists had taken hostage. The new role of the Legion, however, was 
cemented in Kolwezi in 1978. A mining town in Zaire’s mineral-rich province of 
Shaba, Kolwezi was overrun by 4,000 rebel fighters who crossed the border from 
Angola and took hostage the 3,000 European engineers and families living in the 
town. President Mobutu appealed to the French and Belgians for help, and on 
May 19th 1978, 650 paras were dropped over Kolwezi with orders to push back 
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the rebels and release the European hostages. The mission was lauded as “a 
resounding success for 2e REP, a vindication for the Legion’s new role”40. Five 
legionnaires were killed, however, and 25 were wounded, with an additional 190 
Europeans and 200 black civilians killed by the rebels as they retreated back to 
Angola.  
The weak military and political capabilities of the new post-colonial African states 
provided a fresh opportunity for the Legion: France sought to maintain its 
influence in the former francophone colonies, and, upon invitation, sent its 
legionnaires to help restore and maintain order in disputed territories. 
Consequently, the Legion continued to see action in Chad, where it returned in 
1978 and remained until 1988, and in Djibouti, formerly known as French 
Somaliland; it helped evacuate French civilians in Rwanda, Gabon and Zaire in 
1991, returning to Rwanda with Opération Turquoise in 1994. France sent its 
Legion to Centrafrique in 1996 and to Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 to evacuate the 
French expatriate community following violence in the area. A coup attempt and 
rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 brought the French back into the country as 
President Laurent Gbagbo asked France to implement a cease-fire. The 2e REP, 
2e REI and 1er REC were therefore sent to Côte d’Ivoire to support the French 
troops in Opération Licorne.  
French military activity in francophone Africa has become a cornerstone of its 
foreign policy, known as Françafrique. This term encompasses the alleged neo-
colonial interests of France in its former colonies, and is played out through 
diplomatic relations, economic aid and investments, and military intervention. The 
Foreign Legion has been France’s military arm in Africa, and therefore played a 
central part in the country’s continued international prestige. French aspirations 
to remain a great power have been played out in Africa: as Foreign Minister 
Louis de Guiringaud once said, “after all, Africa was the only continent where 
France could still change the course of history with a few hundred men”41. 
                                            
40
Gilbert, Voices of the Foreign Legion : The History of the World's Most Famous Fighting Corps, 243. 
41
 Foreign minister Louis de Guiringaud cited in Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (New York: Continuum, 2010), 66. 
89 
 
Indeed, former President François Mitterand ominously declared in 1957 that 
“without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st Century”42. 
The Foreign Legion has not been limited to Africa, however. As part of its new 
role and in view of France’s increasing collaboration with the international 
community, the French Foreign Legion has been called upon to participate in 
peacekeeping missions under the banner of the United Nations. The 1er REC 
was included in France’s military contribution to the Allied invasion of Iraq in 
1991. In 1992, the Legion was sent to Cambodia and Somalia to facilitate 
humanitarian efforts. This was followed by the controversial Opération Turquoise 
in Rwanda, where French forces, working apart from the U.N., were accused of 
facilitating genocide by providing a safe haven for Hutu génocidaires.  
The Legion’s new role as part of a greater military cooperation was not easily 
accepted by the legionnaires. The civil war between the Serbs, Croats and 
Bosnians in ex-Yugoslavia brought in the 6e REG and 2e REP, but the restrictive 
conditions of the U.N. mandate frustrated the legionnaires who felt that their 
potential was under-exploited. Legionnaire Matt Rake described the difficulties 
that the Legion faced while working with the U. .: “this was the first U. . mission 
the Legion had ever done. We had to change our berets to the blue U.N. ones. 
This didn’t go down well- we’d signed up for the Legion, and not the U. . And we 
were made to wear the French flag on our arm, which we’d never done before, 
and that didn’t go down well either”43. The operational restrictions imposed on the 
Legion further undermined the raison d’être and traditional autonomy of the 
legionnaires. Pádraig O’Keeffe expressed his personal frustration with the 
mission in Bosnia: “our mission in Bosnia was a joke – as far as I was concerned 
we were helping no one. We knew it, and so did the Serbs, the Bosnians and the 
Croats. We were glorified aid workers. We had been trained to take military 
action, we knew the action that was required, and yet we were told to sit on our 
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hands. And while we stood by, innocent people died. I was sick of all the 
bullshit”44. 
 onetheless, the Legion’s role in the twenty-first century is anchored in its ability 
to contribute to international peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster alleviation 
efforts. In 2002, France joined NATO forces in Operation Enduring Freedom and 
committed its legionnaires to working as minesweepers and as instructors for the 
new Afghan army. In 2008, following a new outbreak of violence in the area, the 
Legion was sent back to Chad with EUFOR, a multinational EU force. The 
Legion’s mission in Chad was to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
protect civilians and UN personnel. The Legion also participated in international 
disaster alleviation efforts in South and South-East Asia after the 2004 tsunami in 
the Indian Ocean. Currently, legionnaires are working as peacekeepers in 
Lebanon with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)45.  
The French Foreign Legion has changed dramatically since its creation in 1831. 
From a small force whose purpose was to channel ‘undesirables’ out of France to 
the country’s most elite and celebrated regiments with an international reach, the 
Legion has gloriously weathered public opposition, scandals, desertions, the end 
of the colonial era and the perpetual transformation of French foreign policy. With 
its ability to adapt, its excellent combat record, its non-military qualities and multi-
lingual capabilities, the Legion remains an asset in France’s military operations 
within a new framework of global cooperation. 
     
The legionnaire 
 
The legionnaire is a soldier who has voluntarily enlisted in the French Foreign 
Legion, and is therefore part of France’s Armée de Terre. Legionnaires must be 
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male, between the ages of 17 and 40, and are required to meet the Legion’s 
physical requirements. In practice, however, the Legion has historically been a 
channel to “clear France of foreigners”46 and sometimes even undesirable 
Frenchmen. In 1834, an inspector for the Legion complained that “in their haste 
to speed undesirable foreigners out of France, mayors and recruiting officers 
were enlisting men who were visibly infirm”47. Men accused of petty crimes in 
France were also sometimes given the choice between going to jail and joining 
the Legion. Originally, legionnaires were either foreigners who were fighting for a 
country that was not their own, or ‘bad’ renegade Frenchmen – although the 
latter have been the exception rather than the rule.  
The Legion today is an elite unit of the French Army but 75% of its manpower is 
foreign48. This belies the general expectation that conscripts and national forces 
are superior combatants compared to foreigners or mercenaries. Despite its 
reputation as an exceptional combat force, the Legion suffers from above 
average desertion rates, a characteristic typical of mercenaries. It has 
subsequently been treated with suspicion and negligence by the French 
government, a factor that has arguably contributed to alienating the Legion from 
la patrie. Nonetheless, the legionnaires have defied conventions and proved their 
mettle on the battlefields of French history, earning the admiration and respect of 
the French public and its armed forces. 
 
Motivation 
 
Political repression and poverty have generally been the main motivations for 
men enlisting in the Foreign Legion. Erwin Rosen, a legionnaire in 1905, was 
shocked by the physical state of the men waiting at the recruiting office in Belfort: 
“a dozen men were there. Some of them were mere boys, with only a shadow of 
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beard on their faces; youths with deep-set hungry eyes and deep lines around 
their mounts; men with hard, wrinkled features telling the old story of drink very 
plainly”49. Another legionnaire, Adrian Liddell Hart, explained in 1951 that for a 
large proportion of men, the Legion was “a sanctuary in the most literal sense. A 
few of them, even today, are escaping from their police for civil offences. Many 
more are escaping from their governments for political reasons”50. It is therefore 
not surprising to find that the nationalities of the legionnaires follow the political 
upheavals of history: White Russians enlisted in large numbers in the 1920s, 
Germans volunteered en masse after both World Wars, Hungarians and other 
Eastern Europeans joined the Legion with each new Soviet invasion. Military 
coups and revolutions filled the recruitment bureau of the Legion. Colonel Robert 
 evouges said in 1981 that the Legion “reflects the troubles of the world. Laos, 
Cambodia, Bangladesh – you name the event, and we’ll have the men”51. 
The Legion’s policy of anonymity has been essential for men fleeing a political or 
criminal past. The identité declarée was originally a legally endorsed recruiting 
mechanism that facilitated immediate enlistment in times of conflict, as foreigners 
were not required to prove their identity52. Men signing up for the Legion used a 
nom de guerre and could take on any nationality of their choice. This was 
particularly useful for Frenchmen who, until 2007, were disallowed from enlisting, 
except as officers: “on paper, apart from the officers, there are no French 
nationals serving in the ranks. Any Frenchmen are listed as Belgians, Swiss or 
French-Canadians”53. The anonymity of the Legion, however, was also an 
opportunity for men who had suffered difficulties and failures to gain a second 
chance in life. The Legion vehemently protected the identity of its legionnaires 
during the entirety of their service. The identité declarée became a tool of social 
inclusion and military integration, and forged a silent debt between the Legion 
                                            
49
Erwin Rosen, In the Foreign Legion: The Experiences of a Journalist Who Joined the French Foreign 
Legion in North Africa at the Turn of the 20th Century (Leonaur Ltd 2010), 5-6. 
50
Adrian Liddell Hart, Strange Company (London: G. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), 203. 
51
Gilbert, Voices of the Foreign Legion : The History of the World's Most Famous Fighting Corps, 19.  
52
Légion- trangère, "L’identit    clar e," Portail Internet de la L gion  trangère, http://www.legion-
etrangere.com/modules/info_seul.php?id=58. 
53
Jaime Salazar, Legion of the Lost : The True Experience of an American in the French Foreign Legion 
(New York: Berkley Caliber Book, 2005), 14-15. 
93 
 
and its men: “leur fid lit , leur d vouement, leur engagement et leur disponibilit  
sont à l’image de cette volont  radicale de rupture et de don exclusif à leur 
famille d’accueil”54 (their fidelity, their devotion, their engagement and their 
availability are at the image of this radical desire for rupture and this exclusive gift 
towards their new family). It was a symbol of hope and new beginnings, but also 
a statement of dependency and loyalty to the Legion who had generously 
endowed its soldier with this priceless gift. Since September 20th 2010, 
legionnaires are no longer required to enlist under a nom the guerre, although it 
remains an option and they may at any time reclaim their true identity.  
Money has never been a source of motivation for legionnaires: “during the 
nineteenth century – and well into the twentieth – pay was so poor that it was 
only the most desperate who volunteered for economic reasons: in order to put 
clothes on their backs and food in their mess tins”55. In fact, legionnaires were 
paid about five centimes per day, so little that it “bought nothing more than a box 
of matches, and which even the Arabs scorned”56. The French government 
argued that “to pay legionnaires a fair wage would open them to charges of being 
mercenaries. Therefore, harsh administrative logic decreed that the virtue of the 
legionnaire, as well as that of France, was somehow redeemed by his 
impoverishment”57.  The pay was so low that legionnaires were at times forced to 
sell their equipment to pay for food and medication. This changed, however, in 
the 1960s when the salaries of the Legion were improved to increase its appeal 
to a wider selection of economic migrants58. Today, a new recruit can expect a 
monthly salary between 1,043€ and 3,567€ depending on his posting59. This 
includes housing, food and equipment. All legionnaires enlist as bachelors, 
regardless of their marital status or whether they have dependents and therefore 
the only variation in salaries is according to experience and postings. Only after 
five years of service may legionnaires seek permission to marry. 
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The Foreign Legion has traditionally appealed to professional soldiers and men 
with a military vocation. Adrian Liddell Hart explains that many recruits are “men 
who want to be professional soldiers and cannot soldier in their own countries, or 
have decided that it is anyhow better to soldier in the Legion”60. The Legion is a 
sanctuary and an opportunity for new beginnings; it offered its soldiers a 
community that is recognised by the entire world: “the Legion claims to be 
something more than a military force. This claim is essential. However much it 
may fall short of the fulfilment, the Legion could scarcely exist without this 
aspiration, this mystique”61. It is a self-glorified rite of passage in which its 
legionnaires are promised an opportunity to test their manhood in combat: “there 
are plenty of opportunities for active service – and for action”62.  
The Foreign Legion boasts several prestigious legionnaires and officers in its 
history: King Peter of Serbia and French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer were 
both officers of the Legion. It counts among its roster of legionnaires Shapour 
Bakhtiar, the Shah of Iran’s last prime minister, Prince Aage of  enmark and 
Prince Amilakhvari of Georgia, British multi-millionaire businessman Simon 
Murray and French nationalist leader Jean-Marie le Pen. The Legion has 
traditionally attracted romantics, artists, writers in search of existential 
experiences and emotional challenges, although “the idealistic adventurer (...) 
was actively discouraged”63. German painter Hans Hartung, German writer Ernst 
Jünger and the Hungarian intellectual Arthur Koestler are to be included in the 
Legion’s hall of fame64. The Legion has been the home of men from different 
cultures, countries, races and religions. The diversity of its soldiers has given the 
Legion a unique personality. British legionnaire A.R. Cooper describes the 
Legion as “a refuge, a meal ticket, a place for rehabilitation. It can also be a 
profession. A man goes to it without identity papers, with the nationality of his 
choice, and shorn of criminal records. He leaves his past outside the recruiting 
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office door”65. To potential recruits, the Legion offers “an honourable asylum, the 
possibility of satisfying either their tastes or their needs, and finally, while serving 
the cause of civilisation, the promise of a modest future with a pension”66. Men 
join the Legion for many reasons, although clearly they can rarely be motivated 
by salary or wealth. Nonetheless, as foreigners, legionnaires have been viewed 
with suspicion and are often considered little better than mercenaries who fight 
for a country that is not their own, with no loyalty or patriotism to ensure their 
performance on the battlefield. 
 
Death and the legionnaire 
 
The Legion has historically been used as cannon fodder by the French: sent into 
the most dangerous places, sacrificed to the enemy, and neglected by France. 
This was symbolically voiced by General Oscar de Négrier who told the 
legionnaires leaving to Tonkin in 1883: “Vous, légionnaires, vous êtes soldats 
pour mourir, et je vous envoie où l’on meurt!”67 (You, legionnaires, you are 
soldiers to die, and I am sending you where one dies). It is no surprise, therefore, 
that legionnaires have adopted a nihilistic attitude towards their own life and 
death, evidenced in the high suicide rates and the practically suicidal missions in 
which they take part. In the Legion, “the majority of its members consider 
themselves already dead. That is the full evolution of the soldier (...). Dying is 
what the Legion is all about”68. The sappeurs, or pioneers, of the French Legion 
embody this philosophy: they are tasked with engineering duties including the 
destruction of the enemy’s heavy machinery while under fire. They traditionally 
had a very short life expectancy and consequently were given more leeway in the 
army – which is why they symbolically wear a beard as the mark of their special 
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privileges and as evidence of the high risks they take and the sacrifice that they 
make. 
Embracing death is part of the code of the legionnaire. Article 6 of the Honour 
Code states that “La mission est sacrée, tu l'exécutes jusqu'au bout et si besoin, 
en opérations, au p ril de ta vie”  (Your mission is sacred. It is carried out until 
the end, in respect of the law, the customs of war International Conventions, if 
needs be, at the risk of your own life). Upon entering the Legion, the recruit 
swears an oath to defend himself and his comrades to the death, if necessary.  
The Battle of Camerone on April 30th 1863 exemplifies this philosophy: the 
Foreign Legion was stationed in  exico in 1863 as part of France’s campaign 
against President Juárez who had suspended interest payments to its creditors, 
France, Britain and Spain. During the campaign, the French sent a convoy 
carrying 3 million francs, equipment and munitions. A reconnaissance team of 62 
legionnaires and 3 officers were sent out ahead of the convoy. The men were 
attacked by up to 2,000 soldiers from the Mexican cavalry and infantry. Led by 
Captain Danjou, the legionnaires refused to surrender, despite the inevitability of 
their impending defeat, earning the admiration and respect of their opponent. 
After eleven hours and having lost all but three men, the Mexicans allegedly 
begged the legionnaires to surrender and save themselves, which they did on 
conditions that their fallen comrades would be collected and that they would be 
allowed to keep their weapons69. The heroic sacrifice of Danjou and his men 
saved the convoy, and set an example for the legionnaires. Camerone Day on 
April 30
th
 is one of two sacred holidays in the Legion’s calendar. A huge parade 
is organised to showcase the Legion and the famous wooden hand of Captain 
Danjou is taken out of the crypt.  
Sergent-chef LaBella described the symbolic meaning of battle of Camerone: 
“the appeal of Camerone to a legionnaire is as natural as instinct. He reaches out 
to it in his own heart, because it is part of his own pain. It is the great reminder to 
the legionnaire that the sand is always blowing in his eyes, the battleground is 
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always ill-chosen, the odds are too great, the cause insufficient to justify his 
death, and the tools at hand always the wrong ones. And, above all, nobody 
cares whether he wins or loses, lives or dies. Camerone gives the legionnaire 
strength to live with his despair. It reminds him that he cannot win, but it makes 
him feel that there is dignity in being a loser”70. The inevitability of death is ever 
present in the life of the soldier, and particularly so for the legionnaire. American 
poet Alan Seegers, who met his end in 1916 fighting with the French Foreign 
Legion, wrote his poem Rendezvous which beautifully illustrates the mindset of 
these legionnaires: 
 
But I’ve a rendezvous  it  Deat  
At midnight in some flaming town, 
When Spring trips north again this year, 
And I to my pledged word am true, 
Shall not fail that rendezvous
71
 
 
 
The legionnaire might not find meaning in fighting for the fatherland, but he does 
find meaning in a heroic death. This is born from a “supreme disdain for death. 
The composite legionnaire has all the sublime virtues brought out by war and 
displays virility and superiority”72 and this has been the strength of the Legion 
and the best guarantee of military performance. 
Cut-off from his past and isolated from reality, the legionnaire’s life is worth very 
little to anyone, and least of all to France. This has inevitably affected morale, 
particularly during periods of peace and boredom when the Legion is given 
construction duties. Legionnaires are particularly sensitive to spouts of 
depression, which is commonly called le cafard after the cockroach that 
“metaphorically eats away at a man’s brain, apparently devouring both mind and 
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soul”73. Legionnaire Frederic Martyn described the effects of le cafard as: “a form 
of mania supposed to be peculiar to the Legion – it is nothing more nor less, 
according to my idea of it, than a sort of hysteria set up by the action of a 
monotonous regime upon restless active natures in that climate. It is nature 
calling out insistently for change. It is but rarely that manifestations of the cafard 
end in tragedy; in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred they simply assume the 
character of an ordinary drunken quarrel or an extraordinary drunken spree”74. In 
other cases, however, depression and the oppressiveness of the Legion have led 
men to suicide, and once this avenue has been opened, it often spreads across 
the regiment. Patrick le Poer wrote in 1880 that “when one man shoots himself 
an epidemic seems to set in; men hear every day in hut or tent or guard room the 
ill-omened report; soon they go about looking fearfully at one another, for no one 
knows but that he is looking into the eyes of a comrade who has made up his 
mind to die”75.  
Suicide, like desertion, is harmful to a regiment. It reduces manpower, brings 
down morale, and exposes a weakened army to the enemy. The legionnaire 
famously “does not fear death”; while he may run steadfast to his death on the 
battlefield, he may also find very little to live for: fighting and dying, with no hope 
of recognition, for a cause that is not his own, and for a country where he has no 
past and probably no future. This ambivalent relationship with death is 
detrimental to the image of the Legion. It undermines the reliability of the 
legionnaires whose unpredictable suicidal tendencies and perceived lack of 
patriotic allegiance can at any time jeopardise the mission. 
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Patriotism and foreignness 
 
Legionnaires are often categorised as mercenaries: they are foreign, paid, albeit 
poorly, to go to war for a cause that is not their own, and are unruly and 
unreliable. The “outlaw image of the Legion, its racism, anti-Semitism and anti-
intellectualism, its aggressive, hard-drinking and brother-crawling culture”76 
attracted a certain type of man, as did the active lifestyle and opportunity for 
battle.  espite their different nationalities, legionnaires often “shared a common 
background and attitude and even certain psychological traits”77 that are equally 
prevalent in mercenary forces: they “were denied any of the motivations 
commonly thought essential for modern fighting men – patriotism, a desire to 
defend family and homeland, the certainty that one’s national cause is righteous 
and, lastly, the crutches of a language and national character, even of a shared 
sense of humor, so essential in carrying men over the rough spots”78. 
Consequently, the French government treated the Legion with suspicion, neglect 
and violence. Captain Morin de La Haye compared the legionnaires to a “human 
beast (who) shows his teeth and is brought to heel only through the use of 
fists”79.  
Although the Legion is integrated into the French army, the legionnaires have 
historically been profoundly anti-French, “contemptuous of France’s army and 
her political system”80. As the Legion is perceived to be for foreigners, 
legionnaires have frequently objected to the presence of French nationals on 
‘their’ territory. The language advantage that the French legionnaires have has 
also contributed to this resentment. Anti-French hostility was voiced by American 
Jaime Salazar who complained that “the French wasted little time organising the 
inevitable mafia francophone, making the non-French further resent their 
exclusivity and arrogance. The Legion was supposed to be for foreigners, for 
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Chrissake!”81. Furthermore, as Germans have often been a majority within the 
Legion, this has encouraged Franco-German antagonism. Kevin Foster, a former 
Royal Navy seaman and legionnaire in the 1980s stated that “the French thought 
themselves above everyone else. The common denominator in the Legion was 
that everyone hated the French”82.  
The image of the legionnaire was already viewed with suspicion because of its 
foreignness and infamous indiscipline. The high desertion rate of the Legion, 
however, exacerbated this impression because “desertion is a characteristic of 
mercenary forces, whose troops often lack an overriding sense of loyalty to the 
unit”83. Desertion is part of the tradition of being a legionnaire and the Legion still 
loses approximately 300 soldiers each year84. Porch explains that “many 
legionnaires saw desertion as a challenge, a gesture, a personal statement that 
was part of the process of being a legionnaire. The point was not that the 
desertion should succeed but that it should be dramatic”85. This claim is 
corroborated by the surprising number of legionnaires who subsequently reenlist 
in the Legion under another name. Nonetheless, desertion does not appear to 
have been detrimental to regimental performance: legionnaires tended to desert 
under the duress of boredom in stagnant postings rather than during mobile 
campaigns. Desertion, however, remains a sign of cowardice and undermined 
the perceived dependability of the Legion. Consequently, many French generals 
argued that legionnaires could not be trusted in campaigns and might even prove 
dangerous to the regular French troops. The uprising of the 1er REP in Algeria in 
1961 showed that “the Legion had become a prisoner of its own myths, too 
attached to its moral geography and “ville sainte” to remember that its function 
was to carry out government policy, however, distasteful”86. The Legion was 
employed principally in the colonies for two reasons: first because French lives 
were judged to be too important to sacrifice to France’s imperialist ambitions, and 
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second, because the French government suspected the Legion’s loyalties and 
therefore preferred to fight her national wars without foreigners87. Whereas 
desertions are a common occasion in the Legion, rebellions against the 
fatherland remain few and far between. 
The Legion’s estrangement from the French army is further amplified by its 
image as an elite force of mythical proportion. Its motto, Legio Patria Nostra (the 
Legion is our homeland), suggests that the legionnaires owe allegiance to the 
Legion, and not to the ‘fatherland’. The regimental flags are decorated with the 
inscription Honneur et Fidélité (Honour and Loyalty) rather than Honneur et 
Patrie (Honour and Homeland), which adorns the flags of the regular army. This 
is a calculated and symbolic difference between the regular French soldiers and 
the legionnaires; the latter were, after all, mercenaries, and it would be pointless 
and insulting to ask them to fight for a ‘fatherland’ that was not their own. France 
recognised that the nation and patriotism were “not high in the legionnaire’s 
system of values”88 and therefore made allowances for this army of foreigners: if 
the situation arose where a legionnaire came from a country with which France 
was at war, the soldier was asked whether he wanted to participate in the 
conflict. Legionnaire James Worden wrote in the 1950s that the Legion was 
introduced to recruits as the only acceptable beneficiary of a legionnaire’s loyalty: 
“it is at this time that the almost fully trained recruit realises that, although on 
enlistment he swore an oath of allegiance to the French flag, that flag is wholly 
represented by the Legion, and only the Legion. He may be termed a soldier but 
he is not part of the French Army, and for him there will only exist the Legion and 
its officers. The French regular army is as remote as the man on the moon, and 
will not even exist in his mental make-up”89. The Legion also accentuates its 
distinctness symbolically by its uniquely slow parade march and a uniform that 
does not sport the French flag.  
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The assumption that legionnaires are unpredictable and unreliable because of 
their foreignness is contradicted by the incredible courage that these men have 
repeatedly displayed. The Legion has been a useful tool in French foreign policy 
and has served its fatherland for the past 180 years. Loyalty and servitude to 
France are an intrinsic part of the training of the legionnaire. Article 1 of the Code 
d’Honneur du Legionnaire, which every recruit learns by heart in his own 
language as well as in French, defines the legionnaire as a volunteer who 
accepts to serve France with honour and fidelity: “Légionnaire, tu es un 
volontaire servant la France avec  onneur et fid lit ”90 (Legionnaire, you are a 
volunteer, serving France with honour and fidelity). Furthermore, although the 
Legion is staffed with foreigners, it is very much a French institution, “tightly 
bound up with French prejudices and with French vanity”91. France has adopted 
its legionnaires, awarding them – and their children– French nationality, 
conditionally and upon request, after three years of service
92
. This concept of 
“Français par le sang vers ” (French by the blood shed) was institutionalised in 
1999. Despite on-going prejudices against foreigners, mercenaries and the 
Legion, the France’s policy of naturalising its foreign combatants indicates that 
the legionnaires have earned the right to be French through their service to and 
sacrifice for the ‘fatherland’. 
 
Integration 
 
Although the French Foreign Legion is a force made up of foreigners, and indeed 
mercenaries by most definitions, it is nonetheless an integral part of the French 
army. Full integration into the French armed forces required a record of military 
successes and evidence of reliability and state control that were progressively 
realised over the Legion’s 180 years of service. The French government has 
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always exerted control over the Legion, by stipulating its recruitment policies, 
over-viewing training, and setting the mandate for the legionnaires. At the same 
time, it is through its unusual autonomy and the nurturing of ‘sacred rituals’ that 
the Legion has developed such a high degree of unit loyalty among its men.   
The Legion’s officers are nearly all French officers who are serving in the Armée 
de Terre and have volunteered to spend some time in the Legion. Initially, this 
position was looked down upon and viewed as some sort of punishment. As the 
Legion earned itself a reputation as an elite and professional force, it began to 
attract the crème of the French officers. On the other hand this brought about 
accusations that the Legion was draining the French army of its best officers. 
Overall only 10% of the Legion’s officer corps has served as former legionnaires 
and sous-officiers (NCO)93. Officers are traditionally uninvolved in the day to day 
running of the regiments which is left to the responsibility of the  COs: “The 
corporals and sergeants form the backbone of the Legion, and are given more 
responsibility that is usual in other armies”94. Despite the presence of French 
officers, the Legion maintains its regimental autonomy and is allowed to 
administrate its disciplinary measures and training programs at a local level.  
Between its creation and its near-end in 1963, the Legion has hosted more than 
600,000 legionnaires. In order to avoid the creation of a Praetorian Guard, “any 
national component is kept at about 25 percent of the total”95. German speakers, 
including Swiss and Austrian nationals have traditionally made up a comparative 
majority of legionnaires, but have never exceeded 35% of the Legion’s force96. 
Although the Legion was closed off to Frenchmen until 2007, the French, under a 
declared identity, have been a pillar of the French Legion and today represent 
about 24% of its soldiers97. Camaraderie along national lines has been popular, 
however, encouraging cliques to form and parallel hierarchies to develop within a 
regiment; “this situation might seriously compromise discipline, especially if 
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Legion officers and NCOs reacted to it with a lack of understanding and 
diplomacy, which was sometimes the case”98. Although recruitment numbers 
have been decreasing recently in most Western armies, the Legion can afford to 
remain selective with an average of 8 candidates for every opening compared to 
about 3 candidates per opening in the Armée de Terre99. 
 
Training 
 
 
All recruits have to undergo a harsh training program in the process of becoming 
a legionnaire. It is through training that the French government forges the 
characters of the soldiers that the country needs. Basic training takes place in 
Castelnaudary in the Languedoc-Roussillon, and is conducted by the 4ème 
Regiment Etranger. Over fifteen weeks, recruits are taught to adapt to the 
stringent requirements of the Legion whose objective is to create soldiers who 
have a high level of stamina and the capacity to follow orders. 
Unsurprisingly for a regiment of multinational soldiers, the first order of business 
is to make sure that all soldiers quickly reach a workable level of French. Each 
recruit is assigned a binome, a French-speaking partner to assist him during 
instruction. Languages other than French are prohibited, a policy that is 
implemented with extreme punitive measures. Each recruit is required to learn by 
heart the Code d’Honneur although he is also given a copy in his mother tongue 
to ensure that the meaning of the Code is well understood. The Legion’s songs 
are also used for language instruction. Recruits are exposed to the French 
language through the songs that are a cornerstone of the Legion. Learning 
French not only serves to communicate; it also creates esprit de corps and 
contributes to forming an emotional and cultural attachment between the 
legionnaire and the fatherland: “the Legion authorities regard the melodious, 
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rhythmic, vigorous, and unanimous execution of these songs by detachments on 
the march as of the first importance. It is considered that singing in chorus does a 
great deal towards the inculcation of an esprit de corps in men who have no 
other universal way of communicating together”100. 
Central to the training process is the destruction of the individual and his re-birth 
as a legionnaire. Basic training was therefore more a psychological process than 
a physical exercise. The focus on cleanliness and discipline rather than small-
arms training and technical instruction was particularly strenuous for the recruits 
itching for action: “the first four months were, basically, making sure you could 
adapt to the Legion style of discipline, learn French and become physically fit to 
cope with the military training, which you then got in your regiment. But for the 
ex-military guys this seeming lack of military expertise was very frustrating”101. 
Recruits had to first learn the Legion way of doing things, “it may not be the most 
logical way or the simplest way, it may seem like the most stupid, ridiculous 
method in the world – but it is done that way and you are going to do it that way – 
even if it takes all night and all the next day”102. 
Pádraig O’Keeffe described his first few weeks in the Legion:  “the Farm was all 
about your mentality. It wasn’t about whether you could make it physically as a 
soldier. It was about discovering weaknesses and identifying those recruits who 
would invariably seek the easy way out. The Farm instilled a kind of attitude, a 
Legion outlook on how things should be done and why you never, ever quit (...). 
It was a combination of physical exhaustion, mental fatigue, self-doubt and, for 
some, probably even a bit of fear (...).There is only one word that can summarise 
the experience – hell. The idea of the Farm, as one instructor put it, was to ‘take 
you down to the basics and then build you up’.  othing was written down, but at 
the Farm you’d get everyone at the same level, starting with lessons in how to 
wash, and then work upwards”103. Captain Morin de la Haye explained in 1886 
that it was necessary for the training system to be “pushed to its maximum 
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intensity. In the beginning this system produces vague impulses of revolt. 
Refusal to obey, desertion, cases for court martial occur daily; men shot at their 
officers, others look to unhorse them; in the Legion, the officer must expect 
everything”104. The rigorous and at times extreme training program was also a 
method of filtering the recruits: “at times we carried out forced marches. We 
leave for the south. Everyone must keep up. The man who remains in the rear 
risks death by starvation or being taken by Arab dissidents. After these marches, 
the number of stragglers is considerable: one must be strong to endure. This is 
the  arwinist survival of the fittest applied to the troops”105. Sleep deprivation, 
food deprivation and physical torture are used to break down the recruit. The 
methods produce formidable results, however: “in several months, one has a 
solid troop, manoeuvrable, admirably practiced in shooting and marching, and 
entirely in the hands of its leaders”106.  
The rigours of basic training, the stringent disciplinary measures, along with the 
traditions of the Legion that are imbued on the recruit from day one, contribute to 
forging a common experience of what it means to be a legionnaire. Extreme 
hardship and shared lifestyles created an esprit de corps that became part of the 
identity of the legionnaire. Those who successfully complete the 120km Marche 
Képi Blanc in week five and survived the duress and harsh discipline of the next 
ten weeks were then assigned to one of the Legion’s eleven regiments where 
they remained for the duration of their contract. Professionalisation and 
specialisation mostly took place within these regiments.  
 
Discipline and control  
 
Given the heterogeneity of the legionnaires who come from all sorts of 
backgrounds – from criminals and deserters to intellectuals and princes – the 
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Legion has found it necessary to use draconian measures in order to instil 
discipline and impose the authority of the NCOs in charge. In theory, the 
règlement de discipline is the same in the Legion as in the rest of the Armée de 
Terre with the difference that legionnaires need to seek permission before 
owning a vehicle or getting married107. In practice however, the remoteness of 
the garrisons and the legionnaires’ high rate of desertion have created both an 
opportunity and a necessity for NCOs to exercise unusual autonomy in ways of 
disciplining their troops. 
Where training fails to bring the legionnaire up to scratch, disciplinary measures 
have been used both as punishment and as a means to ensure esprit de corps: 
“unit cohesion was guaranteed by fear of punishments long outlawed in Europe, 
if indeed they had ever existed there”108. Traditionally, the Legion favoured 
“short, sharp punishments (that) were in effect more humane and more efficient 
than a prolonged jail sentence, which deprived a unit of a man’s services and 
stained his service record; and, finally, given the nature of Legion recruitment, 
the good legionnaires needed to be protected from the minority of bullies and 
thugs”109. Some of the more brutal punishments included la crapaudine, la pelote 
and le silo. La crapaudine was described by Frederic Martyn in 1892: after an 
Italian legionnaire struck his sergeant, he was “stripped naked, his hands were 
pinioned behind his back, and his ankles tied together. Then his ankles were 
lashed to his wrists, and he was thrown on the ground looking very much like a 
trussed fowl. The agony incidental to this constrained position must have been 
almost beyond human endurance after a time; but in this poor man’s case the 
punishment was intensified by the fact that in no long time after he was tied up 
his body was literally covered with a swarm of black ants”110. The silo was used 
in the nineteenth century to punish serious crimes. It “consisted of a funnel-
shaped hole in the ground, broad at the top and pointed towards the bottom. A 
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regular funnel. Into this hole, used as a cell for solitary confinement, the misdoer 
would be thrown, clad only in a thin suit of fatigue clothes, without a blanket or 
any protection at all against the rain or against sun, at the mercy of the heat by 
day and the cold by night. (...) They very soon became ill from the foul vapours. 
When at length they were taken out of the silo, they could neither walk nor stand 
and had to be carried into hospital. Now and then a silo prisoner died in the 
hole”111. The pelote probably remains the most popular form of punishment:  
perpetrators have their packs filled with stones or sand and are forced to march 
in circles and do press-ups for hours. Legionnaire Jacques Weygand described 
the back-breaking effects of the pelote: “the braces cut into the men’s shoulders; 
elbows and knees are bruised or bleeding from repeated contact with the stony 
ground. No matter; chin-strap braced, watch in hand, implacable, the sergeant 
threshes his human grain. Sweat runs in dark runnels down faces that are clotted 
with dust; and a lesson never to be forgotten is stamped into the most rebellious 
spirits”112.  
Generally however, punishment and corrections take the form of a swift beating 
attributed by the sergeant or caporal. NCOs enjoy an elevated status in the 
Legion and are given more responsibility than in most other armies. They are in 
effect the backbone of the Legion: “they are the cement and the rock of the 
Legion, devoted, tireless, bearing the brunt of the training and the fighting. They 
glory in their work, they are the priests of the traditions of the Legion, they are the 
mainstay of the regiments. They are rough, of course, most of them. They roar a 
great deal. They are martinets as to discipline, bitterly critical judges of the 
niceties of the manual of arms”113. On the other hand, the unique hierarchical 
system of the Legion has made its  COs “virtually unaccountable for their 
actions, least of all to French officers, who traditionally held aloof from the day-to-
day running of their units”114. NCOs therefore have often earned themselves a 
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reputation as brutes, or even sadists. Attempts to appeal against unfair or 
unreasonable treatments were usually discouraged through violent means. 
Excessive brutality, however, can be dangerous, especially when dealing with 
legionnaires, as unpopular NCOs could quickly find themselves with a bullet in 
the back of their head. Authority and respect were key, and overall the Legion 
has arguably maintained a reputation for being hard but just. Cruelty has been 
justified as necessary to produce “cruelly hard soldiers”115 and the presence of 
“hard cases” has excused a certain robust view of punishment and discipline. 
Finally, despite the high level autonomy that is awarded to the NCOs, the French 
government maintains absolute power over the Foreign Legion: “the Legion 
never fully trusted its soldiers, an extension of French suspicion of foreigners that 
caused the country to place them in a separate corps in the first place, and took 
elaborate steps from the 1920s to create a secret service whose primary mission 
was to oversee the loyalties of its own troops”116. Today, every new recruit is 
screened to ensure that he has no record of having committed a serious crime117. 
Furthermore, at least 90% of the officer corps is made up of Frenchmen who 
exert direct control over the units, even though they often delegate minor tasks 
and training to their under-officers. The Legion is entirely reliant on the French 
government for logistics, including housing, equipment, ammunition, food, 
transportation and backup support. France can also order the arrest and 
imprisonment of legionnaires who transgress or attempt to desert. The fatherland 
maintains the right and the ability to punish its soldiers, and may even order the 
dissolution of a regiment. Attempts to challenge the French government have 
shown the latter’s ultimate control over the Foreign Legion: President Charles de 
Gaulle disbanded the 1er REP in 1962, cut the Legion’s numbers in half, and was 
only dissuaded from dismissing the Legion entirely by the personal appeals of 
Pierre Messmer, the French Minister of War. 
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Loyalty 
 
Although the French may view the Legion with suspicion, the legionnaires have 
demonstrated an extraordinary level of unit cohesion. Loyalty to the Legion is 
developed through the common experience of rigorous training, but also through 
the sacred rituals and traditions that lend this unit a unique identity of which the 
legionnaires can be proud. ‘Cultural’ indoctrination is an essential part of building 
the legionnaire. From the moment they arrive in Castelnaudary, recruits are 
exposed to the ‘unique’ attributes that separate the Legion from the rest of the 
French army. 
The Legion aspires to be more than just a military force: its soldiers do not fight 
for France; they fight for glory in its purest tradition. The experience of becoming 
a legionnaire and the life that he leads while under contract “will not appeal to 
anyone who does not love the soldiering trade for its own sake”118. The Legion 
presents itself as an elite, professional force, and the legionnaires must 
demonstrate a true military vocation in order to survive the five plus year of their 
enlistment. Legionnaire Christian Jennings outlined the unique military attributes 
of the Legion: “over the decades the Legion had developed its own kind of 
soldiering. It was not soldiering where all hung on victory or defeat, as in other 
armies, but rather a stylish profession of arms, aimed at bringing greater glory to 
France and to the Legion”119. The mythical image of the Legion has also been 
improved by the cinema and literature that have portrayed legionnaires as 
legendary combatants and glorified the Legion as the ultimate warrior creed. 
The men who join the Legion as volunteers are entering a community with a long 
history and a strong sense of tradition. The Legion offers a second chance to its 
men, and defends their anonymity with zeal: “in joining the Legion men do not 
join only an organised, disciplined institution; they enter a situation which is more 
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or less recognised by the whole world and sanctified by its sacrifice. They belong 
– many for the first time”120. Loyalty in the Legion is both top-down and 
horizontal: “from the highest to the lowest, there is a strong bond among 
legionnaires which is stronger than any solidarity of rank. A private in the Legion 
knows that his colonel prefers him to any officer who is not in the Legion. The 
Legion is like a large family that needs only itself to exist”121. As part of the Code 
d’Honneur, the legionnaires vow to fight for their brothers-in-arms, regardless of 
their background, and to demonstrate the absolute solidarity that one should feel 
for a member of their family: Article 2 – “Chaque légionnaire est ton frère d'arme 
quelle que soit sa nationalité, sa race, sa religion. Tu lui manifestes toujours la 
solidarité étroite qui doit unir les membres d'une même famille” (Each legionnaire 
is your brother in arms whatever his nationality, his race or his religion might be. 
You show to him the same close solidarity that links the members the same 
family). This strong sense of loyalty permeates the harshness of military life and 
welds the legionnaires to one another and to their NCO.  
The Legion maintains its difference from the rest of the French army by nurturing 
its own cultural legacy: regimental mottoes focus on honour and fidelity towards 
the Legion, not towards the French army. Legionnaires are visually distinguished 
from their French comrades by their uniforms and the képis blanc. Recruits are 
expected to learn 52 traditional songs of the Legion, many of which narrate the 
glorious history and harsh challenges that their predecessors encountered. The 
annual celebration of the French Revolution on July 14th further demonstrates the 
differences between the Legion and the French army: the legionnaire march at 
the slow pace of 88 steps per minute, compared to the 120 steps that are the 
requirement for all other units; because the Legion must never be separated, the 
legionnaires do not break ranks when they reach the French President’s chair but 
turn in one movement as the head of the army stands to salute them. The 
mystique of the Legion is recognised by the French public who enthusiastically 
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applauds their legionnaires as they march down the Champs Elysées. This 
contributes to instilling a sense of pride and belonging in these stateless 
legionnaires. 
The esprit de corps that is developed through training and traditions is cemented 
by the camaraderie that inevitably grows from shared experiences. The third 
article of the Code d’Honneur stresses the importance of traditions and 
camaraderie: “Respectueux des traditions, attaché à tes chefs, la discipline et 
la camaraderie sont ta force, le courage et la loyauté tes vertus” (You respect 
your traditions and your superiors. Discipline and friendship are your strengths. 
Courage and honesty are your virtues). This value is extended to the battlefield, 
where each legionnaire is bound by his oath to never abandon his dead or 
wounded comrades: Article 7 – “Au combat, tu agis sans passion et sans haine, 
tu respectes les ennemis vaincus, tu n'abandonnes jamais ni tes morts, ni tes 
blessés, ni tes armes” (In combat you act without passion or hatred. You respect 
vanquished enemies. You never surrender your dead, your wounded, or your 
weapons).  Camaraderie, loyalty and the refusal to surrender have at times led 
the legionnaires straight to their death as evidenced in the battles of Camerone 
and Dien Bien Phu. Nonetheless this extreme devotion and blind obedience to 
the Legion have “produced such a sustained record of combat performance, in 
which its members have every right to feel a legitimate pride”122. 
 
Conclusion: lessons learnt 
 
In 180 years of history, the French Foreign Legion has overcome social norms 
and prejudices towards mercenaries, and successfully demonstrated to the world 
that a foreign and heterogeneous regiment can create excellent and reliable 
soldiers. This is a direct contradiction to the convention that conscript soldiers 
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make the best combatants because they have the right motivations and are 
easily controlled by the state. The successful integration of the Foreign Legion 
into the Armée de Terre offers an opportunity to explore shifting norms and 
adaptation techniques that can inform the debate on the cohabitation of foreign 
and private combatants and conventional armed forces. 
The men who enlist in the Foreign Legion are without exception volunteers. They 
join the Legion out of their own free will and, unlike the stereotypical mercenary, 
they do not do so for money – there is none to be made in the Legion. Their 
motivation varies from vocational aspirations to existential pursuits and while 
legionnaires are not known for their patriotism, their loyalty to the Legion and 
among themselves is legendary and has effectively spirited their performance on 
the battlefield. This loyalty has been deliberately instilled through a program of 
ideological and cultural indoctrination and by exposing the legionnaires to 
extreme situations where they have had to create fraternal relationships in order 
to survive emotionally and physically.  
The physical training, with its focus on stamina and obedience, along with the 
strong ties that unite the legionnaires, have effectively produced a force that is 
both effective and reliable. Despite an uncertain start, the Foreign Legion has 
been a pillar of French defence and an asset to French foreign policy, enabling 
her imperial ambitions and upholding the reputation of a French army whose 
record in the last two centuries has been uneven. It has also been a deliberate 
domestic policy to deal with the problems of refugees and immigrants: “together 
with ridding France of some of her foreigners, the Legion has policed her 
colonies and fought her wars, while at the same time earning fame as a crack 
unit with an international reputation for military efficiency”123.   
On the other hand, the Legion has also experienced many non-military obstacles 
that have marred its image as an elite force. Despite evidence that foreigners are 
not necessarily less reliable than conscript soldiers, legionnaires have suffered 
from prejudices and accusations of mercenarism. This perception has been 
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exacerbated by a high rate of desertion, and by allegations of racism, anti-
Semitism and brutality that have been associated with the Legion since its 
participation in the mission civilisatrice, particularly in Algeria. The questionable 
backgrounds of many legionnaires and the hard-drinking, violent culture of the 
regiments have also contributed to the controversy surrounding this unusual 
military unit. “The cohesiveness of the Legion, its racism, its elite combat image, 
the preference of its commanders for strong-arm solutions to problems of colonial 
agitation and its recruitment made it especially useful to support a shoot-first 
policy” leading to accusations of over-zealousness, particularly in the Kolwezi 
operation where legionnaire “were trigger-happy and killed far more people than 
necessary”124.  
Furthermore, the polyglot nature of the Legion made it at times difficult to 
manoeuvre, undermining its efficiency in battles. This was exacerbated by 
France’s neglect, evidenced in the parsimonious approach to equipping its 
foreign troops: “the real injustice of Legion service was that good troops too often 
failed to realise their true potential because they were inadequately trained, 
armed, led and supplied”125. The difficulties that the Legion has faced are 
testimonies of its isolation from the rest of the French army where integration has 
yet to be accepted fully – although the situation appears to have improved after 
the reform of the Legion in 1962.  
Overall, the French Foreign Legion has survived two centuries of military history, 
and does not appear to be dwindling in the near future. Its military successes, 
long-standing loyalty and “ambivalent yet hard-forged link with the French”126 
have undeniably proven that nationality and patriotism are not correlated with 
military performance. Indeed, it appears that the most important concern in 
society relates to the state’s control over the armed forces, not to the origin of the 
combatants. Despites its relative autonomy, the Legion is led by French officers 
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and remains entirely dependent on the French government which can at any time 
legally and effectively hold the legionnaires accountable for their actions.  
The Legion has successful adapted into its new role in the twenty-first century. 
Current geopolitical trends indicate that, in the near future, Western armies will 
be deployed in peacekeeping and nation-building operations rather than in 
straightforward combat roles. As a participant in multi-national operations, the 
Foreign Legion has represented the fatherland and successfully cohabitated with 
other French troops, even adapting its traditional uniforms to fit in with the U ’s 
requirements. The Legion has been fully integrated into the French army since its 
first mandate in Algeria, and has supported the French in her wars of national 
defence and colonial expansion. Notwithstanding accusations of mercenarism, 
the Legion remains under the authority of the French government, and is a 
recognised and celebrated component of the French Armée de Terre. The 
French Foreign Legion is a success story that shows that mercenaries can 
successfully be integrated into a nation’s foreign policy and can cohabite 
harmoniously with the national armed forces. 
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4. Privatisation: Mercenaries in Africa 
 
Nowhere have mercenaries and private military and security companies been 
more active - or more controversial - than in Africa. Ever since the 1960s, select 
African countries have been plagued by mercenaries trying to turn a profit from 
the post-colonial conflicts raging across the continent. The attempted coups 
against the governments of the Comoros Islands, the Seychelles, and Equatorial 
Guinea that were orchestrated by the brazen mercenaries Bob Denard, Mike 
Hoare and Simon Mann, respectively, further exacerbated the tensions between 
non-state combatants and political leaders. On the other hand, the fall of the 
Soviet Union brought an end to Western and Soviet subsidies and created a new 
market for foreign military support, particularly in weak and war-torn African 
states. The 1990s therefore saw the beginnings of a new military model in Africa: 
the privatisation and commercialisation of mercenary troops by Western and 
South African entrepreneurs.  
Private military companies (PMCs) have become a de facto military solution to 
the national and personal insecurities of many African leaders whose states 
suffer from weak institutions and inadequate military capabilities. These states 
are particularly vulnerable to the institutional disruptions and civil-military rivalries 
that result from outsourcing military services to foreign private military 
companies. This chapter starts by outlining Africa’s contentious military history 
and its experience with mercenaries and private military companies. By using 
Angola as a case-study, it subsequently describes the particular attributes and 
traditions of the national armed forces in a weak and conflicted state and 
highlights the impact of hiring PMCs on the identity and military effectiveness of 
the national army. Despite strict anti-mercenary norms, the African model of 
privatisation appears to be unique in its political and legal freedom to provide 
select military services. The successes and failures of this security model are 
explored in a wider context of military traditions and show that while privatisation 
might appear as a short-term solution to many problems plaguing African 
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leaders, it is fraught with difficulties and can ultimately be damaging to the 
identity, loyalty and hierarchical structure of the national armed forces. 
 
Africa’s armies 
 
Africa in the second half of the twentieth century was the playing field for 
mercenaries searching for adventure and easy money. Following the process of 
decolonisation, many states in Africa were left with weak political and military 
institutions. A divided continent saw no less than 85 successful military coups 
and 19 presidential assassinations since the early 1950s1. Out of 54 independent 
African states, at least 35 countries have at one time or another suffered from 
civil war or interstate war. The conflict-ridden continent therefore provided many 
opportunities for soldiers of fortune to tempt their luck and find employment. The 
flow of foreign mercenaries into Africa created many problems, particularly for the 
national armed forces. 
The pre-colonial military traditions and the legacy of colonialism significantly 
affected the military identity of Africa’s soldiers. Critics argue that African armies 
“are unprofessional, lacking both technical expertise for combat and political 
responsibility to the state”2. Furthermore, African leaders have shown a tendency 
to favour “military loyalty at the expense of capability” and deliberately 
“debilitated their own security forces in an effort to preserve political power”3. 
Consequently, soldiers in many African states have a very different socio-political 
and military environment in which to manoeuvre compared to their European and 
American counterparts. This has inevitably affected their relations with the 
foreign mercenaries who are hired to wage war on their territory. 
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Pre-colonial armies 
 
Prior to the eighteenth century, there was no history of a structured standing 
army in Africa. Except for Northern Africa and arguably so in West Africa, the 
continent’s vast territorial expanse was not conducive to competition between the 
different tribes as the availability of space enabled them to move away when 
faced with an armed threat. There was therefore no urgency to develop an 
organised system of defence4. This contrasts with the European continent where 
the rapid development of military organisation and technology was the result of a 
constant struggle for food and territory that consumed the different tribes living 
within the very restrained geographic space5.  Herbert Howe argues that the “fear 
of invasion has traditionally encouraged states to develop professional militaries: 
the  apoleonic Wars accelerated Europe’s military capabilities and, specifically, 
the creation of a professional officer corps”6. Although inter-tribal violence was 
present in pre-colonial Africa, these wars were neither as frequent nor as deadly 
as the equivalent in Europe.  
Most pre-colonial ‘states’ were conquest states with a fused culture of military 
and political institutions. African tribes generally adopted a warrior tradition 
described by Ali Al’Amin  azrui as a “sub-system of values and institutionalised 
expectations which define the military role of the individual in the defence of his 
society, the martial criteria of adulthood, and the symbolic obligations of 
manhood in time of political and military stress”7. Military service was considered 
to be a transformative experience that distinguished the men from the boys and 
marked their active participation in the tribe’s political organisation, with the 
objective of ensuring its “survival and viability”8. Political leadership was 
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consequently derived from military prowess:  “the king and commander-in-chief 
was the strongest and bravest warrior of them all”9.  
The shift from the ‘warrior-politician’ to the ‘professional warrior’ occurred in the 
18th Century with the development of military professionalism in the Zulu 
Kingdom: the Zulu leader, Shaka, introduced drilling, marches and logistical 
organisation to his army. Shaka’s military reforms were driven by European 
encroachment into African territory. This created “the need (for Shaka and 
others) to raise an army of a size beyond the capacity of a single man to control 
and led to the creation of war chieftaincies; the improvement of weapons and the 
introduction of new ones required skilled and experienced men to handle them, 
and thus a class of professional, or full-time, and semi-professional warriors 
rose”10. This trend spread throughout central and east Africa as the warrior 
institutions and values dictated by Shaka were adopted by neighbouring 
kingdoms. The change was drastic: the warrior was no longer an integrated 
political citizen but segregated from the state and organised into a powerful force 
capable of challenging his king11. The Zulu wars in 1879, a good fifty years after 
the death of Shaka, demonstrated the effectiveness of the military reforms 
spearheaded by the former king and carried on by his nephew, Cetshwayo12: the 
Zulus defeated the British at the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22nd. The 
victory was short-lived, however, as the British, with their superior weaponry, 
crushed the Zulus at the Battle of Ulundi just six months later. 
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The colonial military legacy 
 
The colonial occupation of Africa further changed the dynamics of the armed 
forces. The mandate of the colonial armies was to protect the national 
boundaries and suppress domestic unrest, and they were used by the colonial 
powers as an instrument of control and coercion: “during the colonial era, the 
mission of the military was clearly specified: it was to facilitate the exploitation of 
African resources for the benefit of Europeans. It was used principally as an 
instrument of domestic repression by colonial officials”13.  
Colonial armies were entirely staffed by European officers who “rarely, if ever, 
crossed the civil-military dividing line by challenging civilian rule. Officers, 
especially from Britain and France, were steeped in the tradition of military 
acceptance of civilian control”14. These armies were used by the “major colonial 
powers to impose and ultimately to sustain their rule”15 making the “colonial 
military (into) merely the armed wing of the colonial state”16. Instead of 
developing a local police force, the military was repeatedly used for policing 
missions, setting a precedence for future armies to interfere in civilian disputes. 
Although colonial military forces “displayed some professional traits of political 
responsibility and military capability”17, they failed to “develop an indigenous and 
professional officer corps; the forces laid the groundwork for future 
unprofessional militaries”18. The colonial powers felt threatened by the possibility 
of military retaliation, and consequently declined to develop a competent 
indigenous officer corps or even a professional soldier: “the ideal colonial soldier 
was supposed to be illiterate, uncontaminated by mission education, from a 
                                            
13
Kieh and Agbese, The Military and Politics in Africa : From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional 
Control, 190. 
14
Howe, Ambiguous Order : Military Forces in African States, 28. 
15
 Welch in Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa : The Political and Economic Risks of Arms 
Transfers, Westview Special Studies on Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 129. 
16
Kieh and Agbese, The Military and Politics in Africa : From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional 
Control, 190. 
17
Howe, Ambiguous Order : Military Forces in African States, 28. 
18
Ibid., 29. 
121 
 
remote area, physically tough, and politically unsophisticated”19. The absence of 
external threats further discouraged any urgency to train and equip the army, 
leading to an inexperienced, untrained, under-equipped army, with no substantial 
leadership at the end of the colonial period.  
The transition from colonialism to independence was largely peaceful, leaving 
“the armed forces on the political sidelines, neither needed by the metropolitan 
power to suppress nationalist movements nor countered by guerrilla or liberation 
armies sponsored by indigenous politicians”20. The national army in post-colonial 
states was perceived as a colonial and collaborationist institution, and regarded 
with fear and suspicion by the newly independent governments: “nationalist 
leaders saw them as remnants of imperial rule. Though they had won glory by 
serving overseas in the two World Wars, their imperial ‘credentials’ caused them 
to be regarded in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as 
mercenaries in the service of a foreign power”21. The national armed force, 
therefore, have had to adapt to the requirements of the new African leadership in 
order to maintain a (reasonably) healthy budget and a position of relative 
authority and influence. The civilian government of many post-colonial states 
believe that “the function of the military was to defend authority, and not society; 
it almost always came to the support of the state in suppressing political 
dissidents, democrats, socialists and others”22. Consequently, the armed forces 
have repeatedly been used for domestic deployment to suppress civilian 
uprisings and act as a police force23. The independent African state is frequently 
accused of being the reincarnation of the colonial system, catering its policies 
towards personal enrichment and ignoring the needs of its citizens.  
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Military coups and intervention 
 
Military intervention in African politics has been prevalent since the end of the 
colonial period. The continent has seen no less than 85 successful military coups 
in the last 40 years24. Five of these coups have resulted in the death of the 
incumbent presidents25. Interference of the armed forces into the political affairs 
of the countries is known as ‘praetorianism’, which “characterises a situation 
where the military of a given society exercises independent political power within 
it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force”26. Praetorianism dates back to 
the Roman Empire, when an elite unit of professional soldiers was recruited to 
defend the legitimacy of the empire against rebellious military garrisons. Known 
as the Praetorian Guard, this military force was the only armed presence allowed 
into the city of Rome, and as such exerted huge influence on the candidature of 
the Senate: “thus it was able to manipulate a widely subscribed concept of 
legitimacy and to attain a degree of influence disproportionate to its size and 
military resource”27. In the modern era, intervention in the political arena is to be 
expected if the state lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the armed forces: “when 
civilian politicians rigged an election and defy civil society, it is difficult to demand 
military subservience to an illegitimate regime”28. Unfortunately, this appeared to 
be the case in most post-colonial states, leaving many African politicians fearful 
for their jobs. 
An alleged lack of political legitimacy has in fact been the main trigger for the 
military’s interference in the affairs of the state: “military intervention in African 
politics was rationalised by the soldiers as a patriotic and selfless exercise to rid 
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the continent of corrupt, inefficient, incompetent and decadent politicians”29. 
Armies displayed a ‘messianic complex’ and viewed themselves “as the saviour 
of their countries. The members of the armed forces would routinely argue that 
besides the military, no other section of the society is capable of liberating their 
countries from maladministration and chaos, which are usually the handiwork of 
civilian institutions”30. This is particularly the case in weak states where a lack of 
rule of law and institutional capability of the government provide the military with 
an opportunity to grab power: “the military’s subordination as hypothesised by 
Samuel Huntington has not worked very well on the continent, because most 
African states tend not to operate within an established framework of viable and 
widely based institutions, even when they have been legitimised”31. In The Man 
on Horseback, Samuel Finer explains that in many developing countries, the 
organisational capability of the army far surpasses civilian institutions: “even the 
most poorly organised or maintained of such armies is far more highly and tightly 
structured than any civilian group”32.   
The reasons for which the armed forces do not always interfere in politics, 
however, is that they are technically unable to “administer any but the most 
primitive community” and “lack legitimacy: that is to say, their lack of a moral title 
to rule”33. The military require moral authority to justify their use of violence, and 
often prop up a puppet government to conceal their activities and receive a 
stamp of legitimacy after a military coup – this was the case in Nigeria in 1979 
and 1993 when the Nigerian army briefly transferred power to a civilian 
government over which it maintained power. States that have a developed 
political culture are less vulnerable to military intervention because of the 
normative expectation that the governing institutions must be civilian: “in such 
countries where attachment to civilian institutions is strong and pervasive, the 
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attempts of the military to coerce the lawful government, let alone supplant it, 
would be universally regarded as usurpation”34. A history of military interference 
in domestic politics has left its imprint on the self-perception and identity of the 
armed forces. Politicians lacking confidence in the legitimacy and longevity of 
their rule have attempted to reign in their unruly and unreliable armies.  
 
Weak military institutions 
 
Threatened by the prospect of a coup d’ tat, African leaders have repeatedly 
sought to weaken the military branch of the state. Rulers who fear the power of 
the armed forces intentionally enact policies to curtail the operational capability of 
their armies. This includes “restricting ammunition (...), fuel, and spare parts of 
training expertise”35. President Mobutu in Zaire, for example, deliberately 
weakened his army by encouraging jealously and suspicion between the different 
units and the officers. By playing them against one another, the ruler could avoid 
an officer’s coup and used informants to anticipate any plots: “they removed 
officers who appeared untrustworthy (or too competent), played the regular 
militaries off against other armed groups, such as guards or mercenaries, and 
placed specific constraints on operational capabilities”36. Although the position of 
the President was consequently safeguarded against a military coup, by 
deliberately encouraging dissent within the army, the ruler incapacitated 
decision-making and the implementation of progressive policies. In extreme 
cases, the competition between officers also led to a civil war, as was the case in 
Liberia in the 1980s37. In some countries, the weakness of the armed forces 
facilitated the spread of rebel groups who opposed the government and accused 
the military of corruption and incompetence: “in Sierra Leone’s case, a weak 
RSLMF would later facilitate the growth of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
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through the RSL F’s technical incompetence and its absence of strong loyalty to 
the state”38.  
Furthermore, highly corrupt states often failed to pay their soldiers whose 
salaries were progressively siphoned off by dishonest superiors and other 
intermediaries. The failure to pay soldiers forces the latter to bully the civilian 
population to gain access to their basic resources such as food, clothing, and 
ammunition. It also pushes the military into pursuing commercial activities such 
as smuggling and trafficking, which destabilises the local economy and can lead 
the country into a state of prolonged conflict, as was the case in Angola and the 
 .R. Congo in the 1990s. In addition, “several governments extended the rentier 
concept and permitted the lower ranks to extort money from the citizenry”39 as a 
form of payment.  owhere was this more prevalent than in  obutu’s Zaire, 
where his six private armies were given free range to loot the country. This policy 
alienates the civilian population who lose trust both in the armed forces and in 
the civilian government. It is natural, therefore, that the second most cited 
justification for attempted coups is to preserve the interest of the military 
institution against the predatory and dangerous policies of the state40. Armies rely 
on the government for their budget allocation, and any attack on their status, 
norms, identity and financial or physical well-being can trigger a military 
response: “the military will intervene in the political arena when it determines that 
its corporate interest or interests are being violated by a civilian regime”41.  
The inability to count on the loyalty of their army, however, has compelled rulers 
to create parallel security forces and combat militias, often representing their own 
ethnic group. In multi-ethnic countries, the systematic recruitment by ethnicity of 
military personnel has led to allegations of favouritism and discrimination. “In 
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some African countries, the armed forces are not national institutions (but) are 
dominated by people from particular regions or specific ethnic groups”42, and 
consequently they  do not always feel represented by the government in power. 
This has led to ethnic factionalism between the state and its military arm. In 
extreme cases, the armed forces deliberately target and repress select ethnic 
groups within the country, inducing fear among the population who retaliate 
against other civilians of the same ethnic group as the perpetrators. The targeting 
of civilians by the military “lowers political acceptance of the state by groups 
excluded from the military, (raising fears) of state-sponsored repression”43.  
The use of parallel forces to compensate for an unprofessional army – often at 
the instigation of the government – is also a threat to the identity, professionalism 
and existence of the national army: “parallel forces angered existing national 
forces because of the presidents’ implicit vote of no confidence, the groups’ 
freedom from the military’s normal chain of command, and their first choice in 
equipment”44. This further affected civil-military relations by complicating the 
channels of communication between the military and the government. The lack of 
mutual trust and support between these actors challenges the authority, 
credibility and legitimacy of civilian rule over the military. The armed forces 
effectively loses respect for and belief in the government of their country, and 
reacts by taking decisions into their own hands and ignoring the orders of the 
civilian government. It also frequently leads to internal fighting between the 
military and the parallel forces. Nonetheless, it should be noted that parallel 
forces have repeatedly been perceived by the international community as more 
professional than the regular army, and they provide the ruler with a respectable 
amount of personal security and stability by anticipating and preventing military 
coups against the regime. 
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Breakdown of military identity 
 
The constant intrusions of the government and the loss of faith and support from 
the population can lead to a real crisis of identity for the armed forces. The army 
is a symbol of sovereignty, and “a purposive instrument (...); it comes into being 
by fiat (...) and is rationally conceived to fulfil certain objects”45. As an institution, 
the military s role is to protect society “primarily against external threats, but 
secondarily for internal or domestic purposes”46. One of the first acts of a new 
state is to ensure that it has a functioning or semi-functioning army. When this 
army is unable to carry out its mandate to protect the population and the nation 
against domestic threats, either because it is being manipulated by the 
government or because it is too weak to defend the country against rebels, it 
runs the risk of losing its raison d’être. 
As the budget of the national armed forces depends on the system of taxation in 
which the population participates, good civil-military relations are essential for the 
continuity and operationability of the armed forces. If it loses popular support, the 
army becomes isolated within the state. Its identity shifts from that of protector of 
the people to being an antagonist of the state. The nickname ‘sobels’ – meaning 
soldier by day and rebel by night – was given to Sierra Leone’s armed forces 
between 1991 and 2002 and perfectly illustrates the breakdown of the military’s 
identity. When the army loses its status in society, it ceases to work as a national 
institution, thus forfeiting its role and its funding. The loss of identity and purpose 
leads to the demise of the military.  
Finally, where civilian institutions are too weak to monitor their armed forces, a 
vacuum of authority arises. With no punitive measures or legal infrastructure, the 
state forfeits its authority over an army that it is unable to control. Jakkie Cilliers 
argues that “civilian control over the armed forces is the end result of a complex 
interaction among various factors, including formal legal controls, a strong civil 
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society, and the nature of the armed forces”47. As Africa lacks the “professional 
culture that acknowledges the supremacy of civilian and parliamentary authority 
over the military, the prospects for civilian control over the armed forces are not 
bright”48. Rampant poverty and a tradition of paternalism and patronage have 
also encouraged officers to pursue a military career as a means to political and 
or economic power rather than for patriotic or vocational reasons. Africa's armies 
have consequently suffered from a dearth of professionalism, compounded by 
the state's lack of credibility. This has led to a vicious circle of suspicions and 
sabotage in an environment already prone to conflict and insecurity. Political 
leaders have responded to this crisis by calling forth military support from their 
former colonial powers or from private security providers. 
 
Africa’s mercenaries 
 
If the state’s relationship with professional armies has been bad, even worse is 
Africa’s long and dark history with mercenaries. The weak political and military 
institutions of many African states have attracted soldiers of fortune and 
encouraged domestic politicians, private individuals and foreign governments to 
interfere illicitly in the country’s politics49. Since the 1960s, Africa has 
experienced three models of mercenary intervention:  1) Ad-hoc regiments of 
independent mercenaries recruited for a particular strategic purpose and 
operating under the command of a mercenary leader50. This type of intervention 
is exemplified in  ike Hoare’s missions on behalf of Katanga, a breakaway 
province of Congo, and later in his military operations against the Simba rebels in 
Congo.  2) Mercenary coups, organised and financed by a (usually foreign) 
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benefactor and assembling a group of highly trained mercenaries to topple a 
regime and spearhead an uprising against the incumbent ruler. This strategy was 
made popular by Frederick Forsyth’s 1974 novel The Dogs of War which depicts 
a company of European mercenaries hired to depose the President of a corrupt 
African country. This exact scenario was reproduced – and failed in Equatorial 
Guinea in 2004. 3) Trained military professionals employed for a short term by a 
foreign company and outsourced to a country to provide a temporary service of 
military consulting and potentially organising and leading combat operations 
against the domestic enemies of the contracting state. Private military companies 
– such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International – were used 
respectively by Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s to counter the advance of 
armed groups of rebels. Mercenaries have come to Africa to topple regimes, 
replace soldiers, advise politicians and essentially fight in other people’s wars. 
Africa’s controversial experiences with mercenaries have informed the 
continent’s strict anti-mercenary norms, although these have been practised 
inconsistently: despite legislation condemning the use of mercenaries, African 
leaders have increasingly turned towards private military and security companies 
to compensate for their own security failures. 
 
Secessionist states 
 
The end of the colonial system left behind an amalgamation of ethnically and 
religiously heterogeneous states. Sovereignty was conveyed de jure to the 
foreign colonies by an international community of Western states. Post-colonial 
states were thus empowered with new political and economic responsibilities 
“irrespective of their effective capacity to control their populations and territory 
and to fend off challenges from other states”51. This privilege was engraved in the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 which 
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unilaterally and unconditionally conveys sovereign recognition to “all colonial 
countries and peoples”. A legal “right to complete independence and the integrity 
of their national territory”52 set a precedent that condemned secessionist 
attempts from these newly formed states.  
Nonetheless, after the departure of the foreign powers, secessionist movements 
began to claim ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious differences as grounds to 
separate from the rest of the country. Since independence “ten of sub-Saharan 
Africa's 48 states have experienced a secessionist conflict (...) and most of these 
have been unsuccessful”53. Secessionist attempts have taken place in Katanga 
and South Kasai in D.R. Congo between 1960 and 1963, in  igeria’s province of 
Biafra between 1967 and 1970, in Senegal’s province of Casamance from 1990-
2001, in several regions of Ethiopia, and most recently in Southern Sudan whose 
status as an independent state was recognised by the U.N. in 2011. Somaliland 
has de facto seceded from Somalia, although it has yet to be recognised as its 
own country. Pierre Englebert explains that secessionist movements in Africa, 
however, are largely driven by economic and material motivation rather than 
ethno-political differences: most breakaway states have been areas with superior 
access to resources relative to the rest of the country54. In their efforts to secede 
from the mainland, but constrained by international norms of sovereignty and 
recognition, breakaways states have repeatedly appealed to mercenaries to 
provide combat support and strengthen their armies. Katanga and Biafra are two 
examples of secessionist states that have hired mercenaries for this purpose. 
After declaring independence from D.R. Congo in January 1961, Katanga's new 
'President', Moise Tshombe began recruiting foreign mercenaries to buff-up his 
army which was financially and politically supported by the Union Minière du 
Haut-Katanga (UMHK). Five hundred Belgian, French, Rhodesian and South 
African soldiers of fortune poured into the country. The Katangan mercenaries 
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were referred locally to as ‘les  ffreux’, because of their lack of accountability 
and organisation. These men were led by former French colonel Bob Denard and 
Irish colonel 'Mad' Mike Hoare. Known as the gendarmerie, the mercenary force 
was a threat to the sovereignty of the newly-independent D.R. Congo. When 
Moise Tshombe instructed the mercenaries to attack and kill U.N. Peacekeeping 
forces, the United Nations retaliated by sending in 5,000 men to drive all foreign 
combatants out of the Congo55. Journalist Tony Geraghty claims that the 
mercenaries “led by (Frenchman) Roger Faulques, had killed 1,000 U. . troops 
when they attempted to end (the) secession”56. Eventually, the mercenaries 
found themselves outnumbered by the U.N. and Tshombe agreed to the 
“reintegration of his province into the vast Congo Republic”57. The mercenary war 
reinforced the norm against white mercenaries and brought about accusations of 
neo-colonialism, further strengthening Africa’s resolve to combat this ‘disease’ 
eating up the continent. 
Mercenaries also featured prominently in the Nigerian-Biafran civil war. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu’s proclamation of independence of the resource-rich 
state of Biafra in 1967 provoked an outcry from the Nigerian government – and 
equally so from the foreign oil companies who had an interest in maintaining their 
influence in the country. The new state of Biafra was too wealthy to be left 
alone58. Ill equipped, out-manned and out-gunned by the Nigerian army, Biafra 
resorted to hiring mercenaries to fight its war and turned to the French for 
support. Former legionnaire Roger Faulques along with 100 French mercenaries 
returned to Africa once more to participate in the secessionist war
59
. The Biafran 
air force was created, trained and operated by Swedish Count Gustav von Rosen 
who had “obscure delusions of changing Africa”60. Concurrently, the Nigerian 
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army also recruited mercenaries, particularly for their own air force with Egyptian 
mercenaries employed to fly the larger bombers61. Percy claims that because of 
the ideological principles of independence movements, “the mercenaries stood in 
direct opposition to the great project of self-determination, not only because they 
often literally fought against it but also because the idea of fighting for money 
was disturbing in an environment where the other players were deeply motivated 
by a belief in national liberation”62. She concludes therefore that the “mercenaries 
in Biafra in the civil war between 1967 and 1970 were largely useless, despite all 
the attention paid to them by the international media”63.   
 
Mercenary Coups 
 
Mercenaries are not only instrumental to select African leaders: empowered by 
their own military successes and taking advantage of the weak political 
institutions of post-colonial states, a handful of mercenaries have sought to 
overthrow sitting presidents and take over the country themselves. Although 
mercenaries Bob Denard, Mike Hoare and Simon Mann were each convicted for 
attempting to overthrow the governments of sovereign states, these men did not 
operate alone.  
In 1978, Frenchman Bob Denard invaded the island of the Comoros, killing the 
incumbent president Ali Soilih and replacing him with former president Ahmed 
Abdallah. Although president Soilih had grabbed power himself in 1975 with the 
help of Bob Denard, his shift toward socialist economic policies earned him many 
enemies, including France who terminated all aid and technical assistance to its 
former colony. The 1978 coup against Soilih was carried out by 43 trained 
mercenaries and was allegedly supported by the Rhodesian, South African and 
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French governments64. President Abdallah made Bob Denard the head of the 
Presidential Guard and the Frenchman de facto ruled the country for eleven 
years, until one of his officers shot and killed the president in 1989. Denard was 
subsequently evacuated to South Africa, but attempted another coup d’ tat in 
1995. This time, Denard was an embarrassment to the new post-Apartheid South 
African regime who opposed mercenary coups, and they summarily notified the 
French authorities65. France subsequently sent their special forces to the 
Comoros, arrested Denard and sentenced him to four years in prison for 
"belonging to a gang who conspired to commit a crime”66. During his trial, Bob 
Denard claimed that the French authorities had been aware of his coup, a fact 
that was recognised by the courts67. 
Irishman ‘ ad’  ike Hoare was hired in 1978 to lead a coup d’ tat in the 
Seychelles on behalf of ex-president James Mancham. Mancham had himself 
been deposed a year before by his Prime Minister France-Albert René. A 
successful businessman with strong ties to England and the United States68, 
Mancham was able to muster financial and political support from his allies. The 
53 mercenaries who were sent to the Seychelles, however, were disorganised 
and undisciplined, leading to an accidental shooting upon arrival at the airport. 
Panicking, the mercenaries ended up hijacking an Air India plane and flying it 
back to South Africa where the men were arrested. Mike Hoare was found guilty 
of hijacking a plane and sentenced to ten years in prison. An International 
Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council also concluded 
that the mercenaries had been supplied and encouraged by South African 
defence agencies69. 
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A third, more recent mercenary coup attempt was carried out in 2004 by Simon 
Mann, a British businessman and former SAS officer. Approached by an 
‘anonymous benefactor’ – allegedly Lebanese businessman Eli Calil70 – in 2003 
with an irresistible offer to carry out a coup in oil-rich Equatorial Guinea, Mann 
began to orchestrate an intricate plot involving arms dealers, politicians, covert 
agencies and a collection of international mercenaries. The mission was to 
overthrow the “tyrant” President Teodoro Obiang  ghema and replace him with 
Severo Moto, a former politician and Catholic priest from Equatorial Guinea. 
 ann’s plan was a failure, however, as repeated indiscretions and unforeseen 
obstacles led to a loss of political support from the United States, Spain and 
Great Britain71. On March 7th 2004, Simon Mann and 69 mainly South African 
mercenaries were arrested with a cargo plane full of weapons at Harare airport, 
after a tip-off from the South African intelligence agency72. The ensuing scandal 
led to renewed hostility towards mercenaries in Africa. 
 
Shifting anti-mercenary norms 
 
Africa’s experience with mercenaries is unique.  o other continent has had such 
exposure to so much interference from private and foreign individuals. The U.N. 
General Assembly has expressed its alarm and concern “at the danger that 
mercenaries constitute to peace and security in developing countries, in 
particular in  frica and in small states”73. Mercenaries have been hired by 
secessionist states, ousted leaders, and independent entrepreneurs to illegally 
challenge the legitimacy of the government. Understandably, the continent 
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harbours strict anti-mercenary norms and has been particularly pro-active in 
passing legislation condemning and punishing the recruiting, use, financing and 
training of mercenaries. In 1977, the Organisation of African Unity passed the 
Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. As of 2008, however, 
only 28 of the 53 members had ratified this Convention74. This suggests that 
despite staunch rhetoric against the use of mercenaries, insecure leaders want to 
maintain the prerogative of hiring the services of foreign combatants when 
deemed necessary to the survival of their regime.   
Despite the media attention that these three above-mentioned events attracted, 
“mercenary coups in Africa are a thing of the past” according to Greg  ills of the 
Brenthurst Foundation75. In 1999, the Organisation of African Unity declared that 
it would no longer recognise leaders who came to power through a coup. This 
new approach breaks with its sacred tradition of non-interference and a nearly 
blind respect of sovereignty, engraved in its 1963 Charter76. The general 
consensus among academics and political analysts appears to be that “the time 
of the white mercenary coup is past”77. The end of the Apartheid regime has 
shifted South Africa’s foreign policies towards non-interference and outright 
condemnation of mercenarism, especially the recruiting of mercenaries inside the 
country. This is a dramatic change since South Africa had previously been 
heavily implicated in mercenary and covert activities throughout the continent. 
According to Annette Seegers, African leaders are still afraid of having their rule 
challenged by foreign mercenaries, which is why most countries, including South 
Africa, remain pro-active regarding any rumours of mercenary activities
78
. Finally, 
barring Simon  ann’s foolhardy attempt to topple the government of a sovereign 
state, mercenary coups in recent history have been few and far between.  
African leaders continue to rely on mercenaries to buff-up their armies in times of 
domestic crisis however: former Colonel Gaddafi allegedly recruited heavily from 
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the Tuareg tribes in Mali and Niger in his last attempts to resist the popular 
uprising and foreign attacks threatening his leadership in Libya79. On the other 
hand, mercenaries have gradually been replaced by a new breed: the more 
respectable, if controversial, private military and security companies. As legal 
and established corporate institutions, these foreign-owned private companies 
offer similar services as gangs of mercenaries, but under an umbrella of 
respectability and with a promise of professionalism and moderately superior 
accountability.  
 
Private military and security companies 
 
Private military and security companies have been the preferred security option 
for many political leaders in Africa. Foreign owned, these companies claim to 
work only for legitimate governments and offer a selection of services that range 
from training and advising armies to gathering intelligence, providing operational 
support and participating in combat operations80. Tim Spicer, the CEO of (now 
defunct) private military companies Sandline and Aegis, defines PMCs as 
“corporate bodies specialising in the provision of military skills to governments: 
training, planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operation support and technical 
skills”81.  
Peter Singer categorises the industry of private military and security services into 
three sectors: military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military 
support firms, which he organises according to their proximity to the conflict. 
Military provider firms are distinguished from the other two categories because 
they “run active combat operations”82 whereas military consulting firms offer the 
same services as provider firms, with the exception that they “do not operate on 
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the battlefield itself”83 and are therefore, in theory, not subject to the same degree 
of risks and exposure as the national army.  The third category, the military 
support firms, provides alleged non-lethal services of logistic and technical 
nature, although this can also include intelligence gathering.  
Private military companies have generally set their headquarters in ‘Western’ 
countries – the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa and Israel 
playing host to the largest number of international companies84. They are 
managed by retired officers from elite combat units, business men, and former 
politicians. The personnel that work for these companies are mostly recruited 
from former combat units, including but not limited to the British Special Air 
Service, the U.S. Special Operations Force, and the former South African 
Defence Forces85. Dismissed soldiers from armies in ex-Yugoslavia and the 
former Soviet Union as well as soldiers from Latin American armies have recently 
been recruited into the units of these private military companies – possibly 
because they are cheaper than ‘Western’ soldiers86. Because of the stigma 
attached to private military companies that associates them with mercenaries, 
and the media condemnation that companies like Executive Outcomes have 
faced, “the new freelance teams preferred to be known as private security 
companies rather than private military companies”87. The actual agents that 
operate on the ground, however, tend to be the same veteran soldiers recycled 
from ad hoc mercenary operations or military coups: several of the mercenaries 
who were sentenced for taking part in the 2004 Equatorial Guinea plot are former 
Executive Outcome employees who now work in Iraq and Afghanistan for private 
military and security companies in an ‘advisory’ capacity.  
Not unlike previous mercenary units, private military and security companies 
have enjoyed limited support from the governments of the countries in which they 
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are established: Executive Outcomes and Sandline had to receive government 
licenses to manage their contracts and operations from their home state88. The 
1997 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, allegedly aimed at closing 
down Executive Outcomes89, in actuality granted a licence to the PMC to 
continue its operations from its base in South Africa90. Since the purpose of the 
bill was to “prevent South African companies and citizens from rendering military 
or military-related services abroad without the Government’s authority”91, by 
granting a licence to EO, the South African government was explicitly showing its 
cooperation with EO’s activities. Tim Spicer also emphasised his company’s 
close relationship with the British government: “we had been in regular contact 
with the Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department and had always kept them 
fully informed”92. Abdel Fatau Musah, a conflict prevention advisor at ECOWAS, 
further claimed that “although the British government has consistently denied 
working with Sandline International (...) there can be little doubt that unofficial 
links continue to dominate the ‘old boy network’ relationship between serving 
officers, diplomats and retired diplomats”93.  
Since Executive Outcomes’ first contract with Angola in 1993, private military and 
security companies have met with substantial financial and political success. 
Private companies were used extensively by the various governments of Sierra 
Leone from 1994 to 1998. Originally hired to push back rebel insurgencies, 
private military companies have diversified their operations: they are now 
employed to defend important sites of oil and mineral exploitation, to protect the 
royal and presidential families of select countries – Vinnell is reported to train and 
advise the Saudi  ational Guard “which functions like a Praetorian guard to the 
regime” whereas “O’Gara protects the royal family”94 – and to train and rebuild 
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the armies. The private security company DynCorp has been contracted by the 
United States to create an army of 2,000 soldiers in post-war Liberia95.  
Since the early 1990s, the emergence of private military and security companies 
as a serious actor in strategic warfare has raised issues of military identity, 
accountability, reliability and sovereignty in weak African states. The privatisation 
of military services has also challenged the monopoly over the legitimate use of 
violence that states have traditionally claimed as their exclusive right. Despite 
legal conventions and norms prohibiting the use of foreigners for military 
operations, PMCs have prospered on a continent where political survival and 
perpetual conflict undermine international law and public opinion.  
 
A case-study of hybridisation in Angola 
 
Angola was the first African country to experiment with hybridisation. After more 
than twenty years of civil war and under the imminent threat of being overrun, the 
national armed forces Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) along with acting 
president José Eduardo dos Santos jointly decided to hire the services of the 
private military company Executive Outcomes (EO). Run by a South African 
intelligence agent, Eeben Barlow, and registered in the UK, the company offered 
combat services and military advising to their clients. Between 1992 and 1996, 
EO actively supported the FAA against the rebel insurgency. The four year 
partnership received intense media and academic scrutiny. Consequently Angola 
offers a unique opportunity to study the interactions between the national armed 
forces of Angola and the civilian combatants working for the private military 
company. 
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Independence  
 
Angola officially became a Portuguese province in 1951, after more than 500 
years of close interactions with the Kingdom of Portugal, including a stint of 400 
years as a Portuguese colony. As a colony, Angola experienced the development 
of the mining and oil industries by the Portuguese, the forced Christianisation of 
the population, the installation of a remunerated forced labour system and a 
complete disenfranchisement of the Angolan people who were excluded from 
political life, from the armed forces, and from the economic development of their 
country. This inevitably led to a popular uprising against the Portuguese 
occupation – starting with the formation of opposition parties in the 1950s and 
60s: the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Partido 
Comunista Angolano (PCA) (which eventually merged with the MPLA), the 
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi – were organised 
along ethnic lines that had been exacerbated through the Portuguese’ 
preferential system of division of labour.  
The Portuguese army responded to this challenge with violence and repression. 
The ensuing war of independence lasted until 1975, during which time the three 
aforementioned parties fought each other and the Portuguese with equal fervour, 
using guerrilla tactics. Independence was finally achieved after the Portuguese’ 
right-wing government, the Estado Novo, was overthrown in a military coup, later 
referred to as the Carnation Revolution. This brought about a liberal regime in 
Portugal that granted independence to the state’s three colonies: East Timor, 
Mozambique, and Angola. 
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Angola during the Cold War 
 
The Angolan civil war took off immediately after independence, with both the 
MPLA and UNITA arbitrarily claiming sovereignty over the territory. The MPLA, 
formed by an “educated left-wing, urban elite concentrated in Luanda”96, 
controlled most of Luanda, the capital city, and adopted a Marxist ideology 
bringing in political, military and financial support from the USSR and Cuba. They 
installed Agostinho Neto as the first President of Angola who was succeeded 
after his death in 1979 by José Eduardo dos Santos. Dos Santos has been the 
acting President ever since. UNITA, with its base among the rural largely peasant 
territory of Angola, responded by setting up a rival government along with the 
FNLA and enlisted the help of South Africa and the United States as a counter-
force to the Marxist-Communist ‘threat’. The South African  efence Force “co-
operated for the entire period between 1975 and 1989 with Jonas Savimbi’s 
U ITA rebels, who were engaged in a civil war against Angola’s self-proclaimed 
 arxist  PLA government”97.  
South Africa’s commitment to U ITA was a reaction both to the  PLA’s support 
of SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) insurgents calling for the 
independence of Namibia – a South African territory at the time – and to the 
perceived threat of a Marxist Angola on the internal politics of the South African 
Apartheid system. Likewise, Cuba maintained both an ideological and a financial 
interest in Africa, in particular in Angola where it had a wide margin for 
interference98. Between 1975 and 1988, the Angolan war was a “Cold War proxy 
conflict (...) reflect(ing) the classic parameters of 20th century conflict”99 with both 
the ‘recognised’ government and the rebels receiving weapons, financial support 
and military support from various states. This inevitably led to a vicious circle of 
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unadulterated violence provoked by foreign governments who used the Angolan 
conflict as a forum to fight out their own ideological differences. The civil war and 
foreign interest were further fuelled by Angola’s vast resources: the country is the 
second largest oil producer in Africa, after Nigeria, and the fourth largest 
diamond producer in the world100. It has an enormous coast line of 1,650 km. On 
the other hand, Angola has an inadequate supply of drinking water and only a 
small area of arable land101. Access to mining and oil concessions has drawn 
competing countries and companies into Angola’s civil conflict.  
In 1983, the U. . Security Council demanded South Africa’s withdrawal from 
Angolan territory, which activated the signing of the Lusaka Accords in which 
South Africa agreed to remove its troops on the condition that the MPLA cease 
all support for SWAPO. This initiative failed and the South African Defence Force 
was sent back to Angola in 1985 to support U ITA’s forces against the joint 
MPLA/Cuban alliance: “by the mid 1980s, with substantial South African backing, 
U ITA’s operations had grown to the point where they posed a considerable 
threat to the security of the  PLA”102. This culminated with the  PLA’s 
“devastating defeat at Cuito Carnavale” in 1988103 at the hands of a numerically 
inferior SADF/UNITA coalition. The cost of this military campaign, however, 
compounded with international sanctions against the Apartheid regime, was 
beginning to take its toll on the South African Defence Force and the political will 
of the government and its citizens.  
Financial backing on the part of the Soviet Union and Cuba was also beginning 
to fail and in 1988, “a cash-strapped Soviet Union, beset with its own growing 
internal problems, told the government of President dos Santos that is was no 
longer prepared to provide weapons and assistance”104. Correspondingly, in 
December 1988, South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the Brazzaville Protocol 
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which brought about the implementation of U.N. Security Resolution 435 for a 
cease-fire and the peaceful transition towards the independence of Namibia. This 
removed South Africa’s direct interest in supporting U ITA, although continued 
interest in the resource management of the country allegedly remained an 
important aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy.  
 
Elections and a return to war 
 
Dos Santos and Savimbi agreed to meet in January 1989 and brokered a peace 
deal which was immediately rescinded over “a disagreement about what their 
oral undertakings had been about and over Savimbi’s future role in the 
country”105. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the  PLA’s rejection of its 
Marxist ideology, and a series of peace talks, the warring parties reached an 
agreement known as the Bicesse Accords, which ‘guaranteed’ a free and fair 
election: “the principal objectives of the accords were demilitarization and 
democratization, including preparations for Angola s first democratic elections”106. 
The first and so far only “free and fair” election in Angola took place in September 
1992. The international community generally agreed that the process was indeed 
democratic: 91% of registered voters, i.e. 4,4 million people turned out to vote. 
Dos Santos received 49.6% of the vote, against Savimbi who retained just 40.7% 
of the electorate. As both candidates received less that a majority, a second 
round of voting was required, although this never occurred as Jonas Savimbi and 
UNITA rejected the results and returned to war107.  
Former South African Ambassador Sean Cleary suggested that Savimbi was 
under the impression that the elections had been fraudulent because he 
controlled 75% of the country and therefore should have easily won a majority of 
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votes108. Furthermore, he states that the  PLA, threatened by Savimbi’s position 
of relative power, “attacked and destroyed all U ITA’s residences and party 
offices in Luanda, leading to the death of many and the capture of almost all its 
military and civilian cadres in the capital”109 between October 31st and November 
2nd 1992. This is corroborated by Simon Mann in Cry Havoc: “as the news of the 
election result came through, UNITA supporters and staff were hunted down and 
slaughtered. Savimbi himself narrowly escaped”110. The MPLA and Simon Mann 
argue that the massacres were planned by UNITA to give them an excuse to 
return to war. Both sides mistrusted the other and reacted to any provocation 
with unrestrained violence. The United Nations by this time had already lost 
credibility, having maintained an insultingly small force in Angola since 1989, 
including “350 unarmed military observers, 130 unarmed police observers, and 
100 electoral observers”111.  
 
Violence and insecurity  
 
By the time the private military company Executive Outcomes was contracted in 
Angola in 1993, the MPLA was desperate: the Forças Armadas Angolanas had 
been severely weakened as it had proceeded to disarm and reduce its numbers 
in accordance with the conditions of the Bicesse Accords, and was unable to 
contain the military threat when UNITA took up arms after the 1992 elections112. 
In mid-1993, UNITA controlled 75% of the country113 and the MPLA, despite 
having won the first round of elections, was losing the war114.  
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In 1995, Human Rights Watch published a report on the human rights 
development of Angola: it estimated that more than 100,000 people had died, 
including “250 child deaths reported each day in the besieged government-held 
city of Malanje alone. In September 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General reported 
that there had been a 10% increase in the number of people severely affected by 
the war since February 1994, and that nearly 3.7 million Angolans, mostly 
displaced and other victims of conflict, were in need of emergency supplies, 
including essential medicines, vaccines and food aid”115. UNITA was accused of 
indiscriminate shelling of cities, using civilians as a weapon of war, and recruiting 
child soldiers. These tactics were allegedly equally used by the government’s 
 PLA forces: “the ethnic cleansing of Ovimbundi and Bakongo citizens, revenge 
killings by both sides of those suspected of supporting the other in cities which 
changed hands; as well as from landmines, starvation and disease”116. UNITA 
was known to lay sieges to cities and towns, causing widespread starvation. It 
was also infamous for attacking humanitarian relief operations.  
Both sides admitted to torturing prisoners. Kidnappings, especially of foreigners, 
were widespread.  ine warfare was rampant with “thousands of new mines 
being laid by the government and UNITA to obstruct roads and bridges, to 
encircle besieged towns with mine belts up to three kilometres wide and to 
despoil agricultural lands. There were an estimated nine to fifteen million mines 
laid throughout the country. The U.N. estimated that the number of amputees as 
a result of mines injury will reach 70,000 in 1994”117. UNITA financed its military 
campaign by occupying mining areas and leasing concessions to foreign 
industrialists or mining and selling the diamonds themselves. This strategy also 
deprived the government of its main source of income.  
Not only was Angola weakened by a quarter century of civil war, it also suffered 
from intrinsic weaknesses characteristic of the colonial system which further 
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increased its vulnerability to security threats. The United States Department of 
State highlights the high level of corruption in the country. Angola placed 158 out 
of 180 countries on the Corruption Perception Index in 2008: “corruption is rife at 
all levels of government- mainly owing to the meagre salaries paid to low-level 
officials”118. Police, government employees, immigration and customs officials 
are known to frequently and regularly ask for bribes and accompany their abuse 
of authority with violence: the United States travel website warned that “officials 
are sometimes undisciplined; however, their authority should not be 
challenged”119. The Angolan government is unable or unwilling to provide 
security throughout the country, leaving both foreigners and citizens at the mercy 
of gangs, rebels, and miscreants: “several attacks against expatriates in Cabinda 
resulting in rape, robbery, and murder were registered.  Those responsible 
declared their intention to continue attacks against expatriates.  Occasional 
attacks against police and Angolan Armed Forces convoys and outposts in 
Cabinda also continue to be reported”120. Similarly, the diamond interests further 
contributed to weakening the state as “capture and occupation of these areas for 
personal benefit were important goals” for FAA generals and officers as much as 
for the rebels121.  
Angola’s criminal justice system requires institutional reforms: “Angola has only 
656 registered lawyers (...). Luanda has five judges, each of whom deal with an 
estimated 900 cases per year (...). External awaiting-trial periods of between two 
and three years are common for prisoners”122. Furthermore, the government’s 
failure to guarantee the salaries of its police and armed forces have contributed 
to these agents of safety and security turning into a threatening force towards 
their citizens: “the police have also allegedly been involved in widespread 
criminal activity. The latter is largely attributable to failure by the government to 
pay the salaries of security forces, which leads to their harassing, extorting and 
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abusing civilians to obtain supplies, with tacit support from the government”123. 
Consequently, citizens have very little faith in their undemocratic government, 
which is itself unable to control the armed forces and indeed has set them 
against the very people they should be protecting.  
Angola displayed all the symptoms of a post-colonial state: the government had 
no legitimacy and very little authority. The armed forces were weak and 
undisciplined, unable to claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. 
Finally, the population were the ultimate victims of the war, but remained 
impotent agents caught between the rebels and their own government.  
 
Outsourcing security 
 
It was in this environment of violence and chronic structural failure that President 
dos Santos and General Luis Façeira, the Angolan supreme commander of the 
army’s ground forces, contacted Eeben Barlow in April 1993, offering the South 
African a contract for his company to train the  PLA’s army and defeat U ITA 
once and for all. Executive Outcomes had already started to build a reputation for 
itself, after a successful contract with Heritage Oil & Gas for which it had 
provided security and recovered valuable material from Soyo, an area held and 
controlled by the UNITA rebels. Heritage Oil & Gas was heavily involved in oil 
exploration and drilling of the Angolan coast, and its CEO, a British businessman 
by the name of Tony Buckingham had therefore an interest in the political 
development of the country.  
Tony Buckingham and his number two Simon Mann124 were present at the 
meeting between Barlow, President dos Santos and General Façeira. The two oil 
moguls allegedly ended up supplying most of the financing for EO’s contract in 
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Angola: “Tony Buckingham would guarantee all funds and ensure they were paid 
into my company account as stipulated. The finance would be provided by 
Sonangol, Heritage Oil and Gas, and Ranger Oil”125. The one year contract was 
eventually extended to four years, but there appears to be contradictions 
regarding who paid EO’s fee of approximately $60 million – the MPLA, the oil 
companies or a joint-venture between the two? Allegedly the contract was 
sponsored half-half by Tony Buckingham and the MPLA126. There have also 
been allegations that the contract was partially paid with mining concessions: “in 
further payment for EO’s services, substantial concessions were granted to 
Branch Energy, Buckingham’s company”127. On the other hand, EO’s first 
contract with Tony Buckingham’s Heritage in Soyo was allegedly paid for by the 
Angolan government128.  
The decision to outsource security to a foreign private military company was a 
deliberate policy adopted jointly by the head of state, President dos Santos, and 
the head of the armed forces, General Luis Façeira. According to Barlow, the 
decision makers in Angola recognised that they “were in desperate need of help. 
We have made many requests to the United Nations which they have ignored. 
No one there wants to help us. When UNITA returned to war after they lost the 
elections they caught us completely off-guard. We had demobilised our units, 
which allowed UNITA a free hand to occupy large areas of Angola”129. Their 
perceived abandonment by the international community and the inability of the 
army to defeat the rebels drove dos Santos and Façeira to contract the private 
military company Executive Outcomes with the belief that the mercenary 
company would be able to supplement the national armed forces by bringing in a 
thorough training program, clear leadership, and logistical efficiency. EO would 
thus act as a force-multiplier and change the course of the war in the 
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government’s favour. General Antonio Fa eira of the country’s Special Forces 
commented that “this is probably our last chance of saving our country”130, 
showing that the armed forces recognised their inability to control the situation 
and their desperate need for effective military support. 
This narrative, however, is contested by Sean Cleary, who argues that the FAA 
was a “highly capacitated military force with sophisticated equipment, good order 
of battle” which had benefited from Soviet and Cuban advisory groups131. 
Ambassador Cleary suggests that Angola suffered a massive political failure in 
which rampant mistrust between the two parties – UNITA and the MPLA, led to a 
self-sustaining prophesy of incapacitated peace negotiations. He further 
explained that when UNITA took over Soyo, a major oil producing city, the 
government and oil companies turned to Executive Outcomes as a quick, easy 
and effective solution to retake the town. Although the FAA could have handled 
UNITA, which was already marginalised and had relatively little access to 
resources beyond some diamond fields, the senior ranks of the Angolan armed 
forces benefited far more by outsourcing security and encouraging a continuation 
of the war than by suing for a sub-optimal peace: “ e  atos will not accept 
U ITA’s army integration into the FAA, despite what has been agreed on the 
political level. Full integration is not possibly as De Matos will then not be able to 
count on the loyalty of the FAA in the event of a return to war. De Matos benefits 
from EO’s presence in Angola, it reinforces his strength as they are answerable 
to him. He has factored them into his planning for the reconstitution and training 
of FAA”132.  
In fact, the diamond interest fuelled the war to a large part as the above-
mentioned military officers gained access to mining concessions which are still 
owned by army veterans today. The army was also able to participate in 
advantageous weapons purchases through their cooperation with EO. 
Undoubtedly a strong component of hiring Executive Outcomes on the part of the 
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military officers was fuelled by the possibilities for career advancements in times 
of war, access to military technology and high-tech weapons, expert training and 
diamonds. President dos Santos would also have appreciated the apparent low 
cost of hiring a private military company, as “giving resource in exchange for 
military services was cheap(er)”133 and faster than investing in military training, 
purchases, pensions and healthcare, and does not require immediate access to 
cash. Greg Mills explained that in 1992, the FAA might have had the equipment, 
but they certainly did not have the training or the money; Executive Outcomes 
gave them an advantage that was able to swing the balance in their favour134. 
 
 O’s military campaign 
 
During the four years Executive Outcomes spent in Angola, it developed a 
comprehensive training program for the Forças Armadas Angolanas, the Angolan 
army. This included intelligence, counter-insurgency operations, military 
discipline, small unit tactics, administrative, logistic and maintenance training, 
leadership, offensive and defensive exercises135. Although it appears that the 
initial contract was for the purpose of training the Angolan army, a joint EO/FAA 
plan “aimed at defeating U ITA on the battlefield”136 saw the mercenaries lead 
the newly trained Angolan soldiers in successful campaigns against UNITA as 
they proceeded to retake various parts of Angola, starting with the oil-producing 
and diamond mining areas, Saurimo and Cafunfu137.  
The presence of EO and their rigorous training program gave the FAA a much 
needed boost of confidence, and the Angolan forces resumed the war with 
enthusiasm. Furthermore, Executive Outcomes provided their employees with 
constant air support. This was important because it motivated the soldiers to take 
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the risks necessary to carry out their mission: nobody went into the bush without 
asking who was flying the helicopters or planes in case of an emergency 
evacuation138. The “fixed wing and helicopter” also gave the government forces 
an edge as they flew “countless sorties, often braving intense anti-aircraft fire to 
relieve pressure on the FAA”139. The Angolan armed forces were to provide all 
weapons and equipment needed to conduct the training. This included “a full 
range of weapons, vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and 
ground-attack aircrafts”140 that were generally bought from third countries. One 
EO pilot suggested that the Angolan army had all the modern weaponry, 
including helicopters and fighting planes, that they needed, but lacked the 
organisational ability, logistical know-how and leadership to utilise their material 
effectively. South African Veteran, Colonel Velthuizen pointed out that it was the 
low level of maintenance and lack of technicians that rendered these weapons 
useless, which partially explains why the FAA required foreign support to fight 
their war in the first place141.  
By  ovember 1994, “U ITA had been convincingly defeated by the FAA over a 
wide front on the battlefield. They had lost the strategic diamond mining town of 
Cafunfu and were coming under increasing pressure to accept a cease-fire. The 
 PLA was finally able to negotiate from a position of strength”142. UNITA and the 
MPLA signed the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 making provisions for 
“a complete cease fire, the integration of U ITA’s general officers and other 
ranks into the FAA, U ITA’s demilitarisation, the repatriation of mercenaries”143. 
After overwhelming pressure from the international community and in particular 
the United States, Executive Outcomes left Angola in January 1996 but not 
without warning the government that the situation was still too precarious to 
leave. Indeed, in June 1997, UNITA resumed its offensive campaign by attacking 
a village in Luanda Norte and killing all its inhabitants. The civil war spiralled on, 
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virtually ignored by the international community, until the death of Jonas Savimbi, 
reportedly killed by the MPLA, although this has been contested orally by some 
mercenaries and South Africans working in Angola who claimed that “Israel took 
him out”144. 
Executive Outcomes claims that its intervention forced Savimbi and UNITA to the 
negotiations table, a statement which was reiterated by Dr. Herbert Howe. 
Between 1993 and 1996, the time when EO left the country after their contract 
had ended, the military company had “trained a demoralised and defeated army 
and turned the tide of the 20-year-long Angolan war”145. Sean Cleary, on the 
other hand, argues that EO gave the FAA a military advantage beyond its 
capabilities, and therefore “contributed to the prolongation of the war”146. 
 
Analysis of legitimacy  
 
Executive Outcomes claims that it only worked for legitimate governments – but 
in weak African states, this was a big risk as the government of the day could 
change very quickly and democratic elections were few and far between. From 
its independence in 1975 until the elections in 1992, Angola was represented by 
various factions, each supported and recognised by different communities in the 
international system: UNITA was backed by the United States and South Africa, 
whereas the MPLA could count on the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 
1976, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formally recognised the MPLA as 
the legal sovereign of the territory and the official representation of Angola 
abroad, after the party overpowered several UNITA strongholds. The two parties 
eventually came to an accord and agreed to a cease-fire and elections in 1992. 
These U.N.-monitored elections, however, led to an impasse as neither 
candidate received a majority and consequently a second round of elections with 
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a runoff between the two principle candidates was required by Angolan law147. 
The second round of election never took place because the civil war resumed 
shortly after. The international community subsequently condemned UNITA for 
its failure to honour the election results, and promptly recognised the MPLA as 
the legitimate government.   
The MPLA therefore derived its right to rule from international legal 
sovereignty148. The international community’s recognition sufficed for it to claim 
development aid and support and the right to organise and distribute the 
resources and manage the population within its own territory. The MPLA could 
subsequently set its own foreign policy, interact with foreign investors, distribute 
mining concessions and fix levels of taxation in all ‘legitimacy’. Within its own 
territory, however, the reality was quite different: the MPLA was unable to 
effectively control the diamond mines which were taken over and exploited by 
UNITA. Indeed by 1993, UNITA allegedly controlled some 75% of Angolan 
territory, although arguably most of this land was unpopulated waste land which 
explains why the Angolan economy continued its strong growth during the civil 
war: the MPLA was able to control the capital city, Luanda, and the oil fields from 
which it derived its main revenue. It also held the monopoly on the licensing and 
taxation for the trading of commodities in and out of the country.  
Nonetheless the MPLA was never able to qualify as the legitimate government in 
terms of Weberian sovereignty149. The party neither provided its population with 
security, nor was it capable of monopolising or even controlling the level of 
legitimate violence within its territory: the MPLA therefore did not “successfully 
claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory”150 beyond its stronghold in Luanda. Instead of encouraging a social 
contract between the government and its citizens, the MPLA criminalised all 
forms of opposition, and then enacted its policy with violent enthusiasm against 
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UNITA and any potential supporters, at times attacking its own population. It 
failed to provide its citizens with most public goods beyond Luanda. Furthermore, 
despite its relative capacity, the Angolan army was incapable of controlling its 
borders, enabling illicit support for UNITA and illegal mining and trading to occur 
within its territory. This encouraged UNITA to continue fighting the MPLA as it 
was able to keep its supply lines open, facilitating its military efforts by 
exchanging weapons for illegal diamonds151. Seegers argues that capacity 
depends on one’s good relations with its neighbours152, and UNITA was able to 
support its campaign with the help of its foreign allies, in particular  obutu’s 
regime in Zaire which equipped the UNITA forces and happily traded with 
them153. 
In countries that do not necessarily have a history of democratic regimes and 
good civil-military relations, governments have very few avenues to claim 
legitimacy: they can have legitimacy stamped on them by the international 
community – which Stephen Krasner calls international legal sovereignty – but 
this does not translate to effective sovereignty in the sense that they often 
encounter internal dissent from civilians or the military. Alternatively, the 
government can seize control by force and claim Weberian sovereignty by their 
capacity to monopolise the legitimate use of violence and provide security or 
alternatively threaten to repress its citizens. This was the case in Liberia, 
although the international community’s failure to recognise Charles Taylor’s 
regime did undermine his foreign policy. The government can also claim 
legitimacy by holding elections and winning a majority of votes. By this last 
strategy, it effectively lays the ground for a binding legal relationship between 
itself and the people it claims to represent. These elections are not necessarily 
democratic, but they are symbolic and have come to represent a compromise 
between the international community, the government, and the population. 
Indeed, most peacekeeping missions are principally aimed at promoting and 
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facilitating elections that subsequently confirm the government in power and 
enable commercial and political relations to resume. The relationship between a 
government and its people is therefore based on political control, not a social 
contract as idealised by the West.  
Because of the failure to hold a second round of elections, the MPLA never 
cemented its right to represent Angola through a democratic process. Legally 
speaking, the MPLA did not receive its mandate from the people as it could 
neither claim to represent the majority of the population nor to have respected 
the constitution’s electoral requirements. The  PLA’s armed forces were also 
unable to provide security to the population or to monopolise the legitimate use of 
force, as evidenced by U ITA’s ongoing military threat against both the citizens 
and the state. In fact, the MPLA derived its legitimacy entirely from the 
international community, despite its obvious failures to carry out the mandate 
expected from sovereign entities. President dos Santos has ruled Angola from 
1979 and is still in power in 2012. This suggests a breakdown in the democratic 
process of the country, and undermines the legitimacy of the MPLA, despite its 
alleged victory in subsequent elections. Eeben Barlow and Simon  ann’s claims 
that they worked for a legitimate government can therefore be contested in this 
environment of contrasting and overlapping claims to sovereignty, and require a 
more developed understanding of the political context in which the private military 
company is operating.  
Executive Outcomes was working for dos Santos and the MPLA, which were the 
internationally recognised authority in Angola, and thus the only legal 
government in the eyes of the United Nations. Consequently Mann and Barlow 
can unquestionably claim that they were on the side of international law and 
international legal sovereignty, in this case, despite the general norm at the time 
that stigmatised private military companies. Since the MPLA was unable to fulfil 
the mandates generally expected from a sovereign government, however, its 
claim to internal sovereignty through the use of a foreign military agent suggests 
an unlawful attempt to grab power beyond its actual capabilities. Executive 
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Outcomes and its administrators may be in their legal right, but the impacts they 
have on the legitimacy of the state and its relationship and responsibilities 
towards its own citizens are politically questionable, especially in the long run.  
 
PMC-military relations 
 
The Forças Armadas Angolanas was reputedly a highly capacitated, equipped 
and capable military by African standards.  Annette Seegers explained that the 
Angolan army is “excellent, organised, and probably one of two armies which 
could take on the South African Army”154. General Fa eira’s decision to 
collaborate with President dos Santos and hire Executive Outcomes to 
supplement the armed forces is an unusual example of civil-military cooperation. 
It also ensured the success of EO’s mission without overtly threatening the 
identity or the authority of the Angolan armed forces. Executive Outcomes had a 
distinct advantage, as most of its personnel had previous experience fighting in 
Angola from the time when South Africa had supported UNITA. This gave the 
men personal knowledge of the terrain as well as intelligence into the tactics, 
strengths and weaknesses of their new enemy, but it also fuelled confusion and 
anger among the FAA who had previously fought against the SADF soldiers: 
“their initial fear and distrust of my men was based largely on the stories of their 
fathers and older brothers who had once been pitted against the South Africans 
on the battlefield”155. It should be noted, however, that this was a unique 
circumstance and EO’s experience in one African country does not make their 
team more or less capable of operating in another context, such as Sierra Leone, 
where the terrain and socio-military infrastructure is so very different156.  
Dealing with a foreign private military company can be a threatening and 
emasculating experience for any national army. Reactions range from relief 
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“thank God someone here is competent”157 to embarrassment and outright 
rebellion. According to Jane’s defence correspondent Helmoed-Romer Heitman, 
“the guys who are actually good will have a problem and question the command 
structure”158. By bringing in a PMC, the government sends a message that its 
army is useless, and this both undermines and disrupts the morale of the armed 
forces, leading to dissent. The tensions between the foreign forces and the 
national army are further exacerbated by the perceived nature of mercenarism: 
“mercenaries are boastful bums with little discipline”159. Eeben Barlow 
acknowledged this problem and explains in his autobiography that it “pained 
many of them (FAA soldiers) to see large numbers of ex-SADF soldiers in their 
midst. Although General De Matos had instructed them that our men should be 
viewed as friends and allies, it was difficult for many FAA soldiers to accept”160. 
As a result, some soldiers “refused to issue weapons, ammunition and other 
equipment to my men (and) there was even talk of some of our men rebelling at 
the way they were being treated”161. Both the FAA and EO personnel faced great 
challenges in their interactions, despite the initiative being spearheaded by the 
senior officers of the Angolan army. Nonetheless, EO successfully completed the 
training of 16-Brigade and led them into battle most notably in Saurimo and 
Cafunfu. The experience of battle contributed to forging a shared experience of 
suffering and excitement, improving the relations between the soldiers and the 
foreign combatants. Taking part in offensive operations was beyond the contract 
of EO, but nonetheless was arguably instrumental to the success of their 
mission: “our men formed one of the brigade’s combat teams. When we initially 
recruited them, they were there purely to train the FAA.  ow they’re gearing up 
for war”162.  
Another problem that is characteristic of PMC-military relations is the ranking 
system. PMC personnel are outside of a national military structure. 
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Consequently, even when they are ‘promoted’ to various ranks, this lacks the 
official sanctions of government recognition and undermines the credibility and 
the merit of the soldier. The national armed forces are understandably sceptical 
of foreign contractors who emerge with glossy ranks and give them orders 
without any formalised structure. A further concern which cannot be overlooked 
is that the private military industry also keeps official troops out of the promotion 
line by taking over the role of the armed forces. This is a straightforward threat to 
the livelihoods of these soldiers who, very often in these countries, are barely 
paid their salary and have little margin for promotions, not to mention a pay-raise. 
To overcome trust issues with senior Angolan officers, Eeben Barlow attributed 
equivalent ranks to his own senior personnel, regularly briefed the generals on 
the training programs and operations and held joint-planning sessions. These 
briefings “played a major role in establishing a lasting foundation of trust with the 
General Staff”163. This maintained a relationship based on respect that did not 
undermine the command structures of the Angolan army. The FAA and EO 
shared information and cooperated closely, therefore improving their access to 
tactical intelligence and drafting military plans that satisfied both parties. 
 
Civil-military relations 
 
Executive Outcomes also focused on building trust among the civilian 
populations. This was necessary to maintain popular support for their operations 
and encourage informants to cooperate with the FAA and turn away from UNITA. 
EO aimed to set itself as a source of security for the local population wherever 
they were stationed. They also gave instructions to their engineers to supply 
purified water and tasked their medics to provide medical care to the 
communities: “the EO medics tried to assist the injured and malnourished povo 
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wherever they could, despite being short of supplies”164. The result was that 
“people started waving at us when we drove past, happy to have us around when 
they developed any medical problems”165. Although the strategy is necessary for 
a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in which the counter-insurgency requires support 
from the local population, this does not appear to be the objective in Barlow’s 
short-term contract in Angola. Rather, the impact that EO had on the local 
population was arguably opportunistic and short-lived, and appears to be an 
initiative led by the teams on the ground out of a spirit of compassion and to 
encourage the people to cooperate with the troops: “trying to relieve the misery of 
the locals in Angola was not to our financial advantage – nor was it part of our 
contract”166.  
Tim Butcher, defence correspondent for The Telegraph, argued that the 
mercenaries were feared by the local population because of their 
unaccountability, the fact that they “didn’t give a shit”, and because they were 
outsiders167. Locals were weary of their presence, and while the PMCs may have 
contributed somewhat to their immediate surroundings, they did the absolute 
minimum. According to Butcher, the hearts and minds campaign is “an absolute 
myth” and corporate social responsibility for a private military company is the 
height of irony: “I never heard anybody say ‘bring them back’”168. Barlow’s brief 
description of his company’s contribution to the local community seems to 
confirm his lack of commitment to this particular enterprise. Mills paints a 
different picture, however, stating that the people just wanted the conflict to end, 
and did not care whether this is achieved through the use of mercenaries or 
foreign soldiers169. 
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Conclusion: A zero-sum equation 
 
The Angolan civil war lasted 27 years and officially came to an end on the 22nd of 
February 2002 with the assassination of Jonas Savimbi. During nearly three 
decades of conflict, an estimated half a million people were killed, “more than 
four million (33%) of Angola’s population are today internally displaced, and 
450,000 are refugees (...). Nine million of its 13 million people live on less than a 
dollar a day”170. The damage to the infrastructure and political and economic 
institutions is immeasurable. Today’s estimated debt burden of $11 billion largely 
reflects the  PLA’s war effort since 1990. 
For Angola, the decision to hire a private military company does not appear to 
have had a significant impact on the long-term security of the state. In terms of 
government credibility, dos Santos’ initiative of hiring a private military company 
had little or no impact on his regime or on his relationship with either the armed 
forces or his citizens.  espite EO’s short-term military successes, the civil war 
carried on until 2002 with UNITA continuing its assaults against the MPLA. 
Executive Outcome’s training program, however, arguably made the armed 
forces more effective, as the MPLA subsequently launched a campaign against 
the rebels: a “ruthless scorched-earth policy towards the civilian population in 
areas traditionally supportive of UNITA, an effective UN-supported international 
sanctions campaign that froze its financial assets, isolated it politically, and 
embarrassed governments traditionally supportive of U ITA”171 contributed to 
toning down the conflict, if not ending the war entirely. The end of  obutu’s 
regime in 1997 also undermined foreign support for the rebels. Eventually, the 
“stick-and-carrot approach followed by the Angolan government led to large-
scale desertions by UNITA soldiers after the introduction of an amnesty in 2001 
and, later, financial assistance ‘for all those who abandon unjust war and opt for 
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democracy’”172. Sean Cleary claimed that “EO unquestionably helped the FAA to 
achieve its military objective”173: while EO may have contributed to prolonging the 
war, it cemented the FAA as the dominant military force in the country. This 
effectively re-instated the Weberian sovereignty of President dos Santos in 
Angola. 
Executive Outcomes encountered all the expected obstacles of a foreign private 
military company operating in a developing state with weak political and military 
institutions. The company’s success in overcoming these problems is largely due 
to its excellent managerial initiatives that focused on cooperation and 
communication between the army and the private combatants. By including the 
leadership of the FAA in all stages of planning, EO set itself in a support role that 
neither threatened nor undermined the authority of the national armed forces. 
The combative role and additional air support that EO supplied demonstrated the 
company’s willingness to lead by example and won the trust of the Angolan 
soldiers. This episode suggests that private military companies can, at the very 
least, not adversely affect the country in which they are operating. This depends 
however on the management of the company, its ability to win credibility and lead 
respectfully, and of course, on its mandate and modus operandi.  
Finally, mercenaries and private military companies have found that Africa offers 
many lucrative opportunities, both because of the huge availability of resources, 
and because of its weak institutions and conflict-prone environment. Errors and 
abuses, mercenary coups and secessionist activities have contributed to 
poisoning the reputation of (particularly white) mercenaries, and stigmatising 
foreign combatants as opportunistic and unscrupulous neo-colonialists. 
Nonetheless, nowhere have these foreigners encountered more freedom of 
action than on the African continent, where legislative efforts and international 
interest have largely veered away from implementing any anti-mercenary laws 
whenever there is a perceived advantage to hiring the services of mercenaries or 
private military companies. American, French and British PMCs have generally 
                                            
172
Ibid., 1. 
173
 Cleary in ibid., 164. 
162 
 
received the political support of their home state in their African contracts and 
only South African mercenaries have really been targeted by international and 
domestic condemnation.  espite international complacency, Africa’s mixed 
experiences with mercenaries and private military companies show that these 
foreign combatants do not appear to make a significant difference on the ground.  
The Angolan case-study on hybridisation illustrates the experiences of a 
developing country with weak political, legal and military institutions. The next 
chapter investigates a new model of hybridisation taking place in a collapsed 
state where the expeditionary force and private military companies work together 
for a state that is remote from the theatre of operations. 
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5. Hybridisation: Contractors in Iraq 
 
The contractor has become the poster boy for the Iraq War. Armed to the teeth 
and high on steroids1, these private agents have earned themselves a reputation 
for being overly aggressive, negligent, and unaccountable. This has inevitably led 
to tensions between the professional soldiers on the ground who are mandated 
with keeping the peace in Iraq, and the private security companies who are ‘in for 
a buck’.  onetheless, the U.S. government has increasingly turned to the private 
sector as an allegedly cheap and immediate solution to the shortage in military 
personnel that threatens their ambitions in Iraq: by 2007, the “ efence 
Department (had) spent $158.3 billion on services, a 76 percent increase over 
the past decade and more than what it spends on supplies, equipment, and 
major weapons systems”2. In 2009, 173,000 private contractors were believed to 
support the work of the 146,000 U.S. troops on the ground3. From these 
contractors hired by the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, 
and USAID, 49% were local Iraqis, 34% were third-country nationals, and only 
17% were US citizens4.  
The emergence of private and foreign combatants as a key component of U.S. 
military strategy has created new opportunities in U.S. foreign policy, and 
exacerbated old tensions between the non-state actors and the professional 
armed forces. This chapter explores the rise of the private military sector within 
the context of privatisation and outsourcing that already characterised U.S. 
domestic policies. Using Iraq as a case-study for America’s experiments in 
military public-private partnerships, it outlines the advantages and difficulties of 
hybridising the armed forces and focuses on civil-military relations, issues of 
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command and control, overlapping identities and blurred hierarchies. The 
massive outsourcing of logistics, tech support, and even military tasks in the last 
decade has changed the face of security in Iraq, with contractors now 
outnumbering regular troops. Military operations are increasingly supported or 
even replaced by private military and security firms, leading to a difficult 
cohabitation between the two actors that can adversely affect the war effort. 
Contractors are here to stay, however, and therefore it is critical to thoroughly 
grasp the obstacles hindering good civil-military relations in order to overcome 
them and adapt to the new military landscape of hybridised armies. 
 
The changing military landscape 
 
The rise of the private security industry at the end of the twentieth century and 
the beginning of the twenty-first was unprecedented: by 2010, the industry had 
reached $200 billion in annual revenue5. The emergence of private security and 
military companies on the global scene defies contemporary anti-mercenary 
norms. In their corporate forms, mercenaries operate freely on the open market, 
offering military and security services to individual governments, private 
investors, and international non-profit organisations. The explanation for this 
sudden expansion of the private sector stems from 1) the new security 
environment in which state actors now operate; 2) the ideological changes and 
general risk aversion that characterises democratic societies; and 3) the culture 
of outsourcing and privatising state services that has been embraced by Western 
governments.  
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Military downsizing 
 
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union shifted the military goals 
of most nations. With the removal of an imminent threat of war, the huge 
conventional armies of the twentieth century became redundant. This led to a 
large-scale downsizing in the standing armies of the major powers: “combined 
military manpower dropped from 6,873,000 in 1990 to 3,283,000 in 1997”6 – 
more than  50%. In the United States alone, the active force in 2000 represented 
only 64% of its 1989 total: “the U.S. Army,  avy, and Air Force all registered 
reductions of about 35% between 1989 and 2000, and the Marine Corps 
registered a 12% reduction”7.  
The downsizing of military personnel was not necessarily followed by a reduction 
in military spending. Between 1989 and 2003, U.S. military spending was 
reduced by only 1%, but since gone up again with the invasion of Iraq and the 
ongoing wars in the region: “the George H. W. Bush administration’s Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2007 budget request of $439 billion marks an increase of approximately 
27% in real terms since September 11, 2001”8. On the other hand, most 
European countries have cut their defence expenditures since the end of the 
Cold War. France cut its defence spending by 10%, Germany by 29%, and the 
UK by 21%9. This is partly due to the consolidation of the European Union and 
the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy which increased co-
operation between member-states and has thus reduced the likelihood of a war 
developing within Europe. Austerity measures and the economic crisis in Europe 
has required further cuts, with the British “ inistry of  efence in the process of 
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cutting 25,000 armed forces personnel and 29,000 civilian staff by 2015, in the 
biggest round of cuts to the military since the end of the Cold War”10. 
The demobilisation of armies at the end of conflicts has always been followed by 
an overwhelming supply of former soldiers with highly specialised skills who flock 
onto the job market11: “in the case of the United States and the UK, there 
appears to be some correlation between the downsizing and the size of their 
private military industry”12. This trend was followed by South Africa at the end of 
the Apartheid regime in 1994: as the country tried to erase its racist history by 
dismantling the military organisations that had enforced the Apartheid policies, it 
became a prime provider of private military companies and military services. 
Academic researcher Carlos Ortiz explains that “downsizing contributed to the 
maturation of a market for private military services that had already been 
identifiable during the Cold War”13.  
The end of the Cold War created a power vacuum, with the new Russian 
Federation politically, financially and militarily uninterested in supporting its 
former allies in third world countries. Concomitantly, the United States and its 
Western allies no longer had an incentive to promote certain political actors, 
particularly in Africa.  eborah Avant explains that “with the increase in supply 
(came) an increase in demand for military skills on the private market- from 
Western states that had downsized their militaries, from countries seeking to 
upgrade their militaries as a way of demonstrating credentials for entry into 
Western institutions, from rulers of weak or failed states no longer propped up by 
superpower patrons, and from non-state actors such as private firms and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the territories of weak or failed 
states”14. 
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Ideological changes 
 
The changes affecting modern armies today are a reflection of “large-scale social 
changes in the broader society”15 according to Charles Moskos. The end of the 
Cold War changed the perceived level of threat of an imminent outbreak of war. 
The survivability of the state was no longer in question, and armies and societies 
needed to find a new purpose for their soldiers. The wars of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century are typically civil wars taking place in the 
Balkans or in former colonies. Immediate threats of terrorism have been isolated 
incidents and do not require mass mobilisation. ‘Geo-economic’ threats such as 
uncontrolled immigration, transnational crime, environmental disasters and 
epidemics have superseded ‘geopolitical’ priorities in the national security 
agenda16. The armed forces have therefore had to redirect their operations and 
rebuild a new identity in “operations other than war”, such as peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions.  
Naturally, the structure of the armed forces has had to adapt to this new level of 
threat perception. During the Cold War, European states generally relied on a 
system of conscription to staff large standing armies. The fall of the Iron Curtain, 
however, accelerated the shift towards a volunteer army: conscription in France 
was abolished in 2001, Germany suspended conscription in 2011, and only six 
European countries still practice a form of conscription in 2012. The United 
States had ended the draft in 1973 and has since depended on an ever-
dwindling army of professional soldiers17. According to Moskos, the progressive 
abandonment of citizen-armies is a phenomenon of postmodernity: “during the 
late 1990s, the decay of the public service tradition was evident, conscientious 
objection had increased, and (France) was moving rapidly toward a smaller, 
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more professional volunteer military focused on peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations”18.  
Public attitude towards the armed forces has also played a significant role in the 
changing military landscape of the twenty-first century. While during times of 
conflict, the public and media are generally supportive of their militaries, the lack 
of imminent threat and the geographical remoteness of active engagements have 
affected society: “in the post-Cold War era, the public mood toward the armed 
forces becomes more one of indifference. The end of conscription makes military 
service less salient to the general populace. The likelihood of volunteer 
recruitment drawing upon future elites and opinion leaders becomes increasingly 
remote”19. Conscientious objection has become an accepted feature of modern 
states and is no longer punishable. This reflects a public apathy towards military 
service and to civic duty in general. The improvements in the standard of living 
and increased access to education have further discouraged voluntary enlistment 
as young men and women enjoy the luxuries of day to day life.  
 oskos argues that today’s Western societies are also less able to accept 
casualties in war20. Edward Luttwak explains that this is a characteristic of ‘post-
heroic’ societies where war has lost is allure and no longer arouses enthusiasm 
among neither the population nor the soldiers. This change in attitudes stems 
from the “small family size of post-industrial societies (that) makes such societies’ 
populations loath to suffer wartime casualties”21. Furthermore, Moskos suggests 
that “the willingness of a country to accept casualties is positively related to the 
proportion of elite youth who are putting their lives on the line”22 which in turn 
requires that the government in power articulate clearly the immediate threat to 
national security to encourage public support for the war effort. The aversion to 
casualties is exemplified by the ongoing body-bag count that defines the success 
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or failure of military operations today. Public support for war naturally has an 
effect on domestic politics, particularly in democratic countries. Consequently, 
and in view of contemporary attitudes of risk aversion, governments have sought 
to protect their soldiers from exposure to lethal situations, creating a paradox that 
jeopardises military effectiveness for the sake of domestic support. 
Although military values are still a pillar of most professional armies, the concept 
of civic duty has gradually been eroded in postmodern societies. Furthermore, 
the abolition of conscription and recent socio-economic changes have affected 
public attitudes towards the armed forces: “public opinion in most countries has 
remained supportive, although citizens are generally not interested in military 
service for themselves or their families”23. Governments, particularly in the United 
States, have had to take into account this change in mood when making foreign 
policies that require military participation.   
 
Privatisation 
 
Military downsizing and the afore-mentioned changing public attitudes forced the 
U.S. government to restructure their defence sector. A study by the Defense 
Science Board Task Force published in 1996 reported that “all  o  support 
services should be contracted out to private vendors except those functions 
which are inherently governmental or directly impact war-fighting capability, or for 
which no adequate private sector capability exists or can be expected to be 
established”24. The study concluded that up to $12 billion could be saved 
annually if the Pentagon “contracted out all support functions except actual 
warfighting”25. By 2005, “the federal government was spending about $100 billion 
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more annually for outside contracts than on employee salaries”26 and up to 80% 
of the federal budget in select departments went straight to private contractors27. 
The privatisation of services was further accelerated under Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld who promoted the use of civilians for all non-combat jobs with 
the purpose of freeing up and concentrating military manpower and resources on 
the war on terror.  
The practice of outsourcing government services to the private sector is a 
fundamental part of U.S. history: for the American Revolution, 700 private ships 
and 30,000 Hessian mercenaries were commissioned to fight against the 
British28. Civilians were also used for logistic support in World War II, the Vietnam 
War and the Bosnian War. The contractor to military ratio has shrunk 
exponentially with civilians overtaking military personnel by 2010 as clearly 
shown in Table 1 on the estimated ratio of contractors to U.S. military personnel 
in recent wars: 
Table 1: Estimated ratio of contractors to U.S. military personnel in recent 
conflicts29 
War  Contractor # Military # Ratio 
Gulf War 9,200 541,000 1:59 
Bosnian War 1,400 20,000 1:14 
Iraq War 2006 21,000 140,000 1:7 
Iraq reconstruction 2010 173,000 146,000 1.2:1 
 
The end of the Cold War has shifted the focus from the population to the 
individual. Citizens in the United States and Europe have such excessively high 
expectations from their governments that outsourcing is inevitable in order to 
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keep up with the populations’ demands. Even foreign policy, once the exclusive 
domain of the state, has been privatised as “everything from diplomacy to 
development to intelligence”30 is being outsourced. According to Philip Bobbitt, 
the modern market state, claims its basis for legitimacy on its ability to “maximize 
individual opportunity and by adopting methods of warfare and defense 
unavailable to the nation states”31. Privatisation has therefore become an intrinsic 
feature of the market state, with defence, security, and even ambassadorial 
services being provided by private companies, albeit under the umbrella of a 
government contract.  
 
Corporate armies 
 
The rise of private military and security companies is a natural development in 
the market economy. The downsizing of armies forced an abundant supply of 
professional soldiers looking for employ, and equally created a new demand for 
private sector support in order for states to carry out their foreign policy32. 
Recognising a potentially lucrative opportunity, former soldiers began to come 
together to form corporations offering their military and security skills on the 
international market. Their ability to successfully commercialise military skills is 
evidence of a significant change of norms regarding the state’s previously 
exclusive claim over the legitimate use of violence.  
Unlike the companies of mercenaries established in the Middle Ages, private 
military companies are legally established commercial enterprises. Some of them 
are even listed on the stock exchange33 with ArmorGroup becoming in 2004 the 
“first independent, international security firm to be traded”34. They “are formally 
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incorporated, and although not exactly paragons of transparency, they produce 
corporate literature, attend international conferences, maintain Web sites, and 
tend to be affiliated to defense or security professional associations”35. They also 
pay taxes, promote their services through marketing campaigns, and enter into 
contractual agreements with recognised governments, non-governmental 
organisations and multi-national corporations. PMCs claim to be experts in the 
“application and transmission of the knowledge of the use of force”36. Services 
range from support and reconstruction to security, intelligence and even combat. 
The largest private military companies are established in or around political 
capitals, particularly in London and in Washington D.C. (USA), and they employ 
a multinational team of professional soldiers and policemen, with recruitment 
efforts recently taking place in ‘third nation countries’: contractors working in Iraq 
“come from Bosnia, Britain,  epal, Chile, Ukraine, Israel, South Africa,  ew 
Zealand, Australia, and Fiji, not to mention those who served in the French 
Foreign Legion”37. British company ArmorGroup “employed hundreds of Gurkhas 
to guard executives with the U.S. firms Bechtel and Kellogg, Brown & Root”38. 
Former soldiers from Chile, Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua have equally 
been hired by American firms Triple Canopy, Inveco International Corp. and 
Blackwater39. Officially, approximately 30% of contractors in Iraq are third-country 
nationals40. The services of PMCs are often transborder, with operations taking 
place simultaneously in different countries, depending on demand. These 
corporations are also exclusively profit-driven, leading to allegations of 
mercenarism. Such accusations, however, are redundant in the twenty-first 
century where the principal employers of these firms are the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Indeed, the biggest difference perhaps between “ragtag 
bands of adventurers, paramilitary forces, or individuals recruited in specific 
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covert operations”41 and organised clandestinely, and the modern corporate firm, 
is that the latter operates openly and freely with the overall blessing of the 
international community. 
Although private military companies claim to work only for legitimate 
governments, in Iraq, “most P Cs do not work directly for the U.S. government” 
as they are subcontracted from prime contractors to provide personnel protection 
to Iraqi and foreign companies seeking business opportunities in the country. The 
initial chaos that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 however, led to an 
environment of impunity and disinformation that undermined the reliability and 
reputation of corporate armies.  
 
A case-study of hybridisation in Iraq 
 
Iraq has been an experiment in the use of private contractors in warfare. 
Between the beginning of the war in March 2003 and the latest census in 2011, 
the ratio of civilian contractors to army personnel operating in the field has 
ballooned from 1:10 in 2003 to 1.2:142. This disproportion between civilians and 
military personnel was an entirely new phenomenon which the new Coalition 
Provisional Authority, under the administrative leadership of L. Paul Bremer who 
was tasked with the reconstruction of Iraq, was unable and unwilling to control. 
The incidents that followed both marred the reputations of many private 
companies, undermined the war effort, and frustrated the U.S. soldiers stationed 
in Iraq. Nonetheless, the reconstruction of Iraq could not have taken place 
without the added support and security that contractors offered to investors, 
governments and NGOs. The role of private contractors in Iraq has received 
enormous media and academic attention and offers unprecedented details on the 
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interactions between civilians and military personnel in a war zone that can 
inform the debate on the effective hybridisation of the armed forces.  
 
Invasion, insurrection and civil war 
 
In 2003, the United States and its allies pre-emptively invaded Iraq with a 
combined force of 300,000 troops, including 46,000 British soldiers and a token 
contribution from Australia and Poland; “the total number of troops in the theatre 
added up to less than half of that mounted for the first Gulf War”43. This was 
despite official estimates that a minimum of 500,000 soldiers were necessary “to 
occupy and pacify Iraq”44, a country with a population of 30,399,572 spread over 
a surface area of 438,317 km
2.  espite a quick victory over Iraq’s conventional 
forces, culminating with President George W. Bush’s premature declaration 
“mission accomplished” on 1 May 2003, the allied forces soon found themselves 
short-handed, overwhelmed, and unable to manage the levels of violence that 
continued to destabilise Iraq after the official cessation of hostilities. Security 
following the 2003 invasion was understandably at an all-time low, with reports of 
massive looting taking place, particularly of archaeological sites throughout Iraq, 
including the National Museum of Iraq45. At least 250,000 tons of weaponry and 
ordnance which were also stolen would later fuel the insurgency46. The armed 
forces focused their limited manpower on protecting hospitals, water plants, 
select ministries and oil refineries47. 
Despite a political end to the war, violence increased towards the end of 2003, 
with a surge in guerrilla attacks. The insurgency gained momentum in the spring 
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of 2004 as foreign opponents to the occupation flocked into Iraq from 
neighbouring countries. An organised insurgency, allegedly led by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi encouraged the targeting of Iraqi civilians and security forces with a 
series of massive bombings. This campaign of violence was meant to challenge 
the authority of the new transitional government and to demoralise Iraqi security 
forces and citizens. Concomitantly, a nationalist and Islamist Sunni insurgency 
and the Shia Mahdi Army also launched attacks on the coalition in an effort to 
force them out of the country. The widespread reach and planning of the attacks 
suggested an insurgent coordination against occupying forces. The coalition 
responded with a military counteroffensive, hunting down former leaders, and 
began the political handover of the country from the transitional Coalition 
Provisional Authority to an Iraqi government, with elections taking place in 
January 2005. A total of 140 U.S. soldiers were killed during the invasion of Iraq, 
whereas 93% of all U.S. military casualties took place in the insurgency that 
followed48. The U.S. army lost a further 849 soldiers in 2004, 823 soldiers in 
2006, and reached an all-time high in 2007 with the death of 904 soldiers49.  
While the counterinsurgency effort proved successful, in 2007, sectarian violence 
between the Shi’a majority and the Sunnis began to tear the country apart, 
undermining the peace and reconstruction efforts of the Allies. Shi’a militia 
groups began to exert vigilante justice through zealous death squads50 while 
Sunni insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda targeted Shi’a religious sites. The Al-
Aksari Mosque bomb attacks by Sunni rebels in 2006 and 2007 sparked a spiral 
of violence as both sides increasingly targeted civilians and religious sites. The 
civil war further discredited the Allies’ ability to restore the country, with the 
ongoing hostilities pushing 1,7 million refugees out of the country and forcing 
another 1,3 million persons into internal displacement by 201151. The continued 
violence also slowed down reconstruction efforts as aid workers, private 
individuals and contractors were targeted by insurgents who used terror tactics 
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such as kidnappings and torture to exert political pressure on the government 
and discourage foreign interference. 
 
Table 2: Civilian deaths by year52 
 
 
 
       Insurgency 
 
       Iraqi Civil War 
 
 
 
Although the United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003, they did not 
anticipate the subsequent insurgency and civil war: they believed that 
“reconstruction would take place in an environment with little threats from 
insurgents or terrorists” and had made “few or no plans for any other condition”53. 
The extent of the unrestrained violence against the Iraqi civilians and security 
forces, the occupying armies, and any foreigner who happened to chance into 
the country severely hindered the reconstruction project that was a priority in the 
U.S.’s plan to hand over power to the Iraqis and bring democracy to the  iddle 
East. It emerged in hindsight that the Bush administration had “grossly 
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Year  Civilian deaths 
2003 12,087 
2004 11,152 
2005 15,491 
2006 28,225 
2007 25,063 
2008 9,385 
2009 4,713 
2010 4,045 
2011 4,087 
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underestimated the number of troops that would be required for stability and 
security operations”54. 
 
Casualty aversion 
 
The violence began to slow down in 2009, with the election of President Barack 
Obama, who announced an 18-month withdrawal timetable for all U.S. combat 
troops. A force of up to 50,000 American troops was to remain in Iraq “to train, 
equip and advise Iraqi forces, help protect withdrawing forces and work on 
counterterrorism”55, with the support of private military and security personnel 
contracted by the U.S. government.  
Although U.S. casualties dropped after 2009, with the loss of ‘only’ 60 soldiers in 
2010 and 54 soldiers in 2011, public support for an ongoing American presence 
in Iraq dwindled. The American public has always been critical regarding combat 
casualties according to a 2005 RAND report on American Public Support for U.S. 
Military Operations56. This was strongly demonstrated in the media outcry to the 
death and desecration of American soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993 that prompted 
the withdrawal of all U.S troops from Somalia57. The U.S. government, 
recognising the impact of body bags on public support, had banned media 
coverage of returning fallen soldiers in January 1991, at the instigation of then 
Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney58. This was an important move, reflecting the 
firm belief that “inherent in our democratic notions of governance, public support 
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(or public consent) is critical to any successful military action abroad”59. The 
policy of hiding military casualties from public view was maintained by the 
George W. Bush administration during the Iraq war60 but was reversed by the 
Obama administration in February 200961. 
According to RA  , ‘casualty sensitivity’ is proportional to the prevalent belief 
about the importance of the stakes and the probability of success62. As combat 
operations wound down in Iraq, the American public became increasingly 
impatient with the loss of their sons and daughters in a foreign land, where the 
immediate threat of a hostile regime had now disappeared. Peace and stability 
have never been a pillar of military operations, and did not justify the continuing 
exposure of U.S. troops to high levels of violence. The insurgency and civil war 
were considered by many as a domestic matter, or at least an international 
responsibility, as were the reconstruction efforts. “The USA and its allies found it 
increasingly difficult to provide the resources, personnel and expertise for urban 
security, peacekeeping and policing operations”63. 
Casualty aversion therefore was a driving force for the massive use of private 
contractors in Iraq, as their deaths did not feature in official figures. 
Consequently, the United States turned to the private sector to appease the 
American population, and to fill the logistical vacuum, awarding contracts of a 
total value of $158,3 billion in 200764 to private military and security companies. 
By 2011, it was estimated that at least 173,000 private contractors were 
operating in Iraq65. From these numbers, at least 1,537 men have been killed 
while carrying out their contract66, of which 257 are U.S. citizens, 59 are British, 
and 985 are Iraqi private contractors67. Another 51,000 contractors have been 
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injured68. According to the U.S.  epartment of  efense, an average of “one 
civilian contractor is killed for every four members of the U.S. Armed Forces”69 – 
but many of these men are not U.S. citizens and none of them are included in the 
official body bag count. Another study in 2011 found that contractor fatalities 
represented 45% of all fatalities70. The substitution of soldiers for contractors 
“has taken place outside of the cognizance of the public”71 and the ‘sacrifice’ of 
these men remains happily ignored by society. 
 
Dependence on private companies 
 
In 2003, Paul Lombardi, CEO of DynCorp, said "You could fight without us, but it 
would be difficult. Because we're so involved, it's difficult to extricate us from the 
process”72. Private military companies were present, if relatively unnoticed, 
during early combat operations. They were primarily hired by the U.S. 
government to provide the U.S. Army with essential logistical support: “the 
military relied on civilian contractors to run the computer system that generated 
the tactical picture for the Combined Air Operations Center for the war in Iraq; 
(...) contract technicians supported Predator unmanned aerial vehicles and the 
datalinks they used to transmit information. The U.S Navy relied on civilian 
contractors to help operate the guided missile systems on is ships (and) the 
Army depends entirely on civilian contractors to maintain its Guardrail 
surveillance aircraft”73. The U.S.’s policy of outsourcing non-combat or non-
military jobs to the private sector took on new proportions “as the Army was so 
short-handed it had to call up tens of thousands of reservists to fight in Iraq. 
Rumsfeld said he intended to assign the troops to military jobs and hire civilian 
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workers or contractors to take the nonmilitary jobs”74. Contractors deliver 50% of 
the U.S. Army’s logistical capacity75. By 2009, private contractors had become an 
intrinsic part of America’s war and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  
While private contractors entered Iraq initially with military support firms, 
providing “non-lethal aid and assistance, such as weapons maintenance, 
technical support, explosive ordnance disposal, and intelligence collection and 
analysis”76, and military consulting firms offering “training and advisory 
services”77, they gradually moved towards the battlefield. Worldwide Personal 
Protective Services (WPPS) contracts were awarded to the private companies 
DynCorp and Blackwater in 2004 to meet the security needs of the U.S. 
Embassy in Baghdad. The Regional Embassy Office in Basra was protected by 
another PMC, Triple Canopy78. These contractors “perform a narrow range of 
tactical duties, including protection of certain foreign heads of state, high-level 
U.S. officials (including members of Congress), and U.S. diplomats under Chief-
of- ission authority”79. They are, naturally, well armed.  
Whereas the U.S. government offers WPPS contracts to private companies to 
guard American public servants, foreign companies that are seeking to do 
business in Iraq and NGOs wishing to participate in the reconstruction efforts are 
forced to pay for their own security. Considering the high risk associated with 
conducting affairs in a war zone, protection is crucial, and has driven the market 
for P Cs.  ost private military companies, in fact, are “subcontracted to provide 
protection for prime contractor employees or are hired by other entities such as 
Iraqi companies or private foreign companies seeking business opportunities in 
Iraq”80. Only eight out of 60 or 13% of the PMCs operating in Iraq were found to 
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be hired by and therefore directly accountable to the Coalition Provisional 
Authority81.  
Reconstruction work is the principle activity of contractors in Iraq however. 
Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root have been the recipient of 
logistic contracts worth as much as $300 million82. Between 2003 and 2007, U.S. 
agencies awarded $85 billion to private contractors in Iraq, of which $6-10 billion, 
or less than 10%, was put towards security83. Nonetheless, it is the security 
aspect of contracting that has received the most attention. The industry has been 
tainted by a lack of transparency and accountability, and by a handful of high-
profile lethal incidents. 
 
Legal immunity 
 
For the first three years of the war, the United States had very little control over 
or information on the contractors working under the umbrella of the U.S. 
government. Furthermore, most PMCs were employed by foreign companies, 
putting them beyond the reach of American authority. Indeed, since their arrival 
in Iraq, private security companies have earned themselves an infamous 
reputation, known for their ‘licence to kill’84 and their immunity from the law. 
Scandals involving fraud, murder, torture and confrontations between the regular 
armed forces and the contractors have generally gone unpunished, testifying to a 
lack of control and legal accountability exerted over these private companies.  
For the first year of the Iraq War, there was neither a legal framework nor any 
oversight to govern the actions of private contractors. It was only in June 2004 
that the Coalition Provisional Authority, under the leadership of Paul Bremer, 
issued Order 17 on the “Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison  issions, their 
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Personnel and Contractors”85. The Order bestowed immunity from “local criminal, 
civil and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest and detention 
other than by persons acting on behalf of their parent states” to all US troops and 
civilian personnel, effectively putting them beyond the legal jurisdiction of the 
Iraqi authorities. In section 3, clauses (1) and (2) explicitly exempt all contractors 
and subcontractors, other than those “normally resident in Iraq”, from “Iraqi laws 
or regulations” for all activities carried out both within the terms of their contract 
and “not performed by them in the course of their official activities”86 during the 
entire duration of authority of the CPA (section 4).  
Despite this perceived blanket grant of immunity, contractors were only exempt 
from Iraqi laws and tribunals; they were not beyond the authority of the CPA, and 
were required to comply with the laws and regulations of the provisional 
government. Memorandum 17, signed by Bremer in June 2004, required that all 
private security companies “be registered, regulated and vetted”87 by the Ministry 
of Interior and Trade. On the other hand, the Rules for the Use of Force by 
Contractors in Iraq, annexed to  emorandum 17, clearly stated that “nothing in 
these rules limits your inherent right to take action necessary to defend yourself”. 
Consequently, the legal provisions for contractors served both to emasculate 
Iraqi authorities and create an impression of control on the part of the CPA, while 
endowing private companies with a large margin of autonomy justified by a claim 
of self-defence.  Furthermore, “both contractors and U.S. government officials 
say that Memorandum 17 is impossible to implement (...as) the Iraqi government 
has neither the personnel (nor) the capacity to enforce the order”88.  
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Fraud 
 
There has been a considerable lack of accountability and oversight on the part of 
the U.S. government with regards to the private security sector: during the first 
three years of the war, “there was no single-source collection point for 
information” and the U.S. had “no accurate count of its contractors” even though 
more than $766 million was spent on private security through the end of 200489. 
Because of the “urgent and compelling”90 circumstances in Iraq, many contracts 
were allegedly awarded to companies without competitive bidding, demonstrating 
the preference for personal relations over democratic processes. This process 
inevitably eliminated any opportunity for free-market control, which would have 
arguably held firms accountable for their actions due to the competitive nature of 
the free market. The lack of transparency in the allegation of security contracts 
had also led to allegations of “cost overruns, inflated invoices, fraud, and 
abuse”91.  
The opportunity for fraud was illustrated in the case of Custer Battles, a private 
security company that was accused of cheating the U.S. government out of up to 
$50 million. Custer Battles landed a $16 million contract with the CPA to guard 
Baghdad International Airport and a second contract to provide logistical support 
for a currency exchange program. “That contract committed the Coalition 
Provisional Authority to paying for all the company's costs for setting up centers 
where the exchanges would take place, plus a 25 percent markup for overhead 
and profit”92. The company was subsequently accused of creating false invoices, 
inflating the 25% mark-up to 162%, and billing the U.S. government. Allegations 
of misconduct included knowingly providing sub-optimal equipment. In the 
testimony, the airport’s director described Custer Battles as “unresponsive, 
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uncooperative, incompetent, deceitful, manipulative and war profiteers”93. Custer 
Battles was found guilty in a federal court of “defrauding the United States by 
filing grossly inflated invoices for work in the chaotic year after the Iraqi 
invasion”94. The ruling was overturned on a technicality, however, not because 
the company was absolved of having committed a crime, but because the CPA 
could not be considered a U.S. agency. Custer Battles was also one of the 
companies whose employees allegedly fired upon Iraqi civilians95. 
The scandal of Custer Battles began to symbolise the poor monitoring and 
accountability system that surrounded contracting in the months following the 
Iraq invasion. The private security company was essentially given $16 million in a 
no-bid contract, having demonstrated little if any experience prior to their 
Request for Proposal. The CPA “forked over $2 million anyway, in cash, to get 
them started”96. The Commission on Wartime Contracting found that “war 
planners have wasted as much as $60 billion on contract fraud and abuse in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, about $1 for every $3.50 spent on contractors in those 
countries over the last decade”97. Out of this amount, between “$21 billion and 
$42 billion of the lost money has gone to incomplete construction and training 
projects, unnecessary subcontractors, unexplained cost overruns and similar 
wasteful practices (and) another $10 to $18 billion has disappeared due to fraud, 
including bribes to local government officials and contractors who simply ran off 
with thousands of dollars”98. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service has 
received more than 1,503 complains for fraudulent activities in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The report concluded that the government simply did not have the 
capacity to oversee the number of contractors that were operating in Iraq, and 
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had awarded too many contracts without a proper bidding process, undermining 
the notions of competition and free market economy. 
 
Civilian casualties and abuses 
 
Private contractors are accused of having been complicit or perpetrators of 
ethical and legal abuses against civilians. These incidents have undermined the 
counterinsurgency operations of the U.S. Army by fuelling local resentment 
against the foreign occupiers who refuse to hold accountable those responsible 
for the violence99. Evidence of gross misconduct on the part of private security 
and military companies have caused international outrage and affected the 
relationship between the armed forces and the civilian contractors. There are no 
official statistics, however, on the number of incidents instigated by private 
contractors against civilians in Iraq, although a number or organisations have 
attempted to compile this data. More than 4,500 pages of incident reports were 
released by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in 2008, and describe about 600 
incidents where security contractors have fired a weapon. 400,000 U.S. military 
documents were also published by the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks, with 
details of operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, and have served as an 
imperfect source for research into this shadowy business. Approximately 65% of 
reported incidents described contractors firing their weapon into a civilian vehicle, 
but with little if any details regarding the consequences of these actions. 
Journalist Robert Young Pelton claimed that “in my time with contractors in Iraq, I 
never saw a single report filed, even though gunfire against civilians was an 
everyday event, possibly to an average of three to six warning shorts per run”100. 
Most incidents were never investigated by the authorities. 10 Iraqi deaths and 14 
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incidents of injuries were recorded in these files101. Half of all incidents reported 
took place outside of Baghdad, although misconduct is less likely to be recorded 
in the provinces as there are fewer witnesses.  
A highly visible and publicised incident of contractor misconduct took place on 
September 16th 2007, when five contractors from the already infamous private 
military company Blackwater fired upon civilians, killing seventeen and wounding 
twenty-four Iraqis in Nisour Square. Although the contractors claimed self-
defence, this was denied by Iraqi officials. Nonetheless, Blackwater continued to 
operate in the country, and nobody was held accountable for the unlawful killing 
of the Iraqi civilians. This contributed to fuelling local outrage and resentment and 
has “undermined the military’s war for the hearts and minds of local civilians by 
failing to abide by the laws and norms of just war”102. Despite the high-profile of 
this incident, it was not by far the first occasion where Blackwater had been 
accused of misconduct: on Christmas Eve 2006, a drunk contractor from the firm 
“shot dead the security guard of the Iraqi Vice President”103, in February 2007, 
Blackwater contractors shot and killed three security guards at the Iraqi Media 
 etwork in Baghdad; and in  ay 2007, “guards opened fire on the streets of 
Baghdad twice in a single week. In one incident a guard shot and killed an Iraqi 
driver near the Interior  inistry”104. Despite these incidents, the State 
Departments extended its contract with Blackwater in September 2009105.  
Although Blackwater has received much negative publicity for its excessive use 
of violence, several other private security and military companies have been 
accused of similar misconduct: employees of London-based defence contractor 
Aegis “posted videos on the Internet in 2005 showing company guards firing 
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automatic weapons at civilians from the back of a moving security vehicle”106. In 
another high profile case, two prominent companies, CACI and Titan were both 
implicated in the notorious Abu Ghraib prison scandal where detained Iraqis were 
tortured, abused and killed. The U.S. Army “found that contractors were involved 
in 36 percent of the (Abu Ghraib) proven incidents and identified 6 employees as 
individually culpable”107. No civilian contractor subsequently faced prosecution, 
whereas several U.S. military were tried and punished. Furthermore, the 
involvement of Titan and CACI in the scandal did not negatively affect their 
business: Titan was subsequently awarded multiple contracts worth several 
million dollars108. 
Allegations of contract misconduct in Iraq have largely been buried in the chaos 
of war, where suicide attacks and car bombings are a daily occurrence. 
Contractors operate in a high-stress environment, with little legal accountability 
but huge professional responsibility vis-à-vis their employer and their clients. 
Contractors also have a higher proportion of casualties (10%) per reported 
incident, compared to coalition forces (0.79%)109. Although this does not justify 
misconduct, it does give a context for the environment in which these incidents 
happen. The armed forces have also been accused of operating with negligence: 
the Abu Ghraib abuses, for example, were largely led by U.S. personnel. A 
significant difference, however, is that military personnel have been selectively 
held accountable for their actions, whereas contractors have largely gone 
unpunished. The impact of Abu Ghraib was notably for U.S. interests in Iraq: 
General Mattis, commander of the United States Central Command, explains that 
“when you lose the moral high ground, you lose it all”110. Contractor or soldier, 
the actions of U.S. employees in the Iraqi prisons resonated around the world. 
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Blue-on-white incidents 
 
‘Blue-on-white’ is the term used to describe ‘friendly fire’, exchanged between 
military personnel and contractors in Iraq111. This exchange is generally 
accidental, reflecting a lack of coordination, communication and trust between 
the two actors. Human Rights First argued that while 610 incidents were reported 
between July 2004 and April 2005, this probably reflected a fraction of the actual 
incidents that took place in that timeframe112. A RAND report published in 2010 
found, however, that “the vast majority of reported blue-on-white incidents in Iraq 
are actually perpetrated by coalition forces against private security contractors, 
with most occurring when contractors are approaching checkpoints or passing 
military convoys”113.  
The most famous incident of blue-on-white occurred in May 2005, when a 19-
man convoy from U.S. firm Zapata Engineering was arrested by the American 
Marines for firing upon them at a checkpoint watchtower. Sixteen contractors 
were remanded in U.S. custody for several days as a result, and reportedly 
harassed and humiliated during their detention. Despite accusations of firing on 
U.S. troops, the employees were never charged for any offence114. Another 
private military company, Triple Canopy, also reported several blue-on-white 
incidents where U.S. military personnel allegedly opened fire on them115. 
The prevalence of blue-on-white incidents in Iraq has not been reduced, despite 
reports of improved coordination between military personnel and security firms 
according to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in 
2007116.  any incidents of friendly fire are blamed on the ‘trigger-happy’, 
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uncontrollable contractors, even though “the most likely friendly-fire victim is a 
private security company employee”117. Private contractors are not required to 
wear standardised uniforms, and many travel in unmarked vehicles at high 
speed, making them suspicious to army personnel in an environment of extreme 
volatility and violence. Not only is it difficult for the military to identify contractors 
as friendly forces, the lack of military-PMSC coordination, compounded with an 
inherent distrust between the two actors and a vehement disinformation 
campaign run by the international media, have led to a difficult coexistence in 
Iraq.  
 
Civil-military relations 
 
The rapid transformation from relying on military personnel to appointing security 
positions to civilian contractors has blurred the line between civilian and 
combatant and has led to a myriad of problems, including “issuing I s and 
weapons permits; chain-of-command ambiguity, contrary objectives, coordination 
of security convoys and friendly fire incidents, not only from coalition troops firing 
on contractors mistaken as potential insurgents, but also between contractors 
and other contractors”118. The difficult cohabitation of American private 
contractors and U.S. military personnel in Iraq has been the product of jealousy, 
misinformation, a vacuum of accountability and sub-optimal efforts between the 
two players towards improving conditions for coordination and communication. 
Furthermore, reckless behaviour on the part of the contractors and the 
companies that hire them have inevitably led to tensions between the 
professional soldiers mandated with maintaining the peace in Iraq, and the 
private, armed contractors who circulate freely inside the country. Overlapping 
identities, diverging salaries and a lack of military hierarchy and judicial 
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accountability have consequently shaped the relationships between soldiers and 
contractors in the war in Iraq.  
 
Identity and motivation 
 
Of the estimated 161,000 private contractors working in Iraq in 2008, only 17%, 
or 27,370, were U.S. citizens. On the other hand, “all but 1,000 of the State 
 epartment’s 5,500 contractors were U.S. citizens”119. Although there is now a 
majority of Iraqi or third country nationals working for private security companies 
in Iraq, the most sensitive missions outsourced by the Pentagon are generally 
awarded to Americans, who are considered to be the most trustworthy, loyal and 
competent contractors.  
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered a sort of gold rush for American ex-military 
personnel who could expect to earn $600-$1,000 per day handling security 
contracts in the country120. Most of these highly paid contractors were former 
SEALS or Green Berets with significant experience, training and service behind 
them. Many of them claimed to be motivated by patriotism. Military sentiment, 
surveyed in a 2010 RAND report, suggested that contractors must “have a sense 
of patriotic duty, since many are prior military”121. Evidently, patriotism is not the 
only motivation, with most contractors lured to Iraq by promises for quick riches: 
“money is obviously a strong incentive for contractors to work in a combat zone 
and separate from their families when they do not have to”122. These ‘patriots for 
profit’123 are perceived as loyal combatants, who, due to their former military 
training,  are not likely to abandon their posts when faced with imminent 
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danger124. On the other hand, they are neither motivated by honour nor 
recognition, since their function as contractors denies them the 
acknowledgement that is reserved for military personnel.  
The reasons that drive an American to enlist in the armed forces or enter a 
contract with a private security and military company are not hugely divergent, as 
was showed in Chapters 1 and 2. The camaraderie, lifestyle, idealism and 
patriotism have lured these men to Iraq, either as soldiers or as contractors. 
Money has also been a source of motivation for young men and women to join 
the army, as has the promise of U.S. citizenship, evidenced by the U.S. Army’s 
policy of endowing citizenship to immigrants who serve in the armed forces125. 
Despite their many similarities, contractors were often subject to resentment from 
the part of American soldiers because of their perceived pay differential, their 
immunity from the law, and their carefree undisciplined attitude that loudly 
illustrated the differences between these armed combatants.  
 
Pay 
 
There is a significant difference in salary between contractors and military 
personnel: in the early days of security contracting in Iraq, “contractors (could) 
make nearly a soldier’s annual salary in just one month”126. RA  ’s report on the 
Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom found that 
interviewed military personnel cited pay differential as a major source of 
resentment and “was detrimental to morale”127. One U.S. Army Major explained 
that “There was always resentment between my soldiers and the contractors 
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because the contractors were making several times more money than my 
soldiers and doing basically the same job”128.  
The difference in payment is also reflected in the differences in lifestyle that 
contractors enjoy in Iraq. A contractor working for Triple Canopy described his 
experience working for a private security company, and how it compared to his 
former job as a Special Forces officer: “the guy in the military is making $40,000 
a year working twelve-hour shifts seven days a week while the contractor is 
making $240,000 a year and working four- to six-hour shifts four to six days a 
week. The guy in the military sleeps in a room with ten other guys while the 
contractor has his own trailer with air-conditioning, television, a DVD player, and 
a fridge. The military guy is under the control of the military, so no sex or 
drinking– the contractor isn’t. The military guy wears a uniform while the 
contractor wears whatever he wants. The military guy stays seven months and is 
forced to stay longer while the contractor can leave whenever he wants”129. 
These differences in lifestyle reinforce identity cleavages and encourage a hostile 
environment fuelled by inequality and jealousy.  
Author David Isenberg argues, however, that the perceived pay differential 
between contractors and military personnel is not accurate. He cites various 
military studies to show that the estimated annual average compensation for 
Navy personnel was $94,900 according to a 2004 Center for Naval Analyses 
report, whereas the Government Accountability Office calculated that 
compensation for active-duty service members averaged $115,500130. 
Furthermore, military personnel enjoy better job security, healthcare benefits, and 
retirement privileges. A 2008 Pentagon Review of Military Compensation 
concluded that “military personnel s annual compensation meets or exceeds the 
80th percentile when compared to their civilian peers of like age and 
education”131. Ann Jocelyn from the war lifestyle publication Serviam 
                                            
128
Dunigan, Victory for Hire : Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness, 64. 
129
Ibid., 64-5. 
130
Isenberg, Shadow Force : Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 33. 
131
Ibid., 34.  
193 
 
Magazine132claims that after taxes, a contractor can earn on average $95,700, 
which is still “38 percent more than the sergeant”133, albeit without health care, 
housing or retirement contributions which, once taken into consideration, leaves 
him with $38,306. 
Nonetheless, the perceived salary difference between soldiers and contractors 
has allegedly affected the armed forces, with a significant portion of highly-
trained military professionals leaving service for the private sector. The Pentagon 
responded by offering bonuses in 2005 of “of up to $150,000 to keep elite 
commandos, such as Army Green Berets and Navy SEALs, in the military and 
prevent them from being lured away to higher-paying jobs by private security 
contractors”134. The British Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, offered its 
soldiers the option of taking a sabbatical during which they could work as 
contractors in Iraq for up to a year and then return to the Army at the same 
rank135. A U.S. Army officer summarised the problem that this talent-drain 
created for the armed forces: “you get stuck with the training and security-
clearance costs; the soldier lured to the private sector gets his salary doubled or 
tripled-then the contractor adds in a markup for his multiple layers of overhead 
costs and a generous profit margin, and bills the taxpayers. How is that cheaper 
than having soldiers do the job? The scam-artists tell us that using contractors 
saves money in the long run, since their employees don't get military health care 
and retirement benefits. But the numbers just don't add up. Contractors are 
looting our military-while wrapping themselves in the flag”136. It costs the state 
eighteen months and $257,000 to train a Green Beret
137
. The attrition of military 
personnel is an onerous enterprise that penalises the effectiveness of the armed 
forces and poses serious challenges for the future. 
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Cooperation and communications 
 
Iraq is the first conflict where contractors and military personnel have been 
operating side by side in overlapping functions. There has consequently been no 
precedent to inform the actors on the best manner to communicate and 
coordinate with each other. Part of the problem, according to the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, is that “U.S. forces in Iraq do not have a 
command and control relationship with private security providers or their 
employees”138 therefore communication takes place in an informal setting where 
personal relationships determine the level of information139. The lack of 
knowledge regarding military positions and the movement of contractors in a 
unit’s area of responsibility has been a source of confusion and has led to 
unnecessary danger on both sides: “this was mainly due to the lack of 
interoperable radio and communications systems between the military and 
PSCs”140. RAND found that security contractors and military personnel 
exchanged cell phone numbers on an ad hoc basis when they knew that they 
could be working in the same area of responsibility; “where voluntary cooperation 
worked, information exchanges helped private guards being caught between the 
lines”141. Although this cooperation is not institutionalised, it nonetheless 
contributes to the integration of civilian contractors and the U.S. Army. 
Nonetheless, the lack of standard operating procedures in place in Iraq has 
sometimes left contractors at the mercy of insurgent attacks. 
The U.S. armed forces, however, are not briefed in their pre-deployment on the 
role and positions of private contractors in Iraq, furthering an environment of 
suspicion, obstruction and jealousy. Furthermore, the tactical aims of contractors 
are to protect the ‘principal’ that they are guarding, with little or no regard to the 
local population or to the Rules of Engagement by which soldier must abide. The 
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often disrespectful attitude of private security guards has soured the Iraqi 
population towards the contractors who are indistinguishable from American 
soldiers. This has undermined the U.S.’s COI  campaign for the hearts-and-
minds of the population. Molly Dunigan from RAND argues that “while the U.S. 
and coalition forces recognize the value of cultivating good relationships with 
locals in a counterinsurgency– focusing largely on the hearts-and-minds 
approach in these two theatres–PSC personnel in many reported cases have 
harmed their own and the military’s relations with locals”142. This has naturally 
had a negative impact on military effectiveness in Iraq. 
To address the lack of cooperation, regional Reconstruction Operations Centres 
(ROCs) were established to improve communication and coordination between 
army personnel and private security forces. These ROCs were managed by the 
British private military company Aegis, under a contract outsourced from the 
Department of the Army (DA). The PMC acted as a clearing house, tracking 
contractors, providing daily intelligence services, and filing claims and reports of 
misconduct. Aegis’ efforts were severely limited though, as two of the largest 
PMCs in Iraq, Blackwater and DynCorp, refused to participate, arguing that they 
were monitored separately by the U.S. government143. A 2006 GAO report 
claimed, however, that “private security providers continue to enter the battle 
space without coordinating with the U.S. military, putting both the military and 
security providers at a greater risk for injury”144. The continued incidents of 
friendly fire undermine the integration and effectiveness of both the armed forces 
and private contractors and exacerbate the feeling of resentment between the 
two. Nonetheless, the increased exposure of the U.S. Army to private security 
companies and their developing interdependence is leading to a shift in attitudes, 
which was illustrated in RA  ’s 2010 report.  
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Efforts to improve cooperation are obstructed, however, by a chain of command 
that does not overlap between the armed forces and private contractors. A U.S. 
Army colonel explained that security contractors “did not fall under my command. 
Normally they were attached to another command moving through the area or 
worked for [the U.S. State Department] . . . The main issue is that they did not 
have to answer to me, so I had very little leverage over them”145. In one 
anecdote, US diplomat Richard Holbrooke was travelling in Iraq under private 
protection, and asked the driver of his vehicle to slow down in view of the high 
level of civilian traffic on the road. The Contractor refused on the grounds the 
officer had no authority and that his responsibility was to protect his 
passenger146. Private security companies are answerable to their shareholders, 
and to the contracting party, but not to the legal or military authority of the Iraqi or 
American governments.  ilitary commanders therefore “do not exercise effective 
control over PSC personnel”147.  
 
Accountability 
 
The lack of oversight from the Department of Defense has not only created 
opportunities for fraud and abuse, but has also undermined the democratic 
control of violence in Iraq. Private military companies are not bound by the Rules 
of Engagement like the armed forces, and therefore have a generous margin to 
exercise any behaviour they judge appropriate for the accomplishment of their 
mission. There is no doctrine, very little contract management, and no command 
and control of contractors. There are also no institutionalised disciplinary 
measures that could be brought against private security companies, other than 
firing the company or terminating the contract.   
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Outsourcing military services to private companies is a convenient practice for 
the U.S. government and the armed forces. It enables them to absolve 
themselves of direct responsibility when things go wrong. While companies are 
not held accountable, incidents can be blamed on private individuals and 
contracts can be terminated or replaced without damaging the overall reputation 
of the coalition in Iraq. Furthermore, as contractor deaths are not included in the 
official body count, the U.S. government has a wider margin to manoeuvre in Iraq 
without attracting the disapproval of the American electorate. Dunigan criticises 
this undemocratic approach and explains that “in cases of co-deployment, PSCs 
act as force multipliers whose deaths do not have to be reported in official 
casualty statistics, thus allowing policymakers to deceive the electorate in such a 
manner as to disrupt the electorate’s conflict selectivity. (...) PSCs allow 
democratic policymakers to involve their countries in conflicts not approved by 
the electorate, thus making it less likely that the electorate will have any influence 
in “selecting” to engage only in those conflicts that the democracy is most likely 
to win. Furthermore, such uses of PSCs – to avoid democratic accountability to 
the electorate – pose a serious challenge to democratic peace theory”148. 
The U.S. government has deliberately outsourced important contracts of a 
military nature to private companies as a response to the logistical limitations 
imposed on them by a democratic society. Contractors have added value 
because they are not held accountable. Should it choose to do so the American 
government could create and implement legislation to discipline private 
companies and their rogue personnel. At this point, however, it appears that 
contractors are a valuable asset in the reconstruction and securitisation of Iraq, 
and bringing outliers to justice requires a significant monetary, legal and political 
investment that is counter-productive to U.S. interests domestically and in Iraq. 
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Conclusion: Hybrid soldiers in Iraq 
 
In Iraq, the U.S. government has instigated a policy of hiring private contractors 
to take over certain jobs previously held by military personnel, and recruit private 
security and military companies to “operate alongside the state-run professional 
military in theatres of combat – mainly in close-protection, convoy security, and 
static site security roles”149. Contractors have been used as interrogators in 
prisons, as guards in front of military bases, as consultants training Iraqi police, 
and as bodyguards for high-profile Americans including the head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer. The use of civilian contractors for military – 
and not only supportive – purposes has led to a new permeability of roles that 
blurs the traditional strongly defended line separating soldiers from civilians. 
Although this policy has created unforeseen problems regarding command and 
control, accountability and coordination, it has also planted the seeds of the 
armies of the future, where civilians and soldiers are co-deployed with the intent 
of complementing each other’s strengths and weaknesses, depending on the 
budget of the state and the nature of the mission.   
America’s policy of outsourcing traditionally military functions to private 
contractors reflects a significant shift in norms. Soldiers are no longer the only 
accepted armed defender of a country’s interests. The new security environment, 
the budgetary constraints of ‘democratic’ armies, and society’s aversion to 
sacrifice and military casualties have propelled forth a new actor: the private 
security company, with its armies of weapon-baring civilian contractors.  
Non-state actors have been a continuous presence in warfare throughout history, 
but they were generally foreigners. For at least the past two decades, the 
international community has sought to delegitimise mercenaries from warfare. 
The particularity of the war in Iraq, however, is that the mercenaries are 
operating private contracts on behalf of the United States and its army, and that 
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they are also U.S. citizens. Most of these contractors are equally veterans of the 
U.S. Army. They share a common military and cultural background with the 
soldiers fighting in Iraq. While contractors are handsomely compensated for the 
risks they take, these men have claimed that patriotism is also a principle source 
of motivation for their presence in the warzone. Consequently, there is more 
common ground between the American contractors and military personnel than 
ever before in the history of mercenaries, in terms of their motivation, 
background, military training, and cooperation efforts.  
But, despite their similarities, there is huge discord and resentment between the 
two actors. Pay differentials are a principal source of envy, as is the freedom and 
lack of accountability that contractors appear to enjoy. Although contractors and 
soldiers share a common background, the structural environments in which they 
operate are completely different. Soldiers are subject to a relentless regime of 
training, function within a strict hierarchy, and are accountable for their actions. 
They develop an esprit de corps and functional ideology that is grounded in their 
common hardships and sense of responsibility towards the army, towards each 
other, and towards their country. Contractors on the other hand have a corporate 
operational culture with very little hierarchy, no accountability and no compulsory 
training. Although there appears to be a certain pride associated with working 
with particular private military companies – such as Blackwater which claims a 
distinct and superior culture to the other PMCs – there is no evidence of a deeper 
purpose or commitment other than to accomplish one’s mission and pocket the 
salary.  unigan explains that “PSC personnel and the military are defined by 
quite different constitutive norms and social purposes in a war zone. For 
instance, two of the GAO’s military interviewees noted that differences in 
operational cultures and missions made it difficult for the two groups to 
coordinate. Not only do PSCs vary among themselves in terms of operational 
styles, they also differ from the military in this sense”150. The irresponsible and 
provocative behaviour of some contractors have severely damaged their 
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reputation. They have been labelled as “cowboys”, “mercenaries” and 
“pseudomercenaries”, reflecting the disdain of the armed forces and the ongoing 
normative obstacles to the use of civilian contractors in military operations. 
U.S. Colonel Bill Gallagher argues that the integration of private contractors into 
combat roles is a result of changes in contemporary warfare where the dividing 
line between combat and peace zones is disappearing151. Likewise, the division 
of functions between contractors and soldiers is being progressively dissolved. 
Although private military companies claim a purely defensive role, their personnel 
have found themselves in the heat of battle in the process of carrying out their 
contract. Blackwater guards, for example, have allegedly had to fight back an 
insurgent attack on the CPA headquarters in Najaf, and there have been rumours 
of DynCorp personnel supporting the U.S. Army in impromptu combat 
operations. Despite their participation in the Iraq war and high casualty rate, 
contractors are still being harassed by their military counterparts. 
The weakening division between military and civilian leaves the soldier searching 
for his space and identity in the twenty-first century. Contractors are invested with 
an authorisation to use lethal violence, which was previously only entrusted to 
‘servants of the state’ who had submitted to military discipline and the recognition 
of the laws of war. The collective identity of the armed forces and their role in 
society is arguably being eroded by the increasing involvement of private civilian 
contractors in the military theatre. Although public support for their national 
armies is at an all-time high, willingness to serve in the armed forces is dwindling, 
governments are under pressure to avoid casualties, and the US Army is 
suffering from the demystification of the values of patriotism and sacrifice. 
Democratic states are increasingly dependent on private security and military 
companies to carry out their military ambitions. The impact on the identity and 
effectiveness of the armed forces, however, is quietly being left for the future. 
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PART III: Synthesis and Conclusions 
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6. State control, Hybridisation and Accountability 
 
Mercenaries are different from soldiers because they are not state-actors. This 
means that they exist outside of the political realm and are not subject to state 
conditioning: “they are a band of people whose appetites are untrammeled by a 
sense of public spirit”1. They are also beyond state control and accountability, 
marking them as potentially dangerous actors, particularly when mandated with 
the security and defence of a state. 
The mistrust and fear of mercenaries are rooted in the social norm that the state, 
as the guarantor of peace and security, holds an exclusive monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence. It exerts this privilege through its chosen servants, the 
soldiers which the state recruits and trains for this expressed purpose. Any 
foreigners to this established system of power are viewed with suspicion and 
censure. The choice of combatant reflects a society and its state’s perpetually 
evolving normative values: “sometimes citizens are called upon to fight; at other 
times the state raises professional armies; and sometimes it contracts out to 
others”2. The use of contractors, mercenaries and private military and security 
companies by the state in the Twenty-First Century suggests that a historic 
change in norms is taking place: the state still claims the prerogative to 
administer and sanction violence, but it no longer relies solely on state-actors as 
it delegates part of its military mandate to external actors. Indeed, the case-
studies of France, Angola and Iraq in the preceding chapters show that non-state 
actors and national armies are increasingly being called upon to work together to 
carry out a state’s foreign policy.  
This chapter explores the changing role of the state and its reliance upon armed 
combatants to establish legitimacy and hold on to power. It analyses the use and 
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manipulation of norms by the state, and shows how norms can be adapted to suit 
the purposes of the ruler, particularly regarding the waging of wars. As the state’s 
need for combatants exceeds its domestic supply and capabilities, it has turned 
to foreigners, mercenaries and corporations to meet its demand, and has easily 
justified this shift to its citizens. By outsourcing its military needs to non-state 
actors, however, the state has reached a new zenith of power, where it can shift 
moral and legal responsibility away from itself and evade the system of 
democratic control that the national army claims to safeguard. The chapter 
concludes that mercenaries that are hired by a state uphold the power and 
centrality of said state, despite accusations to the contrary. On the other hand, 
they threaten established norms of democratic accountability by giving the state 
the ability to act beyond the will of the people, and undermine the morale and 
ultimately the strength and performance of the national armed forces. 
 
Violence and social norms 
 
Social norms define everything: who can exert violence, who can kill, who can be 
a soldier and so forth.  orms are “a set of rules that stipulate the ways states 
(and people) should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe 
acceptable terms of (state) behaviour and proscribe unacceptable kinds of 
behaviour”3.  orms are important because they represent a society’s ethos and 
values and subsequently can influence their state’s choices and behaviour. In a 
comparative study of combatants, the choice of using mercenaries or soldiers in 
wars is contingent on the social norms that envelop the level of acceptability for 
each actor.  
The actual influence of norms, however, has been keenly debated in international 
relations. Structural realist John  earsheimer argues that norms are “a reflection 
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of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested 
calculation of great power and they have no independent effect on state 
behaviour”4. They are created by the state to guide the value system of their 
citizens and nurture their ideological and political support. This pre-supposes that 
the interest of the state actually primes over value systems that in turn can be 
moulded and changed according to the whims of the state. Norms are also 
influenced exogenously, however. Significant changes in military technology and 
in the scale of war have forced armies to adapt in order to survive, regardless of 
the prescribed norms and preferences of the state and society. Constructivists, 
on the other hand, argue that norms are an intrinsic part of state identity and 
therefore determine state behaviour. This explains why states sometimes pursue 
policies that appear counter-productive to their immediate interests and 
aspirations. Percy claims that the constructivist approach is “best suited to 
explaining the norm against mercenary use (...) given that state interests of the 
desirability of deploying private force have changed enormously, in ways that 
cannot always be accounted for by material factors”5.  
Norms are perpetually changing to accommodate new innovations and 
paradigms that “unsettle existing structures of knowledge about the past and its 
relation to the present”6. Philosopher Thomas Kuhn suggests that paradigm 
shifts “occur not in the minds of individual innovators, but in particular 
conjunctures of social and intellectual circumstances which challenge existing 
structures of knowledge and open up space for new ideas”7. War, argues Coker, 
is particularly susceptible to these paradigm shifts because it is itself “the 
invention of culture”, reflecting a society’s values and identity and its adaptability 
to changes in its immediate environment8. Because “war is anchored to what we 
imagine or would like it to be, it is in that sense profoundly normative”9.  
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A fundamental element of war, the choice of combatants is equally susceptible to 
normative preferences that reflect a society’s acceptance of who can yield 
violence and how. The European tradition of civic militarism that was described in 
Chapter 2 and the definition of the modern state in terms of its monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence particularly influence contemporary social norms 
determining the role of mercenaries and soldiers in foreign policy. Alasdair 
 acIntyre explains that war takes place “within the context of norms which a 
community shares” and therefore the culture of war changes geographically and 
historically as norms can vary from place to place10. For the past two hundred 
years, on the European continent, citizens have been the preferred combatant, 
representing the cultural values and choices of the state and society. 
The current preference for soldiers and the concomitant condemnation of 
mercenaries, however, have not been a constant throughout history. Until at least 
the nineteenth century, states conducted their foreign policies through non-state 
subsidiaries including mercenaries, mercantile companies and privateers11. The 
normative hostility towards non-state combatants stems from two social norms: 
one which argues that “mercenaries were antipathetic to the norms of modern 
community”12 due to the instrumentality of war for social conditioning and the 
foreign and therefore apolitical nature of mercenaries who are not part of the 
established community. The second claims that the state must maintain a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and be capable of holding all 
military actors accountable; Mercenaries are foreign, freelance, and therefore 
very difficult to control, making them undesirable in the eyes of modern society, 
which Agnes Heller defines in terms of mediation, efficiency and instrumental or 
mechanical rationality13. These norms, it will be argued, were deliberately 
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designed and adapted by the state in its pursuit and consolidation of power and 
legitimacy. 
 
State control 
 
Security is at the very heart of human communities. No economic, personal or 
political activity can successfully take place in an environment of recurrent 
existential threats. Thomas Hobbes claimed that the state came about to protect 
people against the dangers of the “state of nature”14: individuals were forced by 
the violent nature of mankind to forfeit a part of their freedoms and contribute to 
the safeguard of their community in order to improve their chances of survival in 
a brutish and anarchic world. “Every state is founded on force”15 declared Leon 
Trotsky in 1918, implying that, although other actors have wielded force in the 
history of mankind, only the state has successfully established its legitimacy 
based on its ability to control the level of violence within a given territory and 
therefore protect the community from itself and others. Max Weber concludes 
therefore, that the state “is considered the sole source of the  right  to use 
violence”16. Weber’s definition of the state clearly assumes that the potential to 
use violent means and legitimacy are inseparable. This norm, regardless of 
whether or not it represents the actual abilities of all states in the international 
community, is nonetheless the standard for all states: modern states are 
expected to be able to control the use of violence within their territory and 
subsequently hold accountable any actor who threatens the state or challenges 
its authority.  
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Early predators and the princely state 
 
Historian Charles Tilly famously claimed that: “war made the state and the state 
made war”17. The state structure emerged out of “a centuries long process of 
internal pacification and international warmaking”18 during which various warlords 
sought to control people and their lands in order to levy taxes and increase their 
own wealth. In the early Middle Ages, raids against the population were used as 
the main source of ‘state’ income. This required the collaboration of armed men 
who could intimidate and overwhelm any resistance. Chapter One showed that, 
in the absence of standing armies, bands of mercenaries and knights were the 
de facto choice of combatants19 to help a leader plunder and coerce the local 
inhabitants. Knights were the medieval equivalent to modern soldiers: men 
indentured to a leader who commanded their loyalty, trained them in the arts of 
war and led them in battles and raids; mercenaries were armed combatants 
temporarily hired to participate in a raid or conflict. The main differences at the 
time between knights and mercenaries lay in their personal allegiances and 
permanency. The use of knights, peasants and serfs to supply the armies of 
sovereigns shows an early preference for ‘domestic’ actors ‒ i.e. men tied to their 
vassals by bonds of honour and economic dependence. 
Leaders eventually realised, however, that raids disincentivised peasants from 
producing more than the bare necessities to survive, which limited the amount 
that they could in turn appropriate. Consequently, they shifted to a system of 
racketeering, or “stationary banditry” where leaders could levy a “predictable tax 
that takes only a part of his victims’ outputs, thereby leaving them with an 
incentive to generate income (...) which might well increase output and tax 
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receipts by a large multiple”20. This tax was extracted by means of “tribute, rents, 
dues and fees”21. The leader therefore became a sedentary ruler but in turn had 
to protect his territory from external raids and attacks, making him increasingly 
dependent on his army of knights that had to be permanently mobilised, trained 
and fed.  
Once in power, rulers relied on violence or the threat of violence to consolidate 
their reign and legitimise their exclusive right to levy taxes upon the population. 
Initially, taxes were a means of payment for the security that the new state 
promised its subjects. Mancur Olson compared the sedentary state to a criminal 
organisation that seeks to maximise its self-interest by decreasing taxes and 
providing public goods. While this may appear beneficial in the long run, the 
state’s justification for levying taxes in the first place is to sell protection “both 
against the crime it would commit itself (if not paid) as well as that which would 
be committed by others (if it did not keep out other criminals)”22. This exchange 
nonetheless solidified the “contract between a ruler and the ruled through the 
trading of protection in return for other services like taxes, revenue and labour; 
i.e. the economic base of the state”23. These taxes were subsequently used to 
finance an army with which to enforce the state’s authority within and beyond its 
legitimate territory: “the financial means thus flowing into this central authority 
maintain its monopoly of military force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly 
of taxation”24. Brian  abee explains that “one of the factors in the consolidation 
of states was the unintended consequence of the rulers’ search for power – that 
the need for capital to invest in war-making inadvertently led to the elimination of 
rivals within a given territory, in order to have a greater capacity to extract 
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resources”25. The sedentary state became the leading political actor as it 
managed to accumulate more funds, by means of taxation in exchange for 
guaranteeing protection, than any individual or group could achieve through 
pillage.  achiavelli’s political environment emerged from this system where 
families and princes sought to “enhance their authority and security by promising 
those living under their authority security from an attack from outside forces”26. 
The princely state, as Bobbitt calls it, existed to serve the interest of the prince 
whose power increasingly depended on the loyalty and servitude of its subjects 
and on its relations with other city-states.  
By the seventeenth century, states had accumulated enough power to further 
consolidate their rule over the population by eliminating any potential for internal 
dissent. This was achieved by “general seizures of weapons at the end of 
rebellions, prohibition of duels, controls over the production of weapons, 
introduction of licensing for private arms, (and) restrictions of public displays of 
armed forces”27. In 1689, the English Bill of Rights prohibited the “raising or 
keeping a standing Army within the Kingdome in times of peace unless it is with 
consent of Parliament”28. Private armies were dissolved and the potential powers 
of individual citizens were severely controlled legally and militarily by the state. 
This Bill was challenged, however, by the Jacobite Rising between 1689 and 
1746 during which Jacobite supporters were able to defy the protestant rulers of 
Britain with an army of 8,000 men, made up largely of Scottish Highlanders29. In 
the wake of the rebellions, Highlanders loyal to the crown were recruited and 
stationed across the Highlands to deter clans from assisting the Jacobites. These 
Highlanders were later integrated into the Black Watch Regiment which is still 
active in the British Army today. 
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By disarming the population, the state successfully claimed a monopoly over the 
use of violence within its territory. The right to use force in the name of the state 
was delegated to its chosen agents, who subsequently became state agents with 
a mandate to uphold the peace, and thus established the legitimacy of the state 
as the sole legal and able guarantor of security.  
 
Monopoly of violence 
 
The state has risen to power, maintained its legitimacy and projected its 
ambitions mainly through military means. Otto von Bismarck expressed his vision 
of state-building in his 1862 speech to the Landtag’s budget committee: “not 
through speeches and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be 
decided – that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by iron and 
blood”30. The modern state as it exists today was built from Eisen und Blut, with 
state formation and legitimacy historically attributed to military victories and 
defeats facilitated by access to cutting edge technology. The state’s monopoly of 
violence is a prerequisite for the state to exert its rule over its population. The 
state also derives a significant proportion of its legitimacy from its ability to 
safeguard the lives and wellbeing of its citizens for whom it bares full 
responsibility. The reliance of the state structure on its armed force had naturally 
led to a symbiotic relationship where, in theory, the success of one is dependent 
upon the strength of the other. The armed forces both protect the state and 
project its will. They are the tool through which the state exerts total control over 
its territory and its citizens.  
Through its state-agents, the appointed police and military forces, the state levies 
taxes on its citizens and holds the exclusive right to condemn to death anyone 
inside its territory. Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1789 that “in this world nothing can 
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be said to be certain, except death and taxes”31, both of which are allegedly 
controlled by the state. Should another actor challenge this privilege and kill a 
person, or attempt to illegally levy or evade taxes, the state can retaliate through 
its agents by holding the perpetrator legally accountable and punishing him 
through any means of its choice, including incarceration, and death. The means 
to implement the law are controlled by the state, although it is noteworthy that the 
state’s use or torture was progressively outlawed in Europe in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century32 as modern society is defined by its political civility which 
does not condone this method of punishment. Tilly explains that “a tendency to 
monopolize the means of violence makes a government’s claim to provide 
protections... more credible and more difficult to resist”33. The state’s promise to 
protect its citizens from violent crime and foreign attacks is the raison d’être of 
the state. Bobbitt suggests that in failing to uphold this mandate, the city-state 
“would have ceased to fulfil its most basic reason for being”. The modern state 
has sought this monopoly and is subsequently defined by sociologist Max Weber 
in terms of its ability to hold a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory”34 which is contingent upon its control over and the 
effectiveness of its army and police force.  
 
Soldiers make better citizens (and vice versa) 
 
In their rise to power, warlords and rulers have relied heavily on paid 
mercenaries to subdue the local population, fight off invaders, and conquer new 
lands. This paradigm shifted, however, as sovereigns recognised the fiscal 
advantages of employing citizens as soldiers. Wars had become forbiddingly 
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expensive in the early seventeenth century as gunpowder changed both the 
scale and the price of war and the state had successfully disarmed its citizens 
thus removing the immediate threat of uprisings. The “sheer cost of warfare 
overwhelmed the financial resources of all but the most commercialised states”35 
who were forced “to develop appropriate military power and shape (their) internal 
structure according to the dictates of such potentially existential competition”36. It 
was quickly established that domestic actors were cheaper than hiring 
mercenaries, especially on a massive scale, and governments began to finance 
professional armies of trained citizens who could reinforce the legitimacy of the 
state and project its will domestically and abroad.  
Citizens were not only cheaper, they also were perceived to be better 
combatants, more controllable and more trustworthy than mercenaries ‒   
although as explained in Chapters 1 and 2, discipline, training and punishment 
determine the reliability of a combatant more than alleged character differences. 
 achiavelli warned his Prince that “if anyone supports his state by the arms of 
mercenaries, he will never stand firm or sure”37 due to the unreliable and fickle 
nature of these combatants. More importantly, however, is that rulers recognised 
that they could exert better control over their citizens and their armies by 
integrating the former into the armed forces where they could be moulded and 
indoctrinated with the norms that would best safeguard the interests of the state. 
Plato explained that war “transformed the city from a political unit into a political 
body: its unity was reinforced by the participation of its citizens and made 
meaningful only through the citizen’s input”38. Both philosophers place the citizen 
firmly under the control of the state and at the centre of the state’s policies. It is 
through military service, argues  achiavelli, that the state creates a ‘public spirit’ 
among its citizens: i.e. “the recognition on the part of the citizen that his own 
selfish interests and those of the Commonwealth do, in fact, overlap sufficiently 
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to justify the restraint of the former”39. For Plato and  achiavelli, war was “a 
normative exercise because it is only through war that the citizen can become a 
good soldier, and only a soldier can be a good citizen”40 and therefore 
submissive to and controllable by the state.  
As the armed forces were embedded within society, they were increasingly 
regarded “not as a part of the royal household, but as the embodiment of the 
nation”41 and guardians of society. In return, the community is also dogmatised 
and re-“built through the inculcation of these values within the military by 
education, not institutional devices”42. The state’s preference for citizens over 
foreigners as state combatants, is inherently normative and reflects the state’s 
deliberate strategy to maintain control over her population by transforming 
citizens into soldiers in a bid to build a cheap and obedient army. On the other 
hand, however, an army of citizens increases its control over the government by 
acting as a check on the powers of the state. This also contributes to society’s 
preference for a citizen-army that reflects the values of the community and 
protects its interests. 
 
New responsibilities: from protector to provider 
 
The state was never fully insured against popular uprisings, however, even 
coming from an unarmed citizenry. In their quest to raise taxes and finance their 
armies, sovereigns have had to make a number of concessions. This “bargaining 
took many (...) acceptable forms: pleading with parliaments, buying off city 
officials with tax exceptions, confirming guild privileges in return for loans or fees, 
regularising the assessment and collection of taxes against the guarantee of their 
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more willing payment, and so on”43. The state therefore forfeited some of its 
authority and extended its duties towards its citizens in exchange for their 
cooperation in paying taxes and serving in the armed forces. On the other hand, 
the state also redistributed its responsibility of protection to its citizens who were 
expected to contribute to their safety through private initiatives such as 
neighbourhood watches, private security and gated communities.  
This process progressively led to the development of property rights and 
democratic representation that the government conceded to the main 
contributors to its coffers and, much later, to the entire male (and even later 
female) population44. By delegating some power to the citizenry, the state paved 
the way for the democratic control of the government by the population. 
Rousseau argues that democratic control is really at the heart of the social 
contract establishing the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens45. The 
state was also forced to invest in basic infrastructure such as roads and 
administrative organisations in order to collect taxes and exercise control over 
the population throughout the entire territory.  abee explains that the “‘security 
state’ (...) represents a situation where the increased penetration of the state into 
civil society provided the basis for not only more coordination of society by the 
state, but the reciprocal effect of increased rights and expectations of the citizens 
of states46”. 
Sociologist Eugen Weber further analyses this process in Peasants into 
Frenchmen, which describes the generation-long efforts that the French 
government undertook in the nineteenth century to homogenise and modernise 
the country into one ‘nation’ that it could better tax and control47. In 1840, France 
was a cluster of culturally and ethnically heterogeneous villages, where 
superstitious peasants spoke rural dialects and felt neither unity to the country 
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nor allegiance to the state. Under the Second Empire and the Third Republic, the 
government developed a nationalisation project to eliminate provincial loyalties 
and homogenise the citizens under the control of the state. This included the 
development of new means of transportation (for example through the increased 
use of the bicycle and the building of roads) which improved communication and 
tax collection between the periphery and the centre. The standardisation of 
education and the enforced use of French as the only acceptable language in all 
the schools and for all administrative processes throughout the country were 
crucial to the industrialisation and urbanisation of French society. It was through 
education that the government was able to instil a common sense of patriotism, 
and moral values among its population. Education and military service went hand 
in hand as the state gained access to all young males and found that it was in its 
best interest to provide other services: “eventually the health and education of all 
young males, which affected their military effectiveness, became governmental 
concerns”48. The difficulty of the process of turning “peasants into Frenchmen” 
can be appreciated in view of the many peasant revolts – or jacqueries as they 
are known in France – that shook the country throughout its history. The latest 
jacquerie took place in the Vendée in 1793 and to a large extent contradicted the 
popular philosophy of the levée en masse49. Bobbitt explains that the French 
Revolution transformed France from a kingly state to a state-nation. As the 
responsibilities of and expectation from the state increased, the state-nation 
became “not responsible to the nation, rather it was responsible for the nation”50.  
France’s modernisation and homogenisation program was swiftly followed as 
other “states worked to homogenise their populations and break down their 
segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal 
systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, 
transportation and communications”51. Progressively, the state took on a new 
role as the provider of public services as well as the guarantor of security. In the 
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state-nation state, “most individuals’ security is provided by the state – from 
protection from the internal and external threat of violence to the provision of 
basic needs – and is therefore contingent on political relationships”52 such as that 
between the state, its army, and its citizens.   
 
The new security environment 
 
The state has claimed a legal monopoly over the legitimate use of violence ever 
since its position was consolidated in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia53. By 
agreeing to a norm of non-intervention and recognising each other’s right to 
exclusive military authority within specific territories, the great European powers 
set a precedence that they hoped would address their main security threat, which 
they perceived as coming from other states. This state-centric world endured 
until the fall of the Iron Curtain, at which point the end of the bipolar system, 
globalisation and the rapidly changing security environment forced the state to 
adapt its military apparatus to survive in a new world of non-state threats and 
actors.  
 
Globalisation and security 
 
By the Twenty-First Century, the security environment had dramatically shifted 
from “the major threats to state security coming from international relations (i.e. 
military threats from other states) to the increasing threat from transnational 
sources of power”54. The bipolar system and its obsession with the nuclear threat 
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and mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept the focus on the state at a time 
where globalisation and interdependence were already creating new security 
threats. Although these security concerns were not ignored entirely by individual 
states or the international community, “the Cold War context affected the way 
such issues were viewed”55 and prioritised. The end of the Cold War opened up a 
space in which security could be re-evaluated in non-state-centric terms. 
Environmental degradation, the rise of ethno-political nationalism, economic 
vulnerabilities, diseases, terrorism, organised crime, and ‘rogue states’ 
highlighted the growing impotence of the state-nation as a solo actor faced with 
these multifaceted threats.  
The term globalisation refers here to the rapidly increasing interdependence of 
states and non-state actors on a global scale. This interdependence is the result 
of the invention of new technologies that have made communication and 
transportation easily and affordably accessible. This has facilitated financial 
transactions and cultural and ideological exchanges that have tied the economic 
prosperity and political survival of individual states to that of the international 
community56. The availability of new technologies has created new opportunities, 
but it has also allowed hostile non-state actors to prosper, and therefore 
expanded the scope of security threats. Hostile non-state actors are defined in 
this context as individuals or groups that are “1) willing and capable to use 
violence for pursuing their objectives; and 2) not integrated into formalised state 
institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police or Special Forces. 
They therefore 3) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regards to politics, 
military operations, resources and infrastructure”57. Unaffiliated, autonomous and 
armed, hostile non-state actors are a threat to the Weberian concept of the state 
because they undermine the state’s ability to control the level of violence insides 
                                            
55
Ibid., 53.
56
David Held, Global Transformations : Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1999).Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
57
Ulrich Schneckener Alyson Bailes, Herbert Wulf, "Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of 
Force ", ed. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2007). 
218 
 
their territory and therefore challenge the state’s claim to a monopoly over the 
use of violence.   
Terrorists, insurgents, traffickers and criminal organisations are now able to 
operate across borders using communication and military technology that were 
previously accessible only to the state and its agents. They have also gained 
unparalleled access to weapons, challenging the state’s ability to keep its 
population unarmed; Today, “civilians own approximately 650 million of the total 
875 million combined civilian, law enforcement, and military firearms in the 
world”58, but ‘only’ 1 million, less than 1%, of small arms and light weapons, are 
in the hands of insurgent groups59. Furthermore, the facility with which non-state 
actors transcend national borders has turned local security issues into global 
problems as threats are no longer isolated within the state nor limited to the 
periphery.      
States have responded to this new framework by creating an integrated network 
of organisations such as the United Nations and NATO through which they 
exercise power and tackle security problems together. Ian Clark explains that “in 
so far that this is the case, we are witnessing a diminution of the ‘go-it-alone’ 
mentality that has been the distinctive hallmark of national security in the recent 
historical epoch, and a corresponding shift towards what has been called the 
‘transnationalization of legitimate violence”60. International security cooperation 
reflects the recognition that threats are globalised and require a response that 
goes beyond the state’s individual abilities. This has contributed to establishing a 
norm by which all international actions require an official stamp of legitimacy from 
the international community of states.    
Globalisation has transformed the way that security is perceived and handled: 
“with the transnationalization of security, not only are the networks of power and 
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authority undergoing transformation, but the actual providers of security are 
potentially changing”61. Non-state transborder threats require responses that are 
not necessarily achievable through state-centric military might. States, in their 
pursuit of peace and security, have become increasingly integrated into the 
international community and have begun to look for alternative means with which 
to face the next challenge. This has led to a shift of the traditional role of the state 
to enable it to face the new security environment while maintaining power and 
control.  
 
The state as facilitator 
 
Bobbitt62 explains that the state is continuously evolving and that its future lies 
not in its former role as the provider of welfare but in a role as facilitator or 
regulator of services. The state has indeed undergone substantial transformation 
since the fall of the Iron Curtain. It no longer acts alone to provide security and 
public services but has used international institutions and private providers as 
vehicles to enact its policies. This is an inevitable result of the growing costs of 
public services and public debt and reflects the philosophy of privatisation that 
has swept across most of the developed world.  
Healthcare and education, two pillars of the nation-state, have already 
undergone privatisation in certain countries. The telecommunications and 
transportation industries, ranging from postal services to roads, railways and 
phones have also been merged into privately held companies that are arguably 
more cost-efficient, if less democratic, than the state. The profits derived from 
these services are in turn taxed by the state that maintains control over the 
licensing and profitability of companies established or operating inside the 
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country. The privatisation of public services has been controversial, with critics 
accusing the state of failing to uphold its responsibility towards its citizens as 
some services have become selectively unavailable except for those who can 
afford them.  
Security and control over the use of violence, a guarded feature of the state up to 
recently, are also being outsourced and privatised as states seek to reduce costs 
and keep up with the changing security environment. For example prisons, a 
fortress of state control over the population, are increasingly run by private 
companies that are charged with the welfare and disciplining of the state’s felons: 
In the United States, 7% of all prisons are owned and run by companies, as are 
9% of prisons in the UK, and 18% of prisons in Australia63. Israel’s Supreme 
Court, however, ruled that privately held prisons were unconstitutional as the 
state is considered to be the only entity with the right to exert force and 
incarcerate its citizens and residents64.  
Bobbitt argues that the role of the state has shifted from “nation state to market 
state”. The nation state, as described above as the ‘provider’, offered “free public 
mass education, universal suffrage, and social redistributive taxation” but above 
all it “sought its legitimacy in the betterment of the welfare of its people”65. The 
market state, he conceptualises, “promises instead to maximize the opportunity 
of the people and thus tends to privatize many state activities and to make voting 
and representative government less influential and more responsive to the 
market”66. The state is “no more than a minimal provider or redistributor”67 in the 
international marketplace. Bobbitt argues that, by adapting its function and 
responsibilities and featuring its role as a facilitator promising to maximise the 
total wealth of the society, the market state ensures its own survival as the 
primary actor in international relations. Stephen Krasner and Anna Leander 
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further this argument by explaining that the state never actually held a monopoly 
over the use of force, and that it is not legitimised by its control over the armed 
forces but by its proven ability to provide security and social benefits to its 
citizens, either directly or by delegating these tasks with the objective of 
optimising economic opportunities.  
In view of the rapid demilitarisation of Western societies since the end of the Cold 
War, the role of the state is being transformed: conscript armies and civic duty 
are replaced by smaller and more professional armies of volunteers. Elke 
Krahmann explains that the “non-existential nature of most contemporary threats 
decreases citizens’ willingness to accept large military budgets and to contribute 
personally to national defence”68.  artin Shaw calls this the ‘post-military’ 
societies69, in which the mutual contract between the state and the individual is 
broken: as citizens no longer desire nor have any obligations towards the state, 
neither does the state need to act as the sole provider of security and can 
instead base its legitimacy on its role as a facilitator of security and economic 
progress.  
 
Changing norms on combatants 
 
The shifting role of the state has also affected the armed forces. ‘Post-modern’ 
militaries, facing neither existential threats nor the risk of invasion, have 
undergone major organisational changes and experienced a loosening of ties 
with the nation-state70.  oskos claims that the “sense of identity with and loyalty 
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to the nation-state is “decomposed” in Postmodern society”, paving the way for 
non-nationals to find a place in the national armed forces71. 
Although the state has claimed a preference for its own citizens to serve in the 
armed forces, the public apathy and even hostility towards civic duty that has 
prevailed in ‘post-military’ societies have compelled many Western governments 
to change recruitment laws in order to staff their armies. These laws have been 
enacted by the state, and despite drawing in foreigners and foreign private 
companies into the defence system of the state, have been largely unopposed by 
the country’s citizens who, ultimately, do not want to volunteer for military 
service. Indeed, as was explored in Chapter 3, the ““postmodern motivation” 
characterizes soldiers who enter the military more for the desire to have a 
meaningful personal experience than out of either national patriotism or an 
occupational incentive”72. Consequently, armies are increasingly staffed with 
foreign nationals, reminiscing of a time when the state did not fully control its 
population through enforced military service. Hedley Bull refers to this trend as 
‘neo-medievalism’73. 
In the United Kingdom, “recruitment shortfalls (have) resulted in the removal of 
the restriction requiring citizens on Commonwealth nations to have lived in the 
United Kingdom for at least five year before applying to join the British Army”74. 
Between 1998 and 2008, the number of soldiers from the Commonwealth 
enlisting under the Union Jack leapt from 200 to 6,600. Currently, official figures 
include 2,000 Fijians, 975 Jamaicans, 720 South Africans, and 1,000 
Zimbabweans and Ghanaians among the other 58 nationalities represented in 
the British Army75. The recruitment gap therefore is being met by Commonwealth 
soldiers, with one in five soldiers expected to be non-British by 2020. This has 
raised some concern among the armed forces and the population who object to 
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this ‘invasion’ of foreigners, lured by the promise of British nationality and public 
service. Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the army, proposed that foreign soldiers 
“be capped at 10 percent of the total strength to protect the ‘Britishness’ of the 
army”76. The  inistry of  efence, however, recalled Britain’s “long and 
successful tradition of employing and integrating overseas personnel” to justify 
the continued use of this practice to the population. The British armed forces, 
therefore, not unlike the French army, is being increasingly hybridised by the 
integration of foreigners into the defence system of the country. Ironically, the 
British Army is also cutting down its numbers drastically in its program to reform 
the armed forces, increasing its future dependence on military and security 
contractors77. 
The United States has experienced a similar situation with the narrowing of its 
recruitment base and its military reforms. Author Darren Moore calls the 
separation between civilians and their army ‘the Great  ivorce’78. The 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars forced President Bush to change recruitment and 
incentive policies by offering all non-citizens on duty eligibility for immediate US 
citizenship in order to encourage more people to enlist in the US Army. In 2003, 
approximately 3% or 37,000 active-duty soldiers were non-US citizens, with an 
additional 13,000 foreign reservists. The Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant 
James Helmly defends this policy by claiming that “we must consider the point at 
which we confuse ‘volunteer to become an American soldier’ with ‘mercenary’”79. 
Although Lieutenant Helmly sees a significant difference between the two, by 
offering citizenship as a currency for enlisting in the army, however, the United 
States is effectively ‘buying’ its volunteers. These men are motivated to fight, not 
out of patriotism, but for the promise of a new life with relative economic and 
political security. Nonetheless, soldiers, whether foreign or domestic, as long as 
they are integrated into the armed forces, are under the authority of the military 
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legal system and are consequently accountable to and controllable by the state. 
This legal and political accountability marks a significant distinction between the 
two categories of soldiers and mercenaries and makes one legitimate in the eyes 
of the population while the second remains in the shadows of the law. 
Another characteristic of post-modern societies is the increased dependence of 
the military on the private sector, highlighting a new permeability between civilian 
and military structures80. Chapter 5 described the war in Iraq as a platform for 
unprecedented initiatives in outsourcing and privatising military services to 
domestic and foreign private military and security companies. The United States 
has invested over $75 billion in private military support according to the 
Congressional Budget Office81. By comparison, the UK MOD spent 
approximately half of its £34 billion defence budget on purchases and services 
from the private sector in 200682. The state’s success at changing its military 
composition unopposed by the public suggests that norms regarding the nature 
of the combatant are set by and entrusted to the state. Although the word 
‘mercenary’ remains controversial, foreigners and private contractors have 
nonetheless become more or less forcefully and successfully integrated into the 
defence structures of the nation-state (France) and the market-state (the United 
States). 
 
Authority and control 
 
This suggests a historical change in norms regarding the concept of the state: it 
no longer holds a monopoly of violence but “a monopoly of security”83. The state 
maintains its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens by enabling security to reach 
the population through mediums of both the public and private sectors. The post-
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modern or market state provides “insurance against contingency”84 and remains 
ultimately, but not directly, responsible for the security of its territory and its 
citizens. The state retains the exclusive monopoly to delegate functions to other 
actors but may also penalise these agents if they challenge their instructions or 
fail to fulfil their mandate.  
In Politics as a Vocation, Weber explained that “the right to use physical force is 
ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state 
permits it”85. By this token, the state remains the “ultimate arbiter of the legitimate 
uses of force”86 even when it assigns security and defence functions to private 
and foreign actors. Thomson and Leander stress that it is important to distinguish 
between control and authority as the state may outsource its security without 
losing control over the use of violence inside its territory87. This was illustrated in 
Chapter 4 where it was shown that President dos Santos’ authority in Angola and 
control over the exercise of violence were not weakened by his contract with a 
foreign private military company. This, however, is also a function of the nature of 
the state which is profoundly different in developing countries. 
Bobbitt suggests three side-effects of the market state that reflect this change in 
norms and expectations vis-à-vis the state: first, the market state “will require 
more centralized authority for government, but all governments will be weaker”88 
from outsourcing and privatising their responsibilities. This leads to a devolution 
or complete loss of authority as institutions and private actors take on these 
duties. Second, although “there will be more public participation in government, it 
will count for less, and thus the role of the citizen qua citizen will greatly diminish 
and the role of the citizen as spectator will increase”89. Finally, the welfare state 
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will be reduced while “infrastructure, security, epidemiological surveillance and 
environmental protection (...) will be promoted by the State as never before”90. 
Increased surveillance and security is necessary, as the state’s commitment to 
its citizens and relationship with violence is one of comparative value according 
to Douglass North. The state defines itself in terms of a superior ability to exert 
violence within its territory, not in terms of a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force or as a direct provider of security: “the state is an organisation with a 
comparative advantage in violence on a territory whose boundaries are 
determined by its power to raise taxes”91. Whereas the state may privatise or 
outsource security, it must maintain the ability to reverse its policies by exercising 
more power than any agent, private or public that operates within the boundaries 
of the state, and bringing these agents to heal whenever necessary. Indeed, 
nearly every country in the world invests in its own military force and defence 
system, even while it promotes outsourcing as a strategic solution to security 
problems and foreign policy ambitions. Mercenaries and private military 
companies, however, have shown at times an incredible disregard for national 
and international laws, and yet have remained beyond the legal arm or political 
will of hiring states. The lack of accountability of these actors, therefore, suggests 
a weakness in the state’s authority or in its desire to control the actions of its 
hired agents.  
 
Accountability 
 
Accountability is a fundamental characteristic of the state on two levels: 1) It 
defines the state’s ability to exert control over its agents and therefore 
establishes it as a legitimate sovereign actor, and 2) it upholds the social contract 
between the state and its population. The ability or lack thereof, to hold non-state 
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actors accountable, is the key problematique that determines the social norm 
regarding the state’s official use of foreigners, mercenaries and private military 
and security companies. Mercenaries are considered to be dangerous because 
they do not represent the values of the community for which they are fighting, 
they are unrestrained in their actions, and they are untrustworthy. Despite 
international, domestic and corporate efforts to legislate, limit and punish the use 
of mercenaries and contractors, these non-state actors have continued to 
operate in a largely unrestricted and unaccountable environment therefore 
challenging the authority and political will of the state and undermining the 
democratic institutions of the nation. 
 
International laws 
 
Mercenaries are considered to be illegal combatants according to the norms of 
international law that were drafted by the community of states. As was explained 
in the Introduction, the laws of war outlined in the 1949 Geneva Convention and 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I and II, preclude mercenaries from being 
considered legal combatants. This removes them from the legal protections that 
are enjoyed by soldiers and civilian combatants during a conflict; In particular the 
right to being treated as a prisoner of war, as outlined in the Geneva III which 
entitles the prisoner to medical care, humane treatment, and protects him from 
torture and murder at the hands of his captors92. Conversely, since mercenaries 
do not fall under the prescribed laws of war, neither are they bound by accepted 
norms of behaviours that limit the actions of legal combatants.  
The 1972 (adopted in 1977) Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for 
the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa clearly describes mercenaries as a threat 
to “the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the harmonious 
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development of  ember States of the OAU”. The OAU Convention commits its 
Member States to taking legislative measures to fight the recruitment, training, 
equipping, financing and use of mercenaries within their territories in accordance 
with Article 3 (f) and to enforce these laws with “severe penalties for offences” in 
Article 4.  
In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International 
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 
which further advanced the campaign against mercenarism. The U.N. 
Convention includes all instances of recruitment, use, financing and training of 
mercenaries as offences, and signatory states engage to cooperate in the 
prevention of these crimes and punish offenders by “appropriate penalties” as 
described in Articles 5 and 6. Furthermore, signatories are expected to share any 
information on mercenaries with other affected parties (Article 7) and to abide by 
mutual judicial assistance when applicable (Article 13). The 1989 Convention is 
signed by 17 states but needs 22 signatures in order to become a law. 
Significantly, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom are not party to 
this Convention, and Angola has signed but not ratified the Treaty93.  
Despite the afore-mentioned conventions and other resolutions passed by the 
General Assembly, “there is no total ban on the use of mercenaries under 
international customary law”94. Efforts to curtail the activities of mercenaries have 
been largely ineffective in international law and each of these Conventions 
suffers from a lack of enforcement provisions. Furthermore, there are “no 
international instruments in existence which could regulate corporations (or 
mercenaries) on the international stage (and) there are no courts competent to 
adjudicate on corporations (and P Cs) in the international context”95. Without 
enforcement, legal conventions act only as political statements reflecting general 
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norms. Finally, signatory states have been reluctant to enact domestic legislation 
to enforce these conventions, and some have even transgressed the treaties 
altogether, as exemplified by Angola’s contracting with the P C Executive 
Outcomes in 1993. Overall, it appears that there is a “lack of political will to 
achieve a global regulatory regime”96 to deal with the perceived problem of 
mercenarism. 
 
Domestic laws 
 
Whereas international law has failed to hold mercenaries accountable, domestic 
legislation has been selectively pro-active at regulating the activities of non-state 
actors. Some states have outright outlawed the recruitment and use of 
mercenaries within their territorial jurisdiction: in Australia, “the recruitment of 
mercenaries and the Fighting of Australians in non-governmental forces abroad 
is an offense”;  enmark has prohibited “the recruitment for foreign forces and the 
participation of  anish citizens in foreign armed groups”; Italy and Russia have 
forbidden “mercenary activities and the recruitment, training, financing and use of 
mercenaries”97.  
Although France has not signed the 1989 Convention, since 2003, it has 
criminalised mercenary activities which are punishable according to its Penal 
Code by a fine of up to 75,000 Euros and potential imprisonment (L436-1 to 5). 
The law specifically applies to mercenary activities that threaten the territorial 
integrity of another country, and does not prevent French citizens from 
volunteering in foreign forces. The United Kingdom, with the Foreign Enlistment 
Act of 1870, has made it unlawful for British citizens to join the armed forces of 
any nation at war with Britain or its allies. Like France however, Britain does not 
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outlaw the recruitment or use of foreigners in the armed forces; Both the French 
Foreign Legion and the Gurkha regiments are exempt from the 1949 
Convention’s definition of mercenaries by virtue of their formal integration into the 
national armed forces and accountability to the state. Although a Green Paper 
suggesting options for regulating the private military industry was published in 
2002, no action was ever pursued, and the 1870 Act remains the only legislation 
covering mercenary activities in the UK – although “there have been no 
successful prosecutions under this act”98. 
South Africa is often acclaimed as the forerunner of legislation that regulates 
mercenary activities. The post-Apartheid government sought to control the 
“embarrassing” availability of mercenaries who were being recruited in South 
Africa and participating in violent conflicts worldwide. South Africa enacted the 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) Act in 1998 which “precludes 
any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or 
internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national 
legislation”. The legislation therefore established a licence-based regulatory 
scheme that entrusted the National Conventional Arms Control Committee 
(NCACC) with authorising specific contracts on the provision of security services 
abroad99. Notably, on 24 October 1997, the South African PMC Executive 
Outcomes was awarded a “government-issued licence to continue with its 
work”100.  In 2007, in the wake of the failed 2004 mercenary coup in Equatorial 
Guinea involving a majority of South Africans, a second bill on the Prohibition of 
Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed 
Conflict was signed by President Thabo Mbeki. To this day, the bill has not been 
enforced and “South Africa continues to be a major source of contractors to 
conflict ridden countries in Africa and the  iddle East”101. Mark Thatcher and the 
mercenaries arrested in Zimbabwe and repatriated to South Africa were the first 
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men to be prosecuted under South Africa’s mercenary laws. According to 
mercenary pilot Niel Steyl, if not for their plea bargain, the government would 
have been incapable of successfully prosecuting these men due to loopholes in 
the legislation and a lack of evidence102. Despite its best intentions, the FMA and 
the latest mercenary bill “remain toothless” threats103. 
The regulation of mercenaries and private military and security companies in the 
United States falls under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that 
came into force in 1998. ITAR establishes a licensing system which is overseen 
by the State  epartment’s Office of  efense Trade Controls. One of the principle 
criticisms directed against ITAR is that, under the licensing regime, “Congress 
does not need to be informed of a contract in advance of the issuance of a 
related license unless the contract is valued as $50 million”104, which does not 
happen very often because most contracts are valued less or can be split into 
partial subcontracts. This stipulation consequently circumvents parliamentary 
oversight. Nonetheless, the US model of regulation arguably offers “some control 
of PMCs that are operating in weak states unable to exercise any effective 
control” by “setting (minimum) standards for P Cs using the US as their home 
base” through the licensing conditions required in the U.S.. Legislation in the 
United States, however, falls short of holding companies or mercenaries 
accountable for offences committed abroad. U.S. criminal law is not enforceable 
outside of the territory, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice only applies to 
military personnel. Furthermore, the 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
“extends the realm of the Code to civilians contracted by the Pentagon, but does 
not cover transgressions committed by civilian contractors working for other 
government agencies or for foreign clients”105. Currently, not a single employee 
or private military and security company has been found culpable of a crime, 
despite the many incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan, as explained in Chapter 5. 
                                            
102
 Interview with Niel Steyl 
103
Slamdien, "South Africa: Nation's Mercenary Legislation Remains Toothless." 
104
Sheehy, Maogoto, and Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation, 130.  
105
J ger and Kümmel, Private Military and Security Companies : Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, 
146. 
232 
 
The global nature of PMCs makes them difficult to regulate, monitor and 
prosecute in the first place. National legislation is limited to territorial jurisdiction, 
and there are no mechanisms in place to exercise oversight on the behaviour of 
the P Cs abroad. Even “if a state has the legal means for extraterritorial 
enforcement of PSMCs and their personnel, the company concerned still can 
avoid prosecution by relocating to another country”106. Overall, national 
legislation over the use and recruitment of mercenaries and PMCs has so far 
been ineffective and half-hearted. This suggests that governments are not 
seriously concerned about the threat of mercenaries, or that they want to keep 
open the option of using these non-state resources themselves. 
 
Corporate regulation 
 
Where domestic legislation has failed, private military and security companies 
have argued that they are naturally regulated by market forces107 and in addition, 
they abide by a system of self-regulation. Furthermore, as corporations, PMSCs 
are also regulated by the contract laws and corporate laws of the country in 
which they are established. Regardless of these self-justifying allegations, 
however the activities of mercenaries and military and security corporations are 
only loosely regulated, and they are rarely, if ever, held accountable for offences 
that they may have committed while carrying out a contract.  
Tim Spicer, the CEO of Sandline and Aegis, claims that private military providers 
are regulated by the free market and open competition: “we do not run a 
mercenary outfit. We provide regulated, professional military assistance to 
established governments”108. Assuming that PMSCs are operating in a free 
market and competing with other companies, their reputation is a fundamental 
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selling tool and therefore an incentive for these companies to abide by rules of 
conduct and show professionalism, reliability and integrity. Concern for their 
reputation ensures that companies will hold their employees to high standards in 
order to avoid public scandals and negative publicity. Isenberg argues that 
mercenary groups “fear publicity that would result if a mercenary subsidiary 
carried out a massacre or other egregious human rights abuse. Thus, a 
corporate association might well be a restraining influence in regard to the 
battlefield conduct of such groups”109. Executive Outcome’s emphasis on good 
civil-military relations stems from the knowledge that “the fastest thing that would 
get us out of business is human-rights violations110”. A P C’s has to be able to 
wrap up its mission in order to be able to accept other contracts and show a track 
record of successful and efficient performance. This also supports their profit-
maximising objectives and contradicts allegations that PMCs have an incentive to 
prolong their contracts by encouraging instability in their theatre of operation. 
PMCs that encourage a situation of conflict risk losing both their reputation and 
their future contracts.  
Despite allegations that the free market regulates the private security industry, 
Chapter 5 shows that the system of contracting, at least in the United States and 
likely elsewhere, has been found to be uncompetitive, with major contracts 
allocated to companies in a no-bid process111. Governments are not following the 
rules of the free market and rewarding contracts to companies who offer the best 
services in terms of quality and price. To the contrary, personal relationships and 
connections repeatedly determine the allotment of security contracts. As a result: 
“the most successful contractors are not necessarily those doing the best work, 
but those who have mastered the special skill of selling to Uncle Tom”112. 
Recognising this opportunity, “the top 20 service contractors have spent nearly 
$300 million since 2000 on lobbying and have donated $23 million to political 
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campaigns”113. Singer explains that privatisation is only successful if “a contract 
is competed for on the open market, if the winning firm can specialize on the job 
and build in redundancies, if the client is able to provide oversight and 
management to guard its own interests, and if the contactor is properly motivated 
by the fear of being fired. Forget these simple rules, as the U.S. government 
often does, and the result is not the best of privatization but the worst of 
monopolization”114. 
In the absence of regulations and to advance their credibility, private military and 
security companies have adopted self-regulatory codes of conduct under the 
political umbrella of ISOA – the International Stability Operations Association 
(formerly IPOA). Members of what is ostensibly a trade association agree to 
abide by the IPOA Code of Conduct. Although this Code “encourages” all 
signatories to abide by international humanitarian law, human rights law and 
other rules of engagement and international treaty, this suggestion is part of the 
preamble and is therefore non-binding. Members pledge to operate with 
“integrity, honesty and fairness” in so far that this is “possible and subject to 
contractual and legal limitations” (Article 2). Furthermore, the Code “is not 
enforceable in any meaningful way”115. Benedict Sheehy and Jackson Maogoto 
highlight that “there is no complaint mechanism in the Code, which decreases the 
likelihood that any breach of the Code will be reported. There is also no mention 
of a compliance office or a regular audit process”116. Companies who breach this 
Code face no sanctions other than, possibly, being dismissed from the 
association. 
Nonetheless, most states have a legislative framework to control the actions of 
private corporations: entities within the territorial jurisdiction of a nation are bound 
by contract law and corporate law, including provisions for registering a 
company, internal governance, and accountability. Corporations are legal entities 
                                            
113
Ibid., 20. 
114
Peter W. Singer, "Outsourcing War," New York Times, March 2005 2005. 
115
Sheehy, Maogoto, and Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation, 115. 
116
Ibid., 115. 
235 
 
that have privileges and liabilities that are distinct from their members. Corporate 
law is concerned with the regulation of the internal structure of the corporation, 
and limits the rights, duties and liabilities of the individuals associated with the 
corporation: directors for instance, “are protected from the consequences of their 
actions done on behalf of their principles”117. The logic behind this law is to 
encourage a certain amount of risk-taking within the company which would 
enable it to maximise profit. Likewise, shareholders are generally exempt from 
“liability for the actions or obligations of the corporation and decisions taken in 
the process of pursuing profit”118.  irectors and shareholders are “mere agents of 
the corporation and so take no personal liability for the actions executed on 
behalf of the corporate principals”119. 
Directors, shareholders and corporations are as a result shielded from criminal 
prosecution and there is currently no legal regime to consistently hold non-state 
actors and their affiliations and employees accountable for their actions. Public 
outrage is perhaps the only instance where private military and security 
companies have been challenged, put under criminal investigation or lost a 
contract, as evidenced in Iraq after the Abu Ghraib scandals and the allegations 
of negligent and even criminal behaviour from individual contractors. In most 
cases, however, “despite ongoing litigation and investigations, P Cs involved in 
such scandals are routinely awarded new contracts even while the processes are 
in course”120. 
 
Democratic control 
 
One of the foremost problems regarding the use of mercenaries and private 
military companies is that it has undermined democratic institutions in hiring 
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states by bypassing the influence of the military. The armed forces have not only 
been a tool for the state but also an element of democratic control limiting the 
powers of the government. Samuel Finer121 claims that the military sees itself as 
the servant of the state, rather than of the government in power, and Samuel 
Huntington perceives the armed forces as responsible for the state122. Because 
the armed forces are traditionally made up of citizens, the army is imbued with 
the values of the citizenry who are in turn empowered by being represented 
inside the military institution. Civil-military integration has “ensured civilian control 
over the armed forces, and contributed to public knowledge about security and 
defence policies”123.  
 ichelle Small argues that in Africa, the “privatisation (of security and military 
functions) dramatically reduces the citizenry’s ability to influence governments’ 
policy, diminishing popular sovereignty and inviting the public to wonder whether 
decisions to militarily intervene are influenced by PMFs who supply the weaponry 
and services”124. The same is applicable in other sovereign states. As was 
previously discussed, the privatisation of force has occurred without 
parliamentary oversight and governmental accountability. Krahmann explains 
that the outsourcing of military functions has had a “negative impact on public 
information and parliamentary control over defence spending and the use of 
armed force in deployed missions”125. Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that the 
privatisation of military services has expanded the government’s autonomy with 
regard to their foreign policy and the selected use of force, as in the cases of 
Angola and the U.S. government in Iraq. PMCs have acted as a force multiplier, 
but have also given the government an opportunity to act independently of public 
opinion and without regards for public support. Of course, this may be to the 
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advantage of a government who wishes to carry out an unpopular or 
unsupported policy domestically or externally. 
Furthermore,  avid Greenwood argues that “corporations, being on the private 
side, are protected from the checks and balances of government, including 
transparency, accountability, and political input126. Corporations are not burdened 
by political responsibility nor do they owe allegiance to the population. The 
freedom of private military and security companies to operate without legislative 
or legal oversight removes them from “the public domain of accountability, 
legitimacy and control”127. These non-state actors may act independently, carry 
out a government contract blindly and unquestioningly, and can count on the 
legal vacuum to escape from being held accountability for their actions. Because 
P Cs have the ability to “inflict violence on a scale that would otherwise be 
restricted to more accountable and transparent government”128, they undermine 
the democratic control of the armed forces and of the government, weakening 
the social contract between the military, the government and the population.  
 
Conclusion: control, accountability and the hybridisation of the armed 
forces 
 
Norms are changing: the rise of contractors and mercenaries is eroding the 
state’s control over its population and over the combat operations of its agents. 
The impact of these non-state actors varies according to the state that employs 
them and to the conflict in which they are involved. Overall however, the lack of 
accountability that these men enjoy has affected the state’s credibility in the eyes 
of its citizens and of its armed forces.  
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International and domestic laws fail to hold private contractors, military 
corporations and mercenaries accountable for their actions on the ground. The 
state’s control over its territory is challenged by the presence of non-state actors 
who are beyond the legal control of the state. The legal vacuum surrounding non-
state actors is arguably a deliberate strategy that the state employs in order to 
expand its military reach beyond the wishes of its population. The lack of public 
reaction however, despite the scandals created by African mercenaries, the 
Foreign Legion in Algeria, and contractors in Iraq, shows that the populace 
remains largely unaffected by the choice of combatant – as long as they are free 
to ignore their own civic duty to the state and to each other. Ultimately, the 
population does not care about the norm on combatants, giving the state the 
possibility of setting and changing the standard. 
Nonetheless, the hybridisation of the armed forces has affected the national 
armies of the states in question. The military has been a symbol of nationhood 
and state control for the past two hundred years. The integration of foreigners, 
although they remain under the juridical system of the armed forces, challenges 
the national identity and emotional symbolism of the army as a representative of 
the people. The lack of accountability of these non-state actors and the frequent 
differential in pay also serve to demoralise the state’s soldiers, discourage 
enlistment and subsequently weakens the army. This in turn undermines the 
military institution as an effective check on the powers and behaviour of the 
government.  
The use of private contractors, military corporations and mercenaries to serve the 
government’s ambitions may appear to give the state powers and capabilities in 
excess of their material endowment. The caveat, however, lies in the potential 
loss of control that the state may experience. Without a strong and loyal army to 
implement the will of the state and punish criminals and perpetrators of 
illegitimate violence, the state is a mere puppet in the hands of corporations who 
remain unaccountable and beyond state control.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The resurgence of private non-state actors on the modern battlefield has 
rekindled the academic and political debate on the risks and opportunities that 
these combatants can offer to the hiring agents. This thesis has engaged with the 
problematique of integrating private and foreign combatants into the national 
armed forces. France, Angola and the United States, among others, have each 
experimented with the hybridisation of the armed forces with varying degrees of 
success. Without repeating the conclusions that were brought forth in the 
previous chapters, this final section will highlight some general remarks that 
deserve consideration as part of the wider debate on the privatisation and 
hybridisation of national security. 
 
Military values 
 
The national armed forces are an integral part of the nation state: They protect 
the integrity of the territory from domestic and foreign threats; they defend the 
authority of the state, and they promote the security of the citizens. The army has 
traditionally been the instrument through which sovereigns have built up their 
power and controlled their population. It has also been the safeguard of 
democratic institutions and a check on the ambitions of the government. The 
national army is a vital institution that has traditionally enjoyed preferential 
treatment both in terms of its budget allocation and through its glorification within 
the state. Soldiers have subsequently developed a strong sense of their standing 
within society, and have nurtured military traditions that embody the nation’s 
shared values but also reflect their own uniqueness and importance to the state. 
Chapter 3 illustrated the difficulties integrating foreign troops into the armed 
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forces due to differences in identity, roles, and particularly a perceived lack of 
loyalty and patriotism on behalf of ‘mercenaries’ or foreign soldiers. 
The army’s identity, influence and role within the state vary along with the culture, 
history and traditions of their countries. Consequently the exposure to and 
integration of foreign and private combatants with the national armed forces have 
affected armies in different ways. Chapter 4, for example, revealed that the 
privatisation of the military sector can be a successful foreign policy tool for weak 
states that lack democratic legitimacy and an effective military arm. In Angola 
and in Sierra Leone, where the armed forces were in dire need of training, 
equipment and discipline, Executive Outcomes arguably played a decisive role in 
the resolution of the civil wars. On the other hand, states that have a strong civil 
society and a relatively powerful army can be more susceptible to the hiring of a 
foreign company that has the potential of sidelining the national army. This was 
demonstrated in Papua New Guinea in 1997, when the National Defence Forces 
successfully staged a military coup against the Prime Minister after he had 
signed a US$36 million security contract with the British PSC Sandline. The 
potential effectiveness of hiring a private military company, therefore, cannot be 
assessed without taking into consideration the strength of the army’s institutional 
identity. 
PMCs and mercenaries appeal to states because they are a short-term, 
monetarily advantageous force-multiplier that has the potential of increasing the 
military power of a relatively weaker state against its enemies. The impact that 
these foreigners have on the military institution, however, is not negligible: 
contractors bypass the ranking and compensation system of the armed forces, 
fall outside the command and control of the military hierarchy, and are 
unaccountable for their actions. These non-state agents are in direct competition 
with the armed forces, monetarily and politically. The privatisation of security may 
also encourage governments to neglect their own military institutions in favour of 
private corporations that can allegedly do the same thing at a lower price. The 
integration of foreign non-state combatants into a state’s military policy inevitably 
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weakens the influence and the social and ideological cohesion of the national 
army. This was demonstrated in Chapter 5, which highlighted the tensions that 
characterise relations between U.S. soldiers and private contractors in Iraq. 
The privatisation and hybridisation of the armed forces is a potentially dangerous 
experiment that runs the risk of devaluing the military’s standing in society. It 
demoralises the armed forces and erodes its unique responsibility for and 
commitment to the security of the state. The national army is to a large extent a 
symbol of sovereignty, democracy and citizenship. By integrating non-state 
actors into the security apparatus of the state, one must wonder how this will 
affect the military institution and the society that it represents and claims to 
defend. 
 
Si vis pacem, para bellum1  
 
History has shown that conflict is intrinsic to mankind. Philip Bobbitt explains that 
“war is not a pathology that, with proper hygiene and treatment, can be wholly 
prevented. War is a natural condition of the State, which was organized in order 
to be an effective instrument of violence on behalf of society. Wars are like 
deaths, which, while they can be postponed, will come when they will come and 
cannot be finally avoided”2. Sixty seven years without a major war in the Western 
world have changed attitudes towards security. Despite Twenty-First Century 
threats ranging from terrorism to environmental meltdown, there is no longer a 
perceived immediate existential threat to Western civilisations. This new security 
environment has forced a re-evaluation of risk from both the state and its 
citizens, leading to the re-organisation of the armed forces with military security 
being selectively delegated to non-state actors.  
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The recent shift away from conventional warfare has decreased the immediate 
need for large standing armies and encouraged a change in defence mechanism 
from conscript to professional armies. Recent fiscal difficulties have also forced 
many Western states to downsize their defence budgets and review their military 
objectives. Salaries and pensions have been cut, reflecting a change of attitude 
towards the men and women who fight for their country. Indeed, Western 
societies have recently witnessed a demotion of military values, as fewer citizens 
are willing to sacrifice their comforts for the security of their state. Contemporary 
attitudes towards risk, sacrifice and responsibility are inevitably weakening the 
nation’s commitment and capability to provide for its own security. Consequently 
privatisation has emerged as an attractive option, allowing states to cut their 
military expenses without compromising the political will of their governments.  
Most states have favoured private military companies of Western origin. These 
are perceived to be more trustworthy and culturally compatible with the military 
and political objectives of their employer. With fewer citizens in the West exposed 
to military training, however, third-country nationals are already making-up more 
than half of all contractor personnel in Iraq3. As the West moves away from 
conscription, former soldiers from Colombia, Pakistan, China and India, among 
others, will increasingly make up the bulk of contractors hired by Western 
companies and governments. These mercenaries have a very different military 
tradition from the armed forces of the Europe and the United States, and their 
integration in or cooperation with the national armies may prove to be particularly 
difficult (as was demonstrated in Chapter 3).  
An over-reliance on private military companies has not only weakened the 
effectiveness of the armed forces, it can equally jeopardise the stability and 
security of the state: States that outsource their security needs to private military 
and security companies also risk exposing themselves to the organisational 
errors and limitations of private corporations. This was aptly illustrated with the 
run-up to the 2012 Olympic Games as G4S, the company entrusted with the 
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security of the Olympic venues, failed to deliver the necessary personnel to fulfil 
their contract, prompting the British Army to “come to the rescue” with a 
peacetime deployment of over 18,000 soldiers4. Although the British Army was 
able to expertly handle the situation, this example is one of many that show the 
continued necessity for a state-controlled army of citizen-soldiers in the long 
term. 
There are no guarantees that the future will be peaceful, and all indications 
suggest otherwise. The erosion of civic-militarism and the demilitarisation of 
societies betray a naive and short-term vision of humanity. Although it may not 
be fiscally realistic to prepare for war in the early Twenty-First Century, the extent 
to which postmodern societies are becoming dependent on private companies 
presents a security threat that needs to be addressed before it is too late. 
 
Violence and control 
 
Finally, the military use of non-state actors has challenged the legal control of the 
state and endangered the norms that limit the exercise of violence in warfare. 
The modern state has defined itself in terms of its ability to control the levels of 
violence within its territory. This has been contingent on the obedience of its 
soldiers who are held accountable for their actions. Chapter 6 revealed that 
mercenaries and PMCs are accountable to no-one. While the lawlessness of 
mercenaries has been an opportunity for states to decline responsibility and give 
a free reign to its unofficial representatives, the lack of legal control over private 
corporations and their employees effectively undermines the legitimacy of the 
hiring state. Governments can no longer claim power on the basis of their ability 
to control the level of violence within their jurisdiction when they fail to hold their 
own agents accountable.  
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Furthermore, the absence of punitive measures for crimes committed by 
mercenaries encourages unlimited violence on the part of these actors. By failing 
to control the activities of their employees, the state is effectively sanctioning 
their crimes. This is particularly worrisome as it threatens to tear apart the 
international legal apparatus that limits the violence committed by military actors 
and protects the dignity of the victims of war. This can also increase the level of 
violence committed by all actors involved in the conflict, a horrifying perspective 
for anyone involved in humanitarian activities. 
Mercenaries are an intriguing political tool, but they threaten to overhaul the 
entire military and social apparatus of the modern state in unexpected and 
potentially lethal ways. 
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